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Introduction
Masooda Bano and Keiko Sakurai

Claims abound of Saudi oil money fuelling Salafi Islam across cultural and geographical terrains as far removed as the remote village hamlets of the Swat valley
in Pakistan and sprawling megacities such as Jakarta.1 Assumptions that the
Iranian state is fighting proxy wars with Sunni Arab states in foreign lands similarly tend to be promoted to the status of fact.2 In fact, however, there are few
empirically grounded studies that explore how those with hegemonic aspirations
embed their ideologies in locales to which that thought and its accompanying
practices are very foreign. Questions about how ideas are transported from an
assumed core to societies viewed to be on the periphery, and how these ideas are
embedded, if at all, within the complex socio-economic and political milieus
of their new host societies, are more often answered through the creation of
hypothetical scenarios than by marshalling scholarly evidence. We still lack
academically sound responses to certain critical questions, such as: what enables
a particular brand of Islam to gain centrality among competing positions?; to
what extent do national governments play an active part in promoting a global
Islamic discourse?; and in what ways do the Islamic discourses that acquire
global attention challenge local beliefs and practices? This volume is designed
to address this gap. It represents a rare attempt to map the complex processes
of engagement between an assumed core and the peripheries. The volume illustrates how this engagement at times dramatically transforms the host societies,
while in other cases the absorption of new ideas remains partial – the success
of foreign ideas in transforming local contexts remaining contingent on their
suitability for the socio-economic and political realities of their host societies.
In order to unravel the complex processes that underpin the global transmission of Islamic discourses, this volume focuses on the working of the three
—1—
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most influential international centres of Islamic learning in contemporary times:
al-Azhar University in Egypt; the Islamic University of Medina (IUM) in Saudi
Arabia; and al-Mustafa International University in Iran. These three universities, located in the politically influential countries in the Middle East and Gulf
region, attract students from across the globe. Their graduates carry the ideas
acquired during their education back to their home communities, and some also
bring with them a reformatory zeal. These Islamic universities are the modern
form of Islamic seminaries, which train ʿulama of various ranks, including mujtahid, scholars entitled to issue legal opinions on matters not explicitly addressed
in the Qurʾan.3 The significance of these universities is in their hybrid nature;
they produce ʿulama through their curriculum, as inherited from the seminary
tradition, while claiming a “modern” space by adapting the formal structures of
the Western university. To some this model of mixing features of traditional
and modern education systems might have much in common with Fethullah
Gülen’s effort to globalise an Islamically conscious modern schooling system
in Turkey; however, the Gülen schools fall into a different category, since they
offer pre-tertiary education and do not aim to produce ʿulama. This volume
argues that we should recognise the distinct potential of these universities in
globalising specific Islamic discourses for the precise reason that these institutions are state supported, and thus that studying them enables us to examine the
complex interplay between states’ desires to exercise global legitimacy and the
emergence of global Islamic discourses.4
Al-Medina and al-Mustafa have, in particular, come to act as the central
locations for the promotion of Wahhabi-infused Salafism and Iranian-styled
Shiʿism, respectively: the former particularly associated with encroachment on
alternative religious spaces and erosion of the localised Islam of Sufi veneration
and folk religion; the latter associated with transmitting a particularly Iranian
brand of Shiʿism, which leads to a close overlap of religious and political authority in the spirit of Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of vilāyat-i faqı̄h (guardianship
of the jurist).5 It might at first appear puzzling to situate al-Azhar alongside
two universities that are associated with two globally dominant, but exclusionary, Islamic worldviews, given its much more complex history and rejection of
taqlı̄d (lit. to follow, to imitate; strict adherence to a specific Islamic school of
thought). However, its ability to command an international presence as the
“moderate voice of Islam”, whereby sound understanding of Islamic principles is
matched with a willingness to adapt texts to changing times,6 makes it an illuminating case for comparative analysis. These three universities are unique in the
sense that they all have direct or indirect links with their governments and their
student base comes from across the globe. These characteristics distinguish them
from another global centre of Islamic learning, namely, Dar ul-Ulum Deoband
in India. The Deobandi madrasa network runs completely independently of the
—2—
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government, and its following though large is primarily concentrated within the
South Asian Muslim communities.7 By looking at the workings of these three
global centres of Islamic learning, and tracing the activities of their graduates
and their influence on their home communities, this volume seeks to develop a
more nuanced understanding than is available in the literature on globalisation
of Islamic discourses, on how ideas are transmitted from one locale to another,
and how the ultimate outcomes of this process are rarely fully under the control
of one single actor or state.
Three reasons make this comparative undertaking a particularly useful lens
through which to study the working of global and local linkages in the transmission of global Islamic discourses. First, before setting out to study the processes
that help a given discourse acquire global standing, it is important to establish
that the selected discourse does indeed deserve that label. These three universities easily meet this prerequisite. The influence of these three universities in
shaping Islamic discourse and practice in contemporary Muslim societies is
visible across North Africa, the Middle East and Asia, and in diaspora communities in North America and Europe. It is reflected in the diversity of their
international student populations, with all three universities attracting students
from across the globe. As analysed in the chapters presented in Part One, the
senior leadership within all three universities is very conscious of their influence
in shaping the Islamic discourse for Muslims around the globe, and takes it to
be their religious obligation to provide global leadership due to their recognised
status as a prominent seat of Islamic learning.
Secondly, a comparative analysis of these three universities presents a rare
opportunity to compare the global working of the three dominant strands of
contemporary Islam that rival each other for supremacy in the international
political and religious arena: Wahhabi-styled Salafism, Iranian-inspired Shiʿism
and the voice of “moderate” Islam. Academic scholarship on global Islamic networks, as well as Western policy discourse, remains centred on understanding
the ways in which these three major strands of Islam shape Muslim societies
and how they determine their relationships with the West. What is meant by
these terms is contested, however, given that any scholarly attempt to define
such labels as “liberal”, “moderate” or “orthodox” Islam remains open to critique
depending on what is viewed to be the most important criterion in defining
such terms. As a general norm, Salafism has come to be associated with the
puritanical and rigid interpretation of Islamic texts often associated with Saudistyled Wahhabism. However, as we see repeatedly in this volume, the term
“Salafism” becomes complicated in the Egyptian context,8 where modernists
such as Muhammad ʿAbduh (1849–1935) and his student Rashid Rida (1865–
1935), who were in fact arguing for very modernist interpretations of the Islamic
texts, also defined themselves as Salafis, and are indeed referred to as such by
—3—
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many scholars. They rejected taqlı̄d, or blind following of the four schools of law
(madhāhib, sing. madhhab), and argued for direct and constant engagement with
the Qurʾan and hadith in order to interpret them directly,9 as do the Salafis in
Saudi Arabia. However, in practice their Salafism has had very different theological and societal implications to those of Wahhabi Salafism, where the latter
also argues for going back to the original sources, but instead of reinterpreting
those texts in the light of modern needs seeks doctrinal purification often resulting in the total rejection of Western influence. Thus, the papers looking at
al-Azhar and al-Medina both refer to the influence of these universities in terms
of spreading Salafi ideology, but these are two very different conceptions of
Salafism.10 Although the common denominator is the willingness of both groups
to go back to the original texts, they take very different approaches on how to
engage with those texts.
Defining “moderate” Islam is an equally challenging task given the variations
within the organisations that claim a modernist outlook. But, as in the case of
the term “Salafism”, certain features have come to be recognised as important
in defining moderate Islam. The two most popular criteria used here are a
willingness to adopt more context-bound, as opposed to literal, interpretations
of the text, and to allow for a pluralistic outlook in terms of following several
madhāhib rather than taqlı̄d of one school. Defining the Iranian brand of Shiʿi
Islam is similarly complex, but its underlying feature is its close association with
Khomeini’s political doctrine of vilāyat-i faqı̄h, which leads to a much closer
merger of religious and political authority than was associated with the Najafi
seminaries that traditionally led the Shiʿi Islamic discourse.
The cases selected for this volume present these three distinct conceptions of
Islam. Thus, al-Medina has been selected because it is today recognised as representing the popular conception of Salafism, which is seen as being conservative
and associated with Saudi Islam; few ordinary Muslims, and not just in the West,
are aware of the modernist style Salafism of ʿAbduh. Al-Azhar is today viewed
globally as a leading example of moderate Islam due to its emphasis on teaching
of all four Sunni madhāhib and its willingness to support both the Egyptian and
Western states in their decisions to adapt Islamic injunctions to suit the changes
induced by modern lifestyles. Al-Mustafa is the obvious case for studying the
workings of Iranian Shiʿism, since it is the primary institution in Iran providing
religious education to international students. Thus, in this volume, the selection
of the three cases is based on their ability to present the three dominant strands
of Islam today, as defined in the popular discourse. Individual chapters do, however, show quite clearly that many of these terms are complex, and that they can
be applied to opposing organisations. The reason for starting from these broader
categories, however, is that they do help to capture the dominant positions
within Islam, even though there are variations within each position.
—4—
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Given that these three conceptions of Islam can lead to quite varying outcomes for the shaping of Muslim societies and their relationships with modernity
and Western societies, much of the global policy discourse is aimed at curtailing
the influence of Saudi-style Salafism and the Iranian brand of Shiʿism, and
instead galvanising support for the spread of a more tolerant Islam.11 Looking
at these three major centres of Islamic learning – where each is clearly aligned
with one of the three influential Islamic discourses in the international arena
– thus presents a unique opportunity to study the micro-level working of discourses that have acquired global hegemony and the factors that contribute to
their rise. Such a comparative approach also affords an opportunity to inquire
whether the underlying mechanisms of engagement between the core and the
assumed peripheries are the same across the three influential discourses, or
whether the nature of the discourse (taqlı̄d versus a pluralist outlook) itself ends
up impacting the nature of the engagements between the two sides – taqlı̄d
arguably demanding a one-way transmission of ideas if the purpose is to promote
adherence to specific ideals.
Notwithstanding the growing scholarly debate on the fracturing of Islamic
authority due to the rise of alternative platforms, the power of those who control the teaching of Islamic texts remains paramount with regard to shaping
global Islamic discourse. There is indeed a mushrooming of online imams, and
some have come to command a reasonable level of authority among ordinary
Muslims; but more often than not, in order to gain that attention, they still need
a stamp of higher approval, in the form of a degree certificate from one of the
orthodox centres of learning. This continued importance of the knowledge of
the written texts in staking a claim to religious authority makes these universities, with their focus on the teaching of Islamic texts, central to the training of
serious Islamic scholars who will continue to speak on behalf of Islam in coming
decades.12 Thus, while multiple platforms can be used to promote certain religious ideas globally, centres of Islamic learning that train the ʿulama or scholars
in their ability to interpret the text remain central to advancing any globalising
Islamic mission.13 Looking at the universities that have emerged due to the
direct or indirect support of the theocratic state14 – especially al-Medina and
al-Mustafa – thus enables us to decipher how certain institutions can cultivate
allegiance to very narrow interpretations of the Islamic texts while discrediting
other equally influential sources. The case of al-Azhar, on the other hand, helps
to elaborate how the same texts can be used to promote a pluralistic outlook
where critical engagement with multiple sources is prioritised over the taqlı̄d of
a particular madhhab.
By looking at the working of these three global centres of Islamic learning,
and tracing the activities and influence of their graduates on their home communities, this volume thus argues for a nuanced understanding of how ideas are
—5—
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transmitted from one locale to another, and how the process of transmission
results in making adjustments to those very ideas in the process of winning
followers. By showing that the hegemonic discourses have to be flexible in
engaging with counter-discourses if they are to win a following beyond their
original set of adherents, the volume counters simplistic assumptions about
the mechanisms that shape the global transmission of ideas and also checks
the exaggerated claims sometimes made about the power of theocratic states.
What becomes very clear in the volume is that while the Saudi or Iranian states
might invest heavily in the promotion of their religious ideology, the extent to
which they succeed in this mission is contingent on a number of factors at the
receiving end, most importantly the local political context, historical patterns
of religious affiliation, and the existing cultural and aesthetic sensibilities of the
recipient community. When studying the processes of the global transmission
of ideas, it is thus not only important to map the “attempts at influence”, but
equally important to examine the “adaptations for influence”. As we will see
throughout this volume, this adaptation is essential both to winning students
over to a particular ideology, and equally important for preparing the students
to meet the counter-arguments of other madhāhib or sects. The chapters in this
volume show that in the cases of al-Medina, al-Mustafa and al-Azhar, there is
always a dialectical engagement between those who want to influence and those
being influenced, with both sides having an impact on the other.
More importantly, the volume also illustrates that there is a natural limit
to which religious adherence can be cultivated by design – despite concerted
efforts, not all students enrolled in the three universities absorb the ideas and
attitudes associated with these institutions. Rather, many students use their
education at these universities to advance material rather than religious interests. What becomes clear is that the appeal of the extreme puritanical practices
associated with Saudi-styled Salafism or Iranian Shiʿism can never totally crowd
out the appeal of alternative or more pluralistic platforms, as many individuals
are inherently more inclined towards one approach over the other. Despite all
efforts at expanding its following, Saudi-styled Salafism cannot totally eradicate
the appeal of the more moderate voices of Islam as represented by al-Azhar,
just as the Iranian brand of Shiʿi Islam cannot eliminate the influence of the
seminaries in Najaf, which to date have had limited enthusiasm for Khomeini’s
conception of vilāyat-i faqı̄h. Thus, one of the important correctives offered
by the volume is to put the concerns about the hegemonic tendencies of any
discourse, religious or secular, in perspective – and to note that while financial
commitments do indeed help to cultivate religious allegiance, the ultimate
appeal of a religious worldview is shaped equally by the inherent appeal of the
ideals associated with it and its relevance to the historical practices, as well as
the everyday realities of the believers, and their individual dispositions.
—6—
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The volume maps out the details of how the centres of learning act as the
basis for three critical interactions that eventually shape these apparently
hegemonic global Islamic discourses: (1) between the teachers and the students
at the university; (2) between the state and the management of the university;
and (3) between the students and their communities on their return home.
The chapters in this volume show that students gain appreciation for an idea
if the teacher is able to convince them, and the teacher in turn will be more
effective in spreading an idea if he is himself convinced of it. A state wanting to
promote a specific agenda thus has either to appoint the teachers and select the
students using very narrow parameters to assess their prior affinity to the given
religious outlook, or show sufficient flexibility such that the teachers as well as
the students can gradually develop ownership of those ideals. To illustrate these
complex dynamics, the volume presents eight chapters organised in three parts.
The chapters in Part One highlight the strategies adopted by the three universities to advance their influence. It takes the reader inside these universities
and provides an account of their evolution, the extent of recognition of their
authority globally, their teaching methodologies, and, most importantly, the
nature of their association with the state. Part Two presents three original
case studies illustrating how ideas flow from these global centres of learning to
communities across the globe via their graduating students. Most importantly,
the section illustrates how the relevance of these ideas to local political developments and traditional practices has direct bearing on how extensively these
ideas reshape the local context. Part Three then spells out more vividly how
the spread of the ideals within the home communities depends not just on the
effectiveness or zeal of the messenger, but even more importantly on the specific
characteristics of the community, such as the relationship between the state and
religion, the nature of existing religious elites, and contemporaneous political
developments. The importance of context is addressed in all the chapters, however it is in Part Three that the most explicit evidence is presented. The analysis
presented in this section of the overwhelming influence of al-Azhar in Malaysia
and Indonesia during the twentieth century illustrates how a complex set of
factors have to come together to enable the large-scale diffusion of foreign ideals
in a new context. It is therefore understandable why in most cases the diffusion
remains limited to isolated pockets.

International Islamic Universities within the
Structure of Islamic Authority
The scholarship on Muslim societies has long acknowledged the societal importance of the orthodox centres of Islamic authority, namely, the mosque and
the madrasa, since the ʿulama within them define what it means to be a good
—7—
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Muslim. While in theory Islam has no clergy, those who are able to interpret
Islamic texts come to command great influence in shaping Muslim societies.
Much of this religious authority was traditionally transferred through an informal system of knowledge accreditation in form of an ijāza (a traditional method
of authorisation for a student to start independent teaching) rather than the
issuance of formal degree certificates. The colonial encounter led to the emergence of the first major fracturing of the traditional structures of authority,
whereby graduates from Western-style universities started to speak on behalf of
Islam, thereby establishing significant followings.15 The changed profile of those
exercising Islamic authority had major implications for the socio-political processes within these societies: the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaʿat-i-Islami, the
two most influential political reform movements in the Middle East and South
Asia, respectively, were established by such Islamic modernists.16
What is less studied in terms of the changing structures of Islamic authority,
however, is the shift towards the establishment of international Islamic universities as an alternative to mosque- and madrasa-based centres of learning. While
al-Medina was established as a state-sponsored university from the beginning,
al-Mustafa gradually emerged as a university, albeit a private one. Officially,
al-Mustafa is a private university drawing its budget mainly from the profits of
the factories it owns, as well as from investments, religious endowments and
government funding. However, as Chapter 2 illustrates, the post-revolutionary
Iranian state has played an active role in the gradual emergence of al-Mustafa
as the leading platform for the global dissemination of Iranian-style Shiʿism.
Al-Azhar, whose origin goes all the way back to 970 and was historically more
independent, similarly underwent a major administrative transformation when
it was nationalised in 1961 by the Nasser regime. This conscious preference
by these modern states to invest in Islamic universities, whether by bringing
them under state control or indirectly supporting them, partly reflects their
aspiration to modernise the traditional Islamic education system. Rather than
drawing on the informal personalised method of teaching,17 where the scholars
normally studied a major book at a pace that was tailored to the capabilities of
the individual student, the shift towards the establishment of universities led to
the introduction of a standardised system of education, whereby a standard syllabus, a pre-planned and standardised examination process, and state-accredited
degree certificates replaced the personalised teaching model, informal assessment methods and issuance of an ijāza that marked the madrasa system.
The move towards supporting universities, however, has equally been shaped
by the states’ desire to have greater control over the teaching of Islamic texts. The
most explicit difference between these universities and the traditional structures
of Islamic authority revolves around the nature of the relationship they have
with the state, as compared with the madrasa system. The latter experienced a
—8—
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much higher level of autonomy than is available to a modern university because
of the greater degree of financial autonomy it enjoyed. Historically, the Muslim
empires patronised madrasas in order to gain religious legitimacy, which also
remains the primary motive for the modern states to engage with the international Islamic universities. However, state patronage for the bigger madrasas or
mosques normally took the form of waqf endowments, which provided an independent income to the ʿulama even in cases where the state might also have
provided for the salaries of teachers. This gave the ʿulama within the madrasas
a certain degree of autonomy from the state – this, for instance, was the case for
al-Azhar, which until nationalisation was supported through waqf income. The
nationalisation of al-Azhar resulted in the confiscation of its waqf properties,
making the ʿulama directly dependent on salaries from the state. This greatly
curtailed their authority. Similarly, a number of changes in the post-revolution
Iranian context decreased the ability of independent marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d (see Chapter
2) to collect khums (religious tax), making most leading seminaries in Qom
highly dependent on the state to provide stipends to instructors and students.
Al-Medina university, on the other hand, was founded with a university charter
whereby the scholars appointed to university positions directly draw government salaries and thus are bound by the university regulations. These universities are thus part of the modern educational network, which is much more
tightly regulated by the state in terms of what is taught, and also how it is taught
and examined, than the prestigious centres of Islamic learning historically were.
What is interesting to note, however, is that being influenced by a theocratic
as opposed to a non-theocratic state does have different implications for the
level of religious independence that these international Islamic universities
can exercise. As we see in Chapter 3, the nature and extent of manipulation
by a non-theocratic state is different to that by a theocratic state, because the
latter comes to realise that it is important to allow the religious institution
some autonomy if it is to retain the public legitimacy needed to be useful for
the state. The Mubarak regime in Egypt thus realised early on that al-Azhar’s
religious endorsement would be effective for gaining popular legitimacy only if
al-Azhar continued to command popular respect as an independent mediator on
Islamic matters: the Egyptian state has thus tolerated the existence of dissenting
ʿulama18 within al-Azhar to counter the damage caused to al-Azhar’s reputation
when the Shaykh al-Azhar has been obliged to issue controversial fatwas in support of the state. The religious state, on the other hand, has a different basis of
engagement with places of religious education. A theocratic state is less dependent on institutions such as Islamic universities to gain legitimacy for its actions;
rather, it needs them to propagate its specific religious worldview. In this case, it
is the state’s religious legitimacy that is extended to the universities rather than
the other way around. Thus, in the case of al-Azhar, the state used the Islamic
—9—
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status of the university to seek popular legitimacy for its actions, while in the
case of the other two universities the states had clear religious identities which
the universities were courted to advance.
These international Islamic universities thus represent a very complex case of
religious authority. In order to advance their worldview globally they must have
some following and legitimacy in the eyes of Muslims, yet their heavy reliance
on the state instead of independent sources of survival makes them suspect in
the eyes of more critical followers, who start to see these universities as an extension of the state apparatus. Unpacking the complex processes that help these
universities to balance the complex demands of retaining legitimacy in the eyes
of their followers while also meeting the needs of the states that support them
is thus at the heart of the analytical puzzle addressed in this volume. In order to
resolve this puzzle, it is useful to begin by asking what makes certain places and
institutions acquire the status of the core, and what shapes the interaction of
this core with the alleged peripheries?

Becoming the “Core”
Looking at the three universities it is clear that whether they were deliberately
established by the state, indirectly supported or gradually taken over, the idea of
these universities being core centres of Islamic learning is central to their capacity to advance a certain viewpoint at the global level. What, however, defines
this core? The chapters in this volume show that while the three universities
might have made conscious efforts to exert their identity as the core locations
for the exercise of Islamic authority, there has also been a corresponding willingness on the part of the so-called peripheries, lands geographically at a distance
from these central locations, to recognise the superior status of the core. As
Chapter 7 illustrates in detail, going to the Middle East to pursue higher learning has historically been important in the view of Muslim scholars located in
other lands. There is a recognition that because of their sacred location or otherwise geographical importance, a certain location comes to have a confluence of
scholarship that leads to establishing its right to speak on behalf of Islam. Thus,
the modern Egyptian, Iranian and Saudi states have made conscious efforts to
exert their influence globally, and the locations they are using to exercise this
authority have a pre-modern legacy or global following.
Not surprisingly, hosting the sacred spaces is one of the key credentials for
acquiring the status of the core. In the view of many Muslims, by virtue of being
the guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, the Saudi state has a natural right to guide Muslims across the world. The sites themselves, however,
are not the only claim to authority; rather, the formation of authority is more
complex. These sacred sites traditionally attracted scholars from all corners of
— 10 —
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the Muslim world. Eventually, the confluence of a large number of prominent
scholars at a sacred site leads to the emergence of that location as a core centre
for Islamic learning. Often this confluence is directly linked to the existence of
a sacred site, but in other cases it is also simply a result of geographical location.
This was the case for Cairo, which, due to its central location within the Muslim
lands during the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, became host to many prominent scholars on their way to Mecca for the holy pilgrimage, or a place of refuge
for reputed Muslim scholars escaping persecution in lands where Muslim power
was on the decline. These natural credentials of certain geographical locations
thus lend them a level of legitimacy that attracts state attention. Provision of
state resources does in fact help to increase the outreach of these places that
come to acquire the status of the core, but, as indicated above, this association
with the state also poses serious questions with regard to their authority by those
who believe that religious authority should stay independent of state authority.
These complex dynamics shaping the relationship of these universities with
their multiple constituencies, including the state and their students, form the
focus of analysis in Part One of this volume. The chapters in this part take the
reader inside the three universities and provide an account of their evolution,
their global standing, their conception of their role in shaping global Islamic
discourses, and, most importantly, their relationship with the state. Chapter 1
presents a thoughtful analysis of how the IUM was from its very inception meant
to function as a Saudi-state-backed Salafi missionary project with global reach.
Eighty-five per cent of the places among its entirely male student body were
reserved for non-Saudis, and within decades the university had disbursed tens
of thousands of scholarships to applicants from all over the world under a generous funding programme covering everything from transport, to tuition, living
expenses and the cost of books. The goal was for students to return to their home
countries or to travel on elsewhere after graduation for duʿa, or as missionaries, to
promote spiritual commitment and “correct” religious knowledge and practice.
As the university president and future Grand Mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz wrote
in a prospectus published in 1971, emphasising the sacred geography of Medina
and suggesting a parallel between this Saudi-backed project and the Prophet’s
own mission, the university was to operate as “a source of modern Islamic propagation from the source of the first Islamic propagation”. In addition to the
diverse student body, for much of the early period of its existence a majority of
the university’s faculty also came from beyond the kingdom – particularly from
Egypt, but also from locations as distant as Morocco and Pakistan. The chapter
sketches key aspects of the IUM’s genesis and evolution over the course of half
a century. Unpacking this history serves to underscore the extent to which the
university and its morally conservative missionary project, far from reflecting a
timeless “Wahhabi” anachronism isolated from the sweep of twentieth-century
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history, were in fact deeply involved in far-reaching contemporary dynamics of
religious revival and reform, globalisation and geopolitical rivalry.
Chapter 2 presents an insight into the rise of al-Mustafa International
University, including its two preceding institutions and its globalisation
agenda. Tracing the evolution of the university, it shows how the emergence
of al-Mustafa was a result of the rivalry among the marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d, the highest-ranking Shiʿi authorities, in post-revolutionary Iran. It also elaborates the
attributes and strategies of al-Mustafa that helped this institution to establish
itself as the key international platform for Shiʿi scholarship and to differentiate
itself from its Shiʿi rivals in Najaf and their Sunni counterparts. This university is a product of the complex internal political battles within Iran as well as
the state’s global agenda known as “the export of revolution”, whose mission
is to propagate the Iranian version of Shiʿism which places special value on
Khomeini’s concept of vilāyat-i faqı̄h. Owing to the direct patronage of the
current supreme leader, this university has been able to update its curriculum
and education system to meet the expectations of foreign students, including
females. However, this very attempt to adjust the curriculum to the level of the
majority of the foreign students discourages them from studying up to the level
of mujtahid, which perpetuates Iranians’ monopoly on the position of mujtahids and leaves non-Iranians as their followers (muqallid) in the Shiʿi religious
hierarchy. The uniqueness of al-Mustafa is its strategies to reach out to youth
in other countries through its numerous overseas branches, aiming to counter
the spread of anti-Shiʿi “Wahhabism” and ensuring its uncontested dominance
over its rivals, especially the seminaries in Najaf. Although the “Iranised” and
“politicised” form of teaching remains controversial among Shiʿa outside Iran,
the al-Mustafa graduates are maximising the functional as well as symbolic benefits of their degrees and adapting the knowledge obtained in al-Mustafa to meet
the needs of their local communities.
Chapter 3 shows how al-Azhar, established by the Shiʿi Fatimid empire in
970, was eventually to become one of the most respected centres for Sunni
Islamic learning around the globe. Today, more than 30,000 foreign students
are enrolled in the Islamic Studies and other related faculties of al-Azhar at any
given time. The chapter shows how the emphasis on a “middle way”, as reflected
in al-Azhar’s emphasis on teaching all four Sunni madhāhib, has been central
to the rise of al-Azhar as a global centre of learning. The chapter notes that a
number of factors led to the rise of the university to this prominent leadership
position within Sunni Islam, including its location in Cairo, the exodus of
scholars from places such as Andalusia due to political instability and their settlement in Cairo, the university’s ability to harbour multiple discourses, and the
controversial state-led reforms enacted since the 1960s. The chapter analyses
the challenges al-Azhar has faced in retaining legitimacy in the eyes of believers
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at home and abroad since Nasser’s decision to nationalise it, and what has enabled it to survive these challenges. The chapter further shows how, post-Arab
Spring, al-Azhar acquired a new zeal to play a prominent role as the moderate
voice of Islam both within Egypt as well as globally. It shows how these ambitions are bound to be checked by the return of political authority to the hands
of the military – a move which ironically had the active support of the Shaykh
al-Azhar.

Cultivating the Local: Agency of the Students
As in the case of the universities, we see that the dual process involving strategies of influence and adaptation for influence is equally applicable to the graduates of these universities when they return to their home communities. At least
some of the graduating students do indeed absorb the ideas they are exposed to
during their time at university. However, the spread of these ideas within local
communities is heavily dependent on their skills and ability to adapt the ideas
to the local context. Part Two looks at these issues and presents three original
case studies illustrating how ideas flow out from these three global platforms to
communities across the globe via their graduates. Most importantly, the section illustrates how the relevance of these ideas to the local context, political
developments and traditional practices has direct bearing on their success in
changing the local context.
Chapter 4 profiles a network of prominent preachers, the “Ahlussunnah”
(People of the tradition of the Prophet) of contemporary Kano, northern Nigeria.
Of these preachers, roughly half are graduates of the IUM. By looking at leading
figures within the network, the chapter shows how exposure to new thinkers and
texts at the university, as well as physical distance from the bitter struggles in
northern Nigeria, launched a process of reflection that culminated in the Medina
graduates’ decision to break with the anti-Sufi movement Izala (Jamaʿat Izalat
al Bidʿa wa Iqamat al Sunnah; The Society for the Removal of Heresy and the
Instatement of the Prophetic Model), to which they had been affiliated before
leaving for Medina. Izala, the students felt, had become too rigid in its approach
and was excluding non-members. Upon their return, the graduates established
themselves as independent, though still anti-Sufi, preachers. Study in Medina,
the chapter argues, increased these preachers’ intellectual self-confidence and
led them to seek models of leadership based more on individual reputation than
on the backing of hierarchical organisations. Next, the chapter examines how,
in their preaching at home, the Medina graduates relate events in Nigeria to
struggles in Muslim communities at other times and in other places. The chapter
argues that study in Medina helped to shape the doctrinal positions, intellectual
interests and rhetorical strategies of these preachers, and notes that lasting ties
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to Saudi Arabia provided them with material support. However, the chapter
concludes that the popularity of these preachers among different sections of
Kano society, especially youth, is owed largely to their mastery of new media,
particularly recorded sermons, and their ability to present sectarian identities
and allegiances in ways that address local quotidian concerns. These preachers,
finally, were drawn deeply into local electoral politics and into struggles with the
Sufi brotherhoods and traditional Muslim authorities of Kano, and thus local
issues loomed large in spreading the Ahlussunnah network.
Chapter 5 explains how returnees from al-Mustafa International University,
including those from the International Centre for Islamic Studies, its preceding
institution, have played a significant role in the development of the Shiʿi community in Sunni-dominated Indonesia. Pursuing Islamic education at Qom is a
post-1979 phenomenon made popular by al-Habsyi, an Indonesian scholar of
Arab descent, who gained the trust of religious leaders in the Islamic Republic
of Iran. To date, there are more than 200 Qom alumni in Indonesia. Following
a detailed account of the educational background of Indonesian students who
went to Qom, the chapter illustrates the activities of the graduates in their home
towns, such as their creation of the Association of al-Mustafa International
University Alumni, missionary activities through various Shiʿi institutions, and
educational activities in religious schools, including the Islamic College Jakarta,
a branch of the university. Emphasising the contribution of Qom alumni in
making the Shiʿa a dominant force in Indonesian Islamic movements, the chapter also sheds light on the commitment of Qom alumni to connect Indonesian
Shiʿi to the world’s centre of Shiʿi orthodoxy in Iran, and on the competition
and conflict that arose within the Shiʿi community in Indonesia as a result of
their endeavours.
Taking a historical approach, Chapter 6 discusses the impact of al-Azhar
University on the Moroccan nationalist movement and specifically its independence leader Allal al-Fasi, whose ten-year exile in Egypt exposed him to the ideas
of Muhammad ʿAbduh and influenced the ideological position of the Moroccan
independence party, Istiqlal. The chapter emphasises the impact that ʿAbduh’s
ideas had on the educational policies of the independence party and their continued importance in Moroccan educational politics throughout the twentieth
century. Graduates of the university in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, including Abdullah ibn Idris al-Sanusi and Abu Shuʿayb al-Dukkali,
brought ideas of Islamic modernism back to Morocco. These ideas were shared
with Moroccan religious students through lectures at the Qarawiyyin University
in Fez and flourished into a movement for religious reform. The emphasis shifted
from religious to political reform after the Berber Dahir crisis of 1930, which
provided Berbers with different courts from those for Arabs. An outcry among
the community of religious scholars over the weakening of Islamic law and the
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attempt to divide the Muslim umma led to demonstrations across the Arab
world. Al-Azhar University again became a centre for Moroccan dissidents and
exiles to meet and find support as they protested this decree. After returning to
Morocco, al-Fasi led the country as prime minister and ʿAbduh’s ideas formed
the basis of his party’s educational platform. Those ideas continue to have significant influence on Moroccan educational politics of the twenty-first century.
The chapter thus traces the relationship between Islamic modernism and the
Moroccan nationalist movement, highlighting the role of al-Azhar as the institutional link between these two groups. It concludes by discussing the continuing legacy of the relationship between Islamic modernism and the Moroccan
nationalists in terms of educational policy in twentieth-century Morocco.

Transforming the Local: The Significance of the Context
While the above chapters help to illustrate the multiple ways through which
students carry the influence of these universities back to their home communities and the challenges they face, the chapters in Part Three illustrate how in
a few cases the transformation of the local context in response to the foreign
ideas can be quite extensive, as has been the case with the Azharisation of Islam
in Malaysia and Indonesia. The chapters show how such widespread influence
occurs only when, by a rare coincidence, the independent consensus of the
religious scholars in that community converges with the strategic interests of
the state, forging a wide-ranging support base for the adoption of that external
ideology.
Chapter 7 draws on rich historical evidence to demonstrate how exposure to
al-Azhar, starting in the early twentieth century, led over time to the complete
transformation of the methodology adopted by independent ʿulama and state
religious platforms to issue fatwas in Southeast Asia. It examines the mainstreaming of Salafi methodology – inspired by the work of Muhammad ʿAbduh
– in place of the taqlı̄d of the traditional Shafiʿi School in Southeast Asia for
the issuing of fatwas. Until the middle of the twentieth century, a majority of
influential ʿulama in Southeast Asia studied in Mecca and were followers of the
Shafiʿi School. From the end of the nineteenth century, a number of factors,
including the establishment of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led to a shift to
al-Azhar as opposed to Mecca being the base for Southeast Asian Muslim scholars. By comparing Southeast Asia fatwas of the early twentieth century against
those issued in the 1970s, the chapter shows how the transition from Mecca to
Cairo – and especially towards al-Azhar – led to the mainstreaming of Salafi
methodology.
Chapter 8 discusses the relationship between al-Azhar and the government policy of ʿulama training in Malaysia. The chapter traces how, during
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the twentieth century, a number of factors led to al-Azhar becoming one of
the most popular choices for Malaysian students wanting to major in Islamic
Studies. The chapter shows that, initially, ʿulama adopted al-Azhar’s reformed
curriculum by choice, as the mixed curriculum introduced by al-Azhar, starting
with Muhammad ʿAbduh’s modernisation project, helped the religious schools
in Malaysia to compete with the state-run modern schools. However, with time,
to demonstrate its commitment to Islam, the Malaysian state also started to
invest in al-Azhar education. Under a series of policies intended to emphasise
Islam, religious education and religious administration expanded rapidly, thus
providing increased job opportunities for al-Azhar graduates. In the 1990s, the
state religious governments began to directly import al-Azhar’s curriculum and
examination system, and the federal government introduced a secondary school
Islamic education certification system that is accepted by al-Azhar. The Islamic
education system in Malaysia today is thus heavily inspired by al-Azhar. This
standardisation of the Islamic curriculum has in turn helped to legitimise government control over ʿulama training. In the name of following the al-Azhar
system, the religious schools were modernised and transformed, thus becoming
a part of the national education system. Thus, a host of local social and political
dynamics, and not any proactive globalising agenda of the Egyptian state, has
led to the wide-reaching absorption of Azhari Islam in the Malaysian context.
Despite the breakdown of authority and the rise of individual imams in this
age of online fatwas, it is very clear that these centres of authority will remain
important. The reason for this is that the concentration of scholars in these
institutions gives them a mark of authority and quality. Under the conditions
of modernity, with competing time pressures on the daily lives of believers, the
search costs for a valid interpretation of the Islamic texts are best minimised
by looking for quick markers of quality and identity. Thus, the online imams
that become popular often need to get these markers of identity first, and these
centres will always control those markers. Thus, in all likelihood these centres
will indeed become more rather than less important with time. However, as the
volume shows, it is also important to be clear about the limits to which these
centres can promote their agendas and inculcate a global following through
finance alone. Winning committed converts is a much more complex process than is often acknowledged in the literature on the globalising mission of
certain Islamic discourses.
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Part One
Making of the Global:
Inside the Three Universities

Chapter 1

The Islamic University of Medina since 1961:
The Politics of Religious Mission and the
Making of a Modern Salafi Pedagogy1
Mike Farquhar

Since its founding in 1961 as a project backed by the Saudi state, the Islamic
University of Medina (IUM) has offered fully funded, residential religious training to mostly non-Saudi male students in order that they might then return to
their countries of origin or travel on elsewhere as missionaries. Their task has
been to preach to non-Muslims, but also (and especially) to preach to Muslim
communities around the world that are seen as having strayed from the true
creed. For many decades after it was established, a large proportion of the IUM’s
staff also hailed from outside Saudi Arabia, including from the wider Middle
East and beyond. The IUM thus represents one key node in a lattice of global
connections and processes that have intertwined with efforts by Saudi political
and religious actors to extend their influence far beyond the kingdom’s borders. Yet despite its importance as a centre of migration and as a hub of global
Salafi proselytising, the IUM has to date been almost entirely neglected in the
literature on modern Islamic education.
Given the dearth of research on the history of this influential university, the
first part of this chapter aims to sketch key aspects of the IUM’s genesis and
evolution over half a century, and maps this institutional history onto developments in the realms of national, regional and global politics over the same
period. Through an overview of such basic issues as staffing, student recruitment and budgets, I seek to show how the IUM and its missionary project were
imbricated in far-reaching dynamics of religious revival and reform, political
economy, domestic manoeuvring and geopolitical rivalry.
The remainder of the chapter shifts away from this macro-level concern with
overarching institutional frameworks to offer a more microscopic analysis of
some aspects of teaching. Against a common tendency to view Wahhabism as
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a hermetically sealed and rigid tradition, I argue that the pedagogy that came
together at this university was in fact partly shaped by a dynamic of unequal
reciprocity between the Wahhabi institution, on the one hand, and the staff and
students from all over the world, on the other. This was a process of give and
take which saw staff and students influencing the university at the same time as
they were influenced by it.2
I seek to show how this dynamic related to a politics of religious mission – a
set of struggles for dominance between an array of actors within this sphere of
cultural production and pious practice. I argue that the processes of unequal
reciprocity that played out between the university and its non-Saudi staff and
students were bound up with power relations in two ways. First, they were
unequal insofar as they occurred within the context of institutional and social
relations that placed foreign staff and students in a subordinate position relative
to the Wahhabi establishment and the Saudi state. Secondly, these processes
of reciprocity themselves had a role to play in forging power relations insofar as
they were part and parcel of the construction of the IUM’s missionary enterprise
as a hegemonic project. I suggest that the IUM’s capacity to undergo transformations in this way, whilst maintaining core elements of its Wahhabi identity,
created the space for efforts to develop a kind of moral and intellectual leadership capable of articulating with the dispositions and ambitions of a wide array
of actors, thereby securing their consent for – and channelling their energies
into – its missionary project.

Institutional History: A Brief Overview
In accounting for the establishment of the IUM in 1961, commentators have
noted that this new missionary university, with a majority of student places earmarked for non-Saudis, stood to serve an important foreign policy purpose for
the Saudi regime.3 Insofar as it would promote conservative religious thinking
amongst Muslim communities abroad, it could arguably help to ameliorate a
threatening regional environment in which Nasserist and other brands of radical
republicanism were gaining ground. It has also been noted that the Wahhabi
establishment was at that time calling for the founding of an Islamic higher education institution partly as compensation for the establishment of the University
of Riyadh in 1957, which was to be geared towards instruction in non-religious
subjects. From this latter perspective, the founding of the IUM can be seen in
the context of efforts by the monarchical regime to negotiate patronage relations
with clerical elites who were prepared to support its quest for domestic political
legitimacy partly in return for status and resources. The university was further tied
up with the Saudi royals’ quest for legitimacy insofar as it served to embody dynastic and national narratives of royal beneficence and reformist religious mission.
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At the time of the IUM’s establishment, Saudi Arabia was headed by King
Saʿud. However, Faisal, who would step in after Saʿud was deposed in 1964, had
been engaged in a power struggle with his brother since 1958, and had wielded
extensive powers as prime minister for much of the intervening period leading
up to the opening of the new university. Against this turbulent background, it
is difficult to say which – if either – of the two monarchs was the driving force
behind the new missionary project.4
When it first opened its doors, the IUM consisted only of a secondary schoollevel department and a university-level department. Students who enrolled in
the former were usually to spend three years there, while the study programme in
the latter extended over four years. Besides Arabic language, the subjects taught
included tawh∙ ı̄d, Islamic sects (al-firaq al-islāmı̄yya), jurisprudence (fiqh), legal
methodology (us∙ūl al-fiqh), hadith studies, inheritance law, Islamic history and
Qurʾanic exegesis (tafsı̄r) and recitation (tajwı̄d).5 In 1963, the higher studies
department was renamed the College of Shariʿa, and the following years saw the
founding of a range of additional colleges: a College of Daʿwa and the Principles
of Religion in 1966; a College of the Qurʾan and Islamic Studies in 1974; a
College of Arabic Language in 1975; and a College of Hadith and Islamic
Studies in 1976.6 The university also acquired a Department of Higher Studies
in 1975,7 which would go on to offer training at master’s and doctorate levels.
In 1964, it absorbed a pre-existing educational institution in Medina known as
Dar al-Hadith, and in 1971 it absorbed another institution of the same name
in Mecca.8 Pre-university-level training came to be divided between a secondary institute, an intermediate institute and a stand-alone department offering
Arabic language instruction to non-native speakers.9
While plans to greatly expand the university had been in place since at least
the late 1960s, its growth must also be understood in relation to the 1973 oil
embargo, which led to a sharp rise in oil prices and an enormous boost to the
Saudi economy. Having risen only gradually since 1961, in the wake of the
spike in oil profits the IUM budget suddenly increased nearly fivefold in the
space of just two years; from not much more than 40 million Saudi Riyals (SR)
in 1394/5 h (c. 1975) to over 196 million SR in 1396/7 h (c. 1976). Following
a slight drop, the university budget shot up again from a little over 180 million
SR in 1399/1400 h (c. 1979) to a peak of over 381 million SR in 1402/3 h
(c. 1982).10 This second massive boost coincided with another spike in oil prices
which came in the wake of the revolution in Iran in 1979. It also came in the
context of a renewed emphasis on religious discourse in the political sphere and
increased spending on religious projects across the board in Saudi Arabia around
this time. These latter moves were intended to burnish the image of the regime
and shore up its foundations in the face of new threats posed by revolutionary
Iran, protests amongst Saudi Arabia’s own Shiʿi population, and particularly the
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occupation of the Haram Mosque in Mecca by a militant dissident group led by
Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi, who charged the Al Saʿud family with corruption and
impiety. Juhayman had in fact previously attended classes at the IUM-affiliated
Dar al-Hadith and, prior to embarking on a militant trajectory, had started his
activist career in a pietist proselytising and vigilante movement known as the
Jamaʿa Salafiyya Muhtasiba (Salafi Group that Commands Right and Forbids
Wrong), which had ties to major IUM scholars including ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz
and the Algerian-born Abu Bakr al-Jazaʾiri.11
After this peak, the university’s budget dropped sharply over a period corresponding with the recession that hit Saudi Arabia from 1982, before broadly
levelling out in the mid-1980s, around the same time that the most dramatic
phase of the economic crisis came to an end.
From the start, the IUM was firmly under the control of the Saudi religious and political establishments and, even in periods when the teaching faculty has been dominated by foreigners, it has at all times been headed by a
Saudi. Initially, it was formally presided over by the kingdom’s Grand Mufti
Muhammad bin Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh. However, it was the future Grand Mufti
Bin Baz, in his role as Bin Ibrahim’s deputy resident in Medina, who is generally
considered to have been in de facto charge of the IUM in those early years. Bin
Baz formally took over the university presidency after Bin Ibrahim’s death in
196912 and remained in the post until 1975.13 Following Bin Baz’s departure,
de facto control of the university was handed to ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-ʿAbbad, a
graduate of the College of Shariʿa in Riyadh who had taught at the IUM since
it first opened, and then from the late 1970s to ʿAbdullah al-Zayid. In the early
1980s, the university presidency was formally handed to ʿAbdullah bin Salih
al-ʿUbayd, who held a PhD from Oklahoma State University and had worked
in various Saudi state posts in fields including female education, military instruction and the administration of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina.14 He was
succeeded from the mid-1990s by Salih bin ʿAbdullah al-ʿAbbud, who had a
doctorate from the IUM and had held teaching and administrative posts there
for many years.15
Beyond these top echelons, for the first decades of its existence a large proportion of the IUM’s teaching staff came from outside Saudi Arabia. In the
early 1980s, for example, just 149 of 376 faculty members were identified in staff
lists as being Saudi citizens – and they included individuals who had been born
elsewhere, but had settled in the kingdom and taken citizenship. Well over half
of the non-Saudi staff at that stage were Egyptian, with large numbers also from
Sudan and others from the wider Middle East, North and West Africa, South
Asia and even Australia.16 Non-Saudis who taught at the IUM included members
of movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Ansar al-Sunna
al-Muhammadiyya and the South Asian Ahl-i Hadith. Figures associated with
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such movements also took up positions on the university’s Advisory Council.
The latter, which functioned as a kind of board of directors, allowed the IUM to
draw on the ideas and the reputations of high-profile ʿulama, intellectuals and
activists from around the world. Those who attended its first session in 1962,
for example, included such weighty figures as the Indian revivalists Abul Aʿla
Mawdudi and Abul Hasan ʿAli al-Nadvi, the Salafi scholar Muhammad Salim
al-Bayhani from Aden, the Albanian-born hadith specialist Nasir al-Din al-Albani, and the top Iraqi Muslim Brother Muhammad Mahmud al-Sawwaf.
For all the cosmopolitanism of its faculty in the early decades, the IUM was
subsequently affected by the efforts of the Saudi regime to take a firmer grip on
the kingdom’s education system in the wake of the Gulf War and the increase
in Islamist political activism which occurred in the kingdom in the early 1990s.
This included moves to replace figures seen as sympathetic to politically activist
thinking and practices inspired in part by the Muslim Brotherhood, with supporters of the politically quietist tradition embodied in the figure of the IUM
scholar Rabiʿ bin Hadi al-Madkhali.17 In a shift that may also have been partly
linked to efforts to minimise the scope for politically activist foreigners to catalyse dissent in the kingdom, by the early 1990s the IUM faculty was heavily
dominated by Saudi nationals and their presence as a proportion of the total
number of staff continued to increase throughout the decade.18
At the time of writing, the IUM is preparing for the launch of new colleges
specialising in computer studies, medicine, applied sciences, engineering and
pharmacy.19 These new moves come in the context of what has been celebrated
in some sections of the Saudi press as an “opening up” (infitāh∙ ) in recent years
of a university that had previously been seen as an enclave of exclusivism.20 The
IUM is also reported to have received approval to accept female students, to be
planning to implement distance-learning programmes amid efforts to expand
student numbers, and even to be preparing to employ non-Muslim staff at new
sites outside the Medina h∙ aram boundary.21 This shift is often connected with
the person of Muhammad ʿAli al-ʿAqla, an education administrator who was
appointed director of the IUM in 2007 and whose tenure was extended by
a further four years in early 2011.22 In the wake of the attacks in the United
States in September 2001, the wave of religiously framed militancy that hit
Saudi Arabia from 2003, and the kingdom’s growing role in the production of a
“reformed Islam” in the context of the US-led “War on Terror”,23 the university
has also hosted conferences on topics such as “extremism” and “the combatting
of terrorism”.24
By around 2002 (1422/3 h) the IUM had offered over 28,000 scholarships to
young men from all over the world.25 Such scholarships included not only free
tuition, but also material support covering such things as transport from students’ countries of origin to Medina and visits home each year, accommodation,
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books and money towards clothes, and stipends to cover daily costs.26 However,
factors such as declined offers and substantial drop-out rates meant that the total
number of graduates in the same period was probably significantly lower. Other
figures published by the university suggest that the number of individuals who
had actually secured undergraduate-level qualifications by around 1417/8 h (c.
1997) totalled 11,781, with the annual crop having increased from a first wave
of 43 graduates in 1384/5 h (c. 1965) to 609 in 1417/8 h (c. 1997).27 In 2010,
al-ʿAqla told a journalist that the university had over 30,000 graduates.28 A list
of the countries from which the first group of forty-three graduates were drawn
is almost entirely made up of states with Muslim-majority populations, particularly in the Middle East and Arabic-speaking parts of Africa.29 The fact that the
countries of origin of these first students overlap significantly with the countries
of origin of the members of the university’s founding Advisory Council suggests
that recruitment at that early stage may have been conducted partly through
these and other IUM scholars’ own networks. A list of students’ countries of
origin from the late 1960s points to efforts to expand the geographical reach
of recruitment, including in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and
Africa.30 The geographical breadth of recruitment – measured in terms of the
numbers of countries from which students were drawn – continued to increase
in the decades that followed, and the university also eventually began to make
significant inroads into minority Muslim communities in Europe and North
America.31 As of February 2011, the IUM was reported to have 13,000 students
from 160 countries.32
Over time, a great many IUM graduates would go on to achieve prominence
as high-profile scholars, activists and public figures both within and outside circles which are commonly labelled Salafi. Within Salafi circles, its alumni are to
be found all around the world and situated across the spectrum of viewpoints on
key issues, including the permissibility of political activism and the legitimacy
of using violent means to achieve political change under current conditions.
For example, Saudi IUM graduates range from Safar al-Hawali, a key figure in
the wave of politically activist Islamism known as the Sahwa, which peaked in
the kingdom in the 1990s, to Rabiʿ bin Hadi al-Madkhali, who also went on
to teach at the IUM and whose name became synonymous with the neo-Ahl
al-Hadith tradition whose staunchly quietist stance set up a fierce rivalry with
the Sahwa. Just a few examples of the diverse range of Salafi figures beyond the
kingdom who are IUM alumni include Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadiʿi, the father
figure of contemporary Salafism in Yemen who negotiated an ambivalent path
between pietist mission and strident positions on key political issues; Jaʿfar
Mahmud Adam and Muhammad Sani ʿUmar, who became prominent in new
forms of anti-Sufi activism in northern Nigeria after their return to their country
of origin;33 the Egypt-born ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAbd al-Khaliq, who subsequently
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based himself in Kuwait and has been a key representative of efforts to bring
together elements of Salafi piety and the Muslim Brotherhood’s style of thinking and political practice; and Bilal Phillips, a Jamaica-born convert who is
now a prominent preacher. Others with looser links to the IUM include the
Jordan-based Palestinian jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who never
enrolled at the university, but was informally granted use of its facilities as a
young man;34 and Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi, the leader of the 1979 Haram Mosque
siege who, as mentioned previously, had taken classes at the affiliated Dar
al-Hadith.
Some IUM graduates have been employed by the Saudi state agency Dar
al-Iftaʾ to undertake missionary work outside Saudi Arabia. Others have played
leading roles in more autonomous transnational missionary initiatives, examples
including Bangladesh-born Tawfique Chowdhury of Al Kauthar Institute, and
Canada-born Muhammad Alshareef and US-born Yasir Qadhi of Al Maghrib
Institute. Many others do not particularly engage in coordinated preaching
activities, focusing instead on workaday employment in their countries of origin
or elsewhere in order to support themselves and their families.

Transnational Exchange, Hegemony and the
Making of a Salafi Pedagogy
The remainder of this chapter deals primarily with the content and methods
of teaching at the IUM, with a particular focus on two key subject areas: ʿaqı̄da
(creed) and fiqh (jurisprudence). Through this exploration of pedagogy, I seek
to draw out certain broader dynamics which may help to explain the achievement of the IUM in attracting large numbers of students and winning them over
to its missionary project. The university’s success, measured in these terms, in
itself presents something of an empirical puzzle. Previous attempts at Wahhabi
outreach beyond the Arabian peninsula had faced a great deal of resistance
from the eighteenth century right up until the twentieth century.35 The Saudi
religious establishment, moreover, remained relatively exclusivist and inward-
looking for much of the first half of the twentieth century. The newly appointed
Grand Mufti Muhammad bin Ibrahim chaired the first formal high-level summit
with Muslim leaders from outside the kingdom as late as 1954, just a few years
before the IUM opened its doors.36 It was thus by no means obvious at the time
of the founding of the IUM that a missionary educational institution controlled
by Najdi religious actors, who until recently had in many ways been isolated and
marginal on the global stage, stood much chance of success.
Various factors have already been touched upon that may help to account
for the IUM’s ability to attract and forge bonds with large numbers of students
from diverse backgrounds, including a very generous scholarship programme and
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evidence to suggest a strategy of initial recruitment through existing networks.
In the discussion that follows, I identify various further factors, but pay particular attention to the role played by a certain dynamic of unequal reciprocity.
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, I use the latter term to refer
to a capacity on the part of the university itself to undergo transformations in
the process of dialogical engagement with actors from around the world, while
retaining core elements of its Wahhabi identity. I will suggest that such a
dynamic had a part to play in efforts to construct a missionary project capable of
articulating with the dispositions and ambitions of a wide range of actors.
To argue that the IUM was shaped through processes of dialogical exchange is
not to suggest that it was moulded through open debate and consensus between
a range of Saudi and non-Saudi actors who were on an equal footing. It is clear
that from the start there was an imbalance of power in the relationship between
the university and its students, especially insofar as those behind the IUM had
access to vast reserves of symbolic capital deriving from the fact that the religious training they offered was to take place in the city of the Prophet. Students
were able to spend their evenings studying and socialising in the Prophet’s
Mosque, and there is no question that the lure of this sacred geography is very
strong.
The relationship between the university and its students was also characterised by a vast imbalance in the distribution of material capital. The ability of
those behind the IUM to offer fully funded, degree-level religious training with a
very generous package of additional support, including monthly stipends, played
a major part in setting the terms of a superordinate–subordinate relationship.
The real value of this support varied over time. However, at least at some stages
in the university’s history the financial support available was generous enough
that students from developing countries were able to save a proportion of their
maintenance payments towards the cost of projects such as building a home.
Others used this money and the availability of free flights during the summer
vacations to go on gap-year-style adventures and see the world.37
To emphasise the part played by these reserves of material capital in shaping
power relations between the university and its students is not to claim that the
university simply “bought” its students. In fact, at least some students secure
access to this capital in a quite self-conscious way, aware of what they stand to
gain from an IUM training, the costs and risks that attend this process, and the
scope that exists for negotiating desired outcomes. One South African-born
graduate, for example, recalled that he had been oriented towards Sufi Islam
before taking up a place at the IUM in the 1980s. Studying in this Salafioriented environment thus brought many challenges. However, he steeled himself in order that he could enjoy the benefits associated with an IUM education,
including not only advanced Arabic-language training, but also residence in
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Medina and free flights during university vacations, which he was able to use to
travel the world. He emerged at the end of the process with qualifications and
skills that then allowed him to transition to a prestigious master’s course and
then a PhD programme in Europe.38
The superordinate–subordinate relationship between the university and its
students was not only defined by a differential distribution of material and
symbolic capital. The processes of dialogical engagement that are the focus of
this section also occurred against the backdrop of the uneven power relations
inherent in any modern, disciplinary educational set-up. Over time, the university came increasingly to employ disciplinary educational techniques with
genealogies that ran through Europe: a campus set-up marking off space that
was to be dedicated exclusively to the purposes of education, and internal partitioning of this space into individual dormitories, colleges and classrooms; syllabuses delineating in detail the knowledge that was to be transmitted in class;
timetables dividing up the days, weeks and years into blocks of time reserved
for particular tasks; written examinations producing quantitative scores upon
which depended progression through a series of seamless, consecutive levels of
schooling; detailed regulations governing student behaviour and graded punishments for infringements; a system of social supervision, including discussion
seminars and monitoring of conduct on campus; a university magazine facilitating debate beyond the classroom of scholarly matters and issues of contemporary
personal, social and political concern; and so on. Through the use of such pedagogical techniques, students’ bodies were ordered in space and time, confined
and exposed such that their behaviour and performance could be systematically
observed, examined, ranked, corrected, recorded, rewarded and punished.
Apart from the imbalance in power between the university and its students,
there was also a corresponding imbalance of power between the Saudi actors
responsible for the university and those they brought in from beyond the peninsula to help staff it. The control over the university alluded to earlier by actors
within the Saudi religious and political establishments was bolstered by a rationalised, hierarchical institutional set-up, enshrined in founding documents that
mapped out in detail the specific prerogatives and responsibilities of the range
of actors involved. For example, King Saʿud was named personally as not only
its founder and benefactor, but also as its supreme president,39 with substantial
oversight powers such as the right to review recommendations issued by the
Advisory Council before communicating them to the working president.40
It was within the terms of these unequal relationships – defined by differential
distribution of material and symbolic capital, the implementation of disciplinary
technologies, and bureaucratic mapping of powers and responsibilities – that
certain dynamics of dialogical engagement were to play out: between the university and those who were brought in from outside as staff, and also between
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the university and its students. Such dynamics can be explored in particularly
rich detail through analysis of the syllabuses in use at the IUM at different times.
These serve to underline that any description of the university as a Wahhabi
institution must be considerably qualified.
One area where the label “Wahhabi” might perhaps be usefully employed,
if very cautiously, is in relation to instruction in ʿaqı̄da. The question of creed,
and the issue of tawḥı̄d in particular, had been the keystone of Muhammad ibn
ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s reformist mission and remained a paramount concern for his
Najdi inheritors when the new university opened its doors some two centuries
later. It was their particular conception of tawḥı̄d that grounded the opposition
of the reformist Najdi ʿulama to traditional religious practices, like seeking the
intercession of saints, which they saw as amounting to shirk, or polytheism. It
was thus to be expected that this aspect of teaching at the IUM would be subject
to a special degree of control.
According to the syllabus that was in place when the university opened its
doors,41 the course on tawḥı̄d at the secondary level was to involve memorisation of text from Kitab al-Tawhid, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s own key manifesto on
the topic, as well as study of a famous commentary on the same text titled Fath
al-Majid by his grandson, the leading nineteenth-century Najdi scholar ʿAbd
al-Rahman bin Hasan Al al-Shaykh. In the third year, students were to study
al-ʿAqida al-Wasitiyya by Ibn Taymiyya, a scholar who had been a key influence
on Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab.42 The content of teaching here thus reflects a firm
situatedness in the Saudi context. The equivalent course at the higher studies
level was to last three years, with this entire period devoted to the study of a
commentary by the fourteenth-century scholar Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz on Abu Jaʿfar
al-Tahawi’s al-ʿAqida al-Tahawiyya.43
Syllabuses in use for tawḥı̄d courses in the early 1990s show continuities with
this earlier set-up, though with signs of some further opening up to influences
beyond the narrow confines of the Wahhabi tradition. In the intermediate institute, the subject was again to be taught with reference to Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s
Kitab al-Tawhid, as well as an introduction to Risalat ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani.44
Al-Qayrawani was a tenth-century North African Maliki scholar who wrote in
opposition to the perceived excesses of mysticism and claims of miracle-working,
concerns which were of course later also prominent in the Wahhabi tradition.45
At the secondary level, students were again to study the whole of ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh’s Fath al-Majid and what seems to be a commentary on Ibn
Taymiyya’s al-ʿAqida al-Wasitiyya written by Muhammad Khalil Harras, a contemporary Egyptian Azhari with links to the Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya
Salafi movement.46 At the university level, the main texts taught on tawḥı̄d
were a series of works by Ibn Taymiyya: Shafaʾ al-ʿAlil by Ibn al-Qayyim, a student of Ibn Taymiyya who had long been a strong influence within the Wahhabi
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tradition; the same commentary by Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz on al-ʿAqida al-Tahawiyya;
and Taysir al-ʿAziz al-Hamid by Shaykh Suliman bin ʿAbdullah bin Muhammad
bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab, another grandson of the figurehead of Wahhabism.47 At
this level, these main texts were backed up by a list of additional resources to be
used as further reference points for study, including works by the South Asian
forebear of the Ahl-i Hadith, Muhammad Siddiq Hasan and the early twentieth-century Cairo-based Syrian reformer Muhammad Rashid Rida.
While the presence of these latter texts in particular points to some degree
of transnational exchange in the teaching of ʿaqı̄da and an opening up beyond
the relatively narrow confines of the Wahhabi tradition,48 other parts of the
syllabus are even more clearly suggestive of such dynamics. The teaching of
fiqh offers a particularly neat example and is the focus of the remainder of this
section.
It is well known that there has long been a tension within the Wahhabi
tradition as regards deriving legal rulings. On the one hand, there was a commitment in principle to the rejection of straightforward taqlı̄d, the practice of
simply imitating the substantive legal rulings laid down by any one of the major
schools of Islamic law (madhāhib, sing. madhhab). Instead, Wahhabi scholars
have advocated what Frank Vogel has referred to as “dalı̄l theory” – the idea
that any person, particularly a judge or a mufti, “is obliged to examine the proof
for legal views to the extent of his capability, and to adopt that view for which
the proof seems stronger”.49 This proof, or dalı̄l in Arabic, is to be found in the
Qurʾan, the sunna and the ijmāʿ (consensus) of the first generations of Muslims.
However, in practice Wahhabi scholarship has been very closely associated with
the Hanbali school of law. As one top Saudi judge put it to Vogel, the kingdom’s
judges are Hanbalis; however, their commitment to that madhhab amounts to
ittibāʿ (acknowledgement of leadership) rather than blind taqlı̄d, since they
reserve the right to go against the rulings of that school where they find a dalı̄l
which points to an alternative ruling.50
At the time of the founding of the IUM in 1961, the original syllabus provided for fiqh to be taught from texts by the twelfth-century Hanbali scholar
Muwaffiq al-Din ibn Qudama (1146–1223). In the secondary-level department,
the text used was Ibn Qudama’s al-ʿUmda, and at the higher level it was his
al-Muqniʿ. This use of Hanbali legal manuals as a basis for instruction makes it
clear that at this very early point in the university’s history the arrangements for
teaching substantive law closely reflected the Hanbali leanings that had historically been very strongly characteristic of Wahhabi legal practice. Works of fiqh
by Ibn Qudama, including his al-ʿUmda and al-Muqniʿ, had long been a staple of
Wahhabi scholarship in this field.51 It is worth noting that in the earliest days of
the IUM, separate courses on legal methodology (us∙ūl al-fiqh) were to be taught
at the secondary level from a book authored by staff from the Colleges of Arabic
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Language and Shariʿa in Riyadh, and at the advanced level from Ibn Qudama’s
Rawdat al-Nazir.
In a contemporary description of the teaching of fiqh at the IUM at this
early stage, Bin Baz sought to downplay the Hanbali leanings in the syllabus.
In practice, he insisted, teaching staff took a comparative approach to this
subject that went beyond just this one madhhab. “Teaching of the subject
of fiqh in the university . . . is not restricted to explaining the matter of that
madhhab the teaching of which is stipulated [on the syllabus]. Rather, the
teacher expands as if he is teaching [multiple] madhāhib, not one madhhab,
and he acquaints the student with the best interpretation according to evidence from the Book and the sunna, or from one of them.”52 That there was
at least a limited comparative component in the teaching of fiqh at this very
early stage in the university’s history is also evidenced by an explanatory note
in the original syllabus, which stipulates that – where possible – instruction
in this subject should include exploration of cases where there is disagreement
between the madhāhib and declaration of the preponderant position (tarjı̄h∙ )
on the basis of proof.
However that may be, changes were soon made to the university’s syllabuses
which took things much more clearly in the direction of an opening up beyond
Hanbali jurisprudence. An IUM alumnus who was among the first group of students from Pakistan to enrol at the university in 1962 recalled that his cohort
at the advanced level had studied fiqh partly from Ibn Qudama’s al-Muqniʿ, as
set out in the original syllabus. However, they had also studied another work
altogether, Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid by the Maliki scholar
Ibn Rushd.53 This text, which would subsequently become the key reference
point for the teaching of this subject at the IUM, is strongly comparative in its
approach and includes critical discussion of the positions of each of the various
law schools on any given matter.54
Syllabuses in use in the early 1990s show that by that time, fiqh was still being
taught in the intermediate institute from Ibn Qudama’s ʿUmdat al-Fiqh.55 In the
secondary institute, students were to study fiqh from a commentary on this text
titled al-ʿIdda Sharh al-ʿUmda and authored by Bahaʾ al-Din ʿAbd al-Rahman
bin Ibrahim al-Maqdisi. At this level, they were to study us∙ūl al-fiqh from a work
authored by a number of scholars, including the IUM’s own ʿAtiyya Muhammad
Salim, titled Tashil al-Wusul ila ʿIlm al-Usul.56 However, at the university level,
fiqh was to be taught from Ibn Rushd’s Bidayat al-Mujtahid. What is more, this
text was to be studied alongside the most important works from each of the four
madhāhib (ummahāt kutub al-fiqh fı̄ kull madhhab min al-madhāhib al-arbiʿa).57
Us∙ūl al-fiqh was to be taught primarily from Ibn Qudama’s Rawdat al-Nazir,
along with a commentary on this text titled Nuzhat al-Khatir al-ʿAtir by Ibn
Badran.
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It is thus clear that Hanbali texts remained important in the teaching of legal
methodology at the IUM well into the 1990s, and that Hanbali manuals were
also in use at this time for the teaching of substantive law at the less advanced
levels. Some graduates suggest that an implicit Hanbali bias also persists in practice in the teaching of fiqh even at the higher levels. However, even allowing for
any such residual Hanbali bias and even allowing for Bin Baz’s insistence that
fiqh teaching at the IUM in its earliest days included a comparative component,
the introduction of Bidayat al-Mujtahid as the primary text for the teaching of fiqh
at the university level soon after the university’s founding nonetheless reflected a
significant, concrete shift at that very early stage towards a much more explicitly
comparative approach than had been reflected in the original syllabuses. This
shift is in keeping with a broader trend in legal practice in Saudi Arabia in the
twentieth century, which saw judges and scholars becoming somewhat less constrained by Hanbali norms.58 Other Saudi institutions founded in this period also
came to teach fiqh as a matter of comparison between the various madhāhib.59
Nonetheless, the decision at the IUM to switch from using Hanbali legal manuals to a comparative work by a Maliki scholar merits further exploration, as a very
specific transition occurring in a particular time and context.
This transition might be partly explained in terms of a dynamic of dialogical engagement with those who arrived from outside the kingdom to teach
and otherwise staff the IUM. As was mentioned above, Wahhabi scholars had
long been committed to the rejection of taqlı̄d in principle, even if in practice
they had tended to operate firmly within the framework of the Hanbali school
of law. This rejection of taqlı̄d was further encouraged by influences arriving
at the university from beyond the peninsula. For example, the Albanian-born
Nasir al-Din al-Albani, a formidable figure who arrived to teach at the IUM
very early on and was a member of its founding Advisory Council, held a profound commitment to the rejection of taqlı̄d that may well have contributed to
pulling the university away from its early Hanbali leanings.60 Another possible
influence is the Egyptian Ansar al-Sunna movement, members of which studied
and taught at the IUM. The former president of Ansar al-Sunna ʿAbd al-Razzaq
ʿAfifi sat on the IUM’s founding Advisory Council and was apparently involved
in drawing up syllabuses. As far back as 1949, following a visit to Saudi Arabia,
the Egyptian scholar and Ansar al-Sunna affiliate Ahmad Muhammad Shakir
had written to King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz with recommendations for how to organise
the country’s judicial and education systems. In that report, he had insisted
on the importance of Bidayat al-Mujtahid and its treatment of the differences
between the madhāhib, noting that this crucial work had first been published
in Egypt in the early 1920s in an edition edited by his own father, the scholar
Muhammad Shakir.61 All this points to ways in which a certain dynamic of
dialogical engagement between the university and those who were brought
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from beyond the kingdom to staff it might have contributed to shaping modes
of teaching there.
Quite apart from this dialogical engagement with staff brought from beyond
the kingdom, the shift in approaches to teaching fiqh also appears to have been
tied to a certain dynamic of unequal reciprocity between the university and its
students. In the earliest days of the university’s existence, various voices coming
both from within and from outside the IUM were critical of what was perceived
to be the teaching of Hanbali fiqh at the university at that time and called for
more serious engagement with all four madhāhib. These calls appealed to the
ideal of rejecting taqlı̄d. However, they also explicitly emphasised the need for
the university to adapt to the attitudes and expectations of its students – and the
need to do this specifically in order to secure their consent to, and their active
participation in, its missionary project.
An example of this kind of argument is found in an article published in the
newspaper al-Madina al-Munawwara in December 1961 by the Hijazi intellectual Ahmad ʿAbdullah al-Fasi, who had been a vocal public advocate of the
founding of an Islamic university in Medina in the years immediately prior to its
establishment. Urging that the university should teach all four madhāhib rather
than just one, al-Fasi argued that none of the law schools contradicts the Qurʾan
and the sunna. He also raised practical considerations stemming from the need
to appeal to a diversity of actors. He reminded his readers that “the students
who come to the university have studied from madhāhib other than that which
is taught to them in the university – and that is what they aspire to”.62 Later in
the article, he added:
In addition, the penetration of these madhāhib in the Islamic regions makes
it difficult for graduates of this university to guide the public there. It is hard,
as we know, for a person to be able to convince the public to change their
madhhab. This is something that is admitted and it must not escape our
consideration, especially given that our guiding principle is offering religious guidance to Muslims and providing them with that which illuminates
for them the way and clears for them the path towards knowledge of their
madhāhib, as well as their ability to explain to the people in their homes the
issues of their religion.
Bin Baz took this critique seriously enough to produce a lengthy response, which
was published in the same newspaper the following month. In it, he insisted that
“All of us realise what profound benefit and great utility there is in teaching fiqh
according to the four madhāhib, as long as they are taught according to a correct
procedure and as long as the teacher possesses penetrating vision with regard to
the horizons of the shariʿa and the ability to dive into its beloved depths.”63 It
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was in this context that he offered the description of the teaching of fiqh at the
university quoted earlier in this chapter, in which he insisted that IUM staff did
in practice include a comparative element.
Bin Baz gave assurances that the issue would be examined by the university
council and that a decision would be made according to the common interest.
He concluded with a critique of what he saw as an unhelpful generalisation in
al-Fasi’s remark that none of the madhāhib contradicts the Qurʾan or the sunna,
and that all of them proceed according to the guidance offered by these two
sources. If al-Fasi meant that the four imams all strove to base their work upon
these sources, then, of course, that is true. However, if al-Fasi meant that all of
the madhāhib are free from anything that contradicts Revelation, then that is
obviously incorrect, “for in matters of disagreement there is one truth and that
is what accords with the Book and the sunna”.
This lengthy, very public response from Bin Baz did not put the matter to rest.
As long as the texts on the syllabus remained Hanbali fiqh manuals, the dissenters do not appear to have been satisfied with his claim that teachers went beyond
these core works to offer a wider perspective. In a memorandum presented to the
first session of the IUM’s Advisory Council in May 1962, council member Abul
Hasan ʿAli al-Nadvi – a high-profile revivalist scholar associated with the Indian
Nadwatul Ulama – again urged that all four madhāhib should be taught at the
university. He asserted his own support as a matter of principle for a programme of
study free of the practice of taqlı̄d. However, he also made the separate argument
that “if the student graduates from this university ignorant of his [own] madhhab,
or of the madhhab of the society in which he will live and in which environment
he will undertake his daʿwa, the performance of the burdens of daʿwa will not be
fitting and there will not be a connection between him and his environment that
will make it possible to exert influence within it and to win trust”.64
What is particularly significant in these debates in the context of the current discussion is that they clearly reflect an explicit recognition on the part of
actors who moved in the IUM’s orbit that adapting to the needs and attitudes
of students and those to whom they were intended to preach was important if
it was to be hoped that these people would invest themselves in the university’s
religious mission. It was only in this way that the missionary project underlying
the university could secure their consent. Such considerations thus appear to
have been one of a range of factors at play in the subtle, but significant, shift
in the teaching of fiqh that occurred at the IUM soon after it opened its doors.

Conclusion
The institutional structures and pedagogical practices that took shape and
evolved at the IUM from the early 1960s were far from being a straightforward
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instantiation of an ossified, timeless set of texts, practices and ideals. Rather,
they were very much a product of a particular historical conjuncture and a particular array of contingent political, social and pragmatic as well as theological
considerations.
In the course of this chapter, I have paid particular attention to the ways in
which this important missionary university was situated within, and shaped by,
dynamics of nation and state-building, political economy, geopolitical rivalry
and domestic protest. I also sought to highlight another kind of politics altogether, involving relations of power and resistance that operated more subtly at
the level of cultural production and pious practice. At this level, the construction of the IUM’s missionary project and the kind of modern Salafi pedagogy
that supported it were about more than just the organic evolution of intellectual
and spiritual discursive traditions. They also involved struggles for influence
and dominance between individuals, social movements and state actors, which
appear to have played out through dynamics including the construction of
consent to a project of moral and intellectual leadership, within a framework of
unequal relations defined by disciplinary technologies, bureaucratic structures
and unequal distribution of material and symbolic capital.
In the past there has often been a tendency to depict Wahhabism as something unitary and self-propelling. In fact, discursive structures including religious traditions are surely always porous and prone to continuous evolution
through the absorption and re-articulation of external influences. In the particular context explored in this chapter, this permeability and dynamism were
in fact arguably further catalysed by efforts to expand Wahhabi influence and
to hegemonise non-Wahhabi Muslims far beyond the borders of Saudi Arabia.
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both the earlier and the later syllabuses, has deep roots in the Wahhabi tradition. I
am grateful to Saud al-Sarhan for discussions on this issue.
49. Frank Vogel, “Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia”, PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1993, p. 170.
50. Vogel, “Islamic Law”, p. 175.
51. Guido Steinberg, “Ecology, Knowledge, and Trade in Central Arabia (Najd) during
the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries”, in Madawi al-Rasheed and Robert
Vitalis (eds), Counter-narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi
Arabia and Yemen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 90.
52. Al-Madina al-Munawwara, No. 1030, 16 January 1962.
53. Interview with IUM graduate Suhaib Hasan, London, January 2013.
54. For an English translation of this work, see Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee (trans.), The
Distinguished Jurist’s Primer: A Translation of Bidayat al-Mujtahid (Reading: Garnet
Publishing, 1994).
55. This text had replaced Zad al-Mustaqniʿ by the Hanbali scholar al-Hujawi for teaching at this level in 1982. Al-ʿAbbud, Juhud al-Mamlaka, vol. 1, p. 429.
56. Al-ʿAbbud, Juhud al-Mamlaka, vol. 1, p. 443.
57. Al-ʿAbbud, Juhud al-Mamlaka, vol. 1, p. 565.
58. Frank Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden: Brill,
2000), pp. 77–81.
59. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, p. 79.
60. On al-Albani’s approach to fiqh, see Stéphane Lacroix, “Between Revolution and
Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary
Salafism”, in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
61. Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, Taqrir ʿan Shuʾun al-Taʿlim wa-l Qada: Taqrir Muqaddam
li-Jalalat al-Malik ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Suʿud Sanna 1949 M. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Imam
al-Bukhari li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawziʾ). For a biography of Ahmad Muhammad Shakir,
detailing his links with Ansar al-Sunna, see Ahmad Muhammad al-Tahir, Jamaʿat
Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya: Nashʾatuha, Ahdafuha, Manhajuha, Juhuduha
(Cairo: Jamaʿat Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya, 2006), pp. 202–14.
62. Al-Madina al-Munawwara, No. 1020, 12 December 1961.
63. Al-Madina al-Munawwara, No. 1030, 16 January 1962.
64. Memo to the Advisory Council reproduced in Abul Hasan ʿAli al-Nadvi, Nahw
al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya al-Hurra fi-l-Hukumat wa-l-Bilad al-Islamiyya (Beirut: Dar
al-Irshad, 1969), pp. 93–4.

— 40 —

Chapter 2

Making Qom a Centre of Shiʿi Scholarship:
Al-Mustafa International University
Keiko Sakurai

Introduction
Qom, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, is the world’s largest centre for Shiʿi scholarship, and is also a popular site for pilgrimage.1 The city as a whole has a resident contingent of about 50,000 Iranian seminary students, including women,2
as well about 12,000 students from outside Iran.3 Most of the foreign students
are studying at one of the seminaries belonging to al-Mustafa International
University (MIU) (in Persian, Danishgah-i Bainul-milali-yi al-Mustafa; in
Arabic, Jamiʿat al-Mustafa al-Alamiyya), an umbrella organisation that coordinates seminaries, schools and educational centres exclusively for non-Iranians,
operating both inside and outside Iran. The growth of non-Iranian students
studying at Iranian seminaries is a post-revolutionary phenomenon facilitated
by the clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic, who were eager to promote their
ideology overseas.
Though MIU itself was only recently founded, it has more than two decades’
previous history under the name of the International Centre for Islamic Studies
(ICIS) (Markaz-i Jahani-yi ʿUlum-i Islami) and the Organisation for Overseas
Seminaries and Schools (OOSS) (Sazman-i Hawza va Madaris-i ʿIlmiyya-yi
Kharij az Khishvar). The former was established in 1986 as a supervisory organisation for non-Iranian students admitted to Iranian seminaries, and the latter
was founded in 1991–2 to supervise the schools and seminaries established
outside Iran for non-Iranian students.4 According to the MIU’s official prospectus of 2009, it had about 18,000 non-Iranian students, 10,000 of whom were
studying in Iran while the remaining 8,000 were housed in affiliated institutions
across the world.5
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Despite the MIU’s growing investment in the education of non-Iranians,
its activities have not yet been the subject of scholarly examination. Although
Iranian seminaries in the revolutionary period, including their management
styles and curricula, have been the subjects of some outstanding studies by
Western academics,6 and certain books in Persian have described the changes
that took place in post-revolutionary domestic seminaries,7 recent works on the
development of transnational Shiʿi networks have not yet paid attention to the
activities of MIU, including ICIS and OOSS.8 This chapter aims to fill this gap,
and thereby to gain a better understanding of how clerical leaders of the Islamic
Republic of Iran have tried to make the Qom seminaries the world centre of
Shiʿi scholarship.
This chapter draws on observations of the activities of MIU and its forerunners (ICIS and OOSS), as well as documents issued by MIU and related
organisations, secondary sources, and interviews with professors, administrators
and graduates of ICIS and MIU in Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia and elsewhere. It presents an examination of MIU, including ICIS and OOSS, which
focuses on the following aspects: first, the internal and external factors that
allowed MIU (including ICIS and OOSS) to become a powerful institution in
post-revolutionary Iran; secondly, the organisational features of ICIS and MIU
and the attempts that have been made to develop a new model of seminary
education for non-Iranian students; thirdly, MIU’s strategy for reaching out
to the rest of the world through its various branches and affiliated institutions;
fourthly, the way graduates of ICIS and MIU utilise their education in local
communities; and, fifthly, the implications of the increasing prominence of
MIU within Muslim societies, especially in the Shiʿi world.
The central argument of this chapter is that MIU’s model of education, like
that of ICIS, has diverged from that of traditional seminaries: first, in emphasising the training of propagators of religion, rather than mujtahids (experts who
can issue authoritative opinions on Islamic law); secondly, in the provision of a
segregated space for non-Iranians; thirdly, in the adoption of a highly centralised and bureaucratic form of management; fourthly, in providing special curricula and university degrees for non-Iranians; and, finally, in globalising a new
form of denominational education under the patronage of the Supreme Leader
of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Shiʿi Scholarship before the 1979 Islamic Revolution
In order to clarify the contextual factors that shaped the emergence of MIU, I
begin by giving a brief account of the nature of Shiʿi scholarship and its relation
to the marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d (pl. marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d), the highest authority in Islamic law
prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution. The Shiʿi branch of Islam is distinguished
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from the Sunni by its “informal” religious hierarchy under the leadership of
the marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d.9 The institution of marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d emerged in the mid-
nineteenth century in the Iraqi shrine city of Najaf, where in 1846 Hasan
Najafi (d. 1850) was recognised as “the source for emulation in the Shiʿi community”.10 From the time of Najafi till the late 1940s, Najaf was the seat of the
marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d, with some exceptions.11
One characteristic of the Shiʿi hierarchy is the lack of an institutionalised
procedure for identifying who is the most learned. A marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d cannot
be identified either by election or by appointment, let alone screening. The
“tacit agreement” of the community of experts composed of seminary students,
instructors and scholars is crucial in allowing a scholar to “emerge” as a marjaʿ-i
taqlı̄d.12 The lack of an official procedure for identifying the marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d
contributes to the unique character of the Shiʿi hierarchy, because it allows for
the existence of multiple marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d when the community fails to identify a
single individual to fill that role.13
It is worth noting that Najaf was located on the periphery of the Sunni
Ottoman Empire. Being a minority religion lacking state support, Shiʿism developed its own religious hierarchy while depending on the religious endowments
of its lay community. The most important financial source was a religious tax
called khums (meaning “one-fifth”), paid to a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d by faithful laypeople. Half of the khums goes to support poor sayyids (descendants of the Prophet),
and the other half, called the sahm-i imām, or the share of the imam, is for clerical institutions.14
The disciples of a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d normally serve as his representatives in their
communities and collect khums on his behalf. The ability of a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d
to collect revenue therefore greatly depends on the number of his reliable disciples, as well as on his popularity among laypeople. The collection of khums is
important for seminaries because both these institutions and their students are
financially supported by the sahm-i imām along with the revenues from endowments and income from legal and clerical duties.15
This financial independence has allowed seminaries to remain outside state
control, even while having been marginalised in the process of the expansion
of state-controlled schooling both in Iraq and in Iran. The minimal state intervention allowed seminaries to retain their own management and teaching style,
which is characterised by the absence of a defined curriculum or standardised
examination and evaluation systems. In addition, there are no age restrictions
on admission into the seminaries, nor any limitation on the duration of study.16
It is worthy of note that financial independence from the state and financial
dependence on laypeople are two sides of the same coin: seminaries have to
meet the expectations of khums payers, who tend to be conservative about
social change and oppose reform.17
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Before the spread of universal primary education, boys who completed their
basic studies at local Qurʾanic schools could enter the seminaries in Najaf or
Qom at around 12–14 years of age. The first level of study in these seminaries
is called muqaddamāt (preliminaries), comprising the study of grammar, rhetoric and logic. The middle level of study is called sut∙ūh∙ (texts), in which students learn theology, law and jurisprudence based on textbooks. Only a limited
number of students are able to proceed to the third and most advanced level of
education, called dars-i khārij (studies beyond textbooks), wherein they receive
training to become a mujtahid. When a mentor is satisfied that his student has
acquired the ability to issue a competent legal opinion, he grants a certificate
authorising the student to be a mujtahid in his own name.18 In other words, it
is not an institution, but an individual who certifies the transmission of knowledge, and this “personalistic nature” has clear links with the system of patron–
client relationships.19
Iraq’s shrine city of Najaf had long been regarded as the most prestigious
centre of Shiʿi learning. In the early twentieth century there were about twenty
seminaries in Najaf 20 and around 8,000 students studying therein. In addition to
Arab students from Iraq, Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, there were many nonArab students such as Iranians, Turks and Indians.
The early 1920s was a turning point for Shiʿi scholarship. ʿAbd al-Karim
Haʾiri-Yazdi (d. 1937), regarded as one of the marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d, arrived in Qom to
restore the historical Faydiyya seminary. Haʾiri-Yazdi’s success in revitalising that
institution facilitated the transfer of seminary scholars and students from Iraq to
Iran,21 and this marked the beginning of the rise of Qom as a new centre of learning in the Shiʿi world. The rise of Qom and the decline of Najaf became decisive
when Qom resident Ayatollah Burujirdi (d. 1962) was singled out as the sole
marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d of the Shiʿi religious hierarchy in the late 1940s, after the death
of Ayatollah Isfahani (d. 1946). Interestingly, both Isfahani and Burujirdi were
Iranians, but Isfahani resided in Najaf, while Burujirdi was in Qom. Burujirdi’s
presence enhanced the prestige of Qom as a seat of Shiʿi scholarship.22
After the death of Burujirdi, the Shiʿi community reverted to the position of
having plural marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d: in 1975, Khomeini (d. 1989) and Khuʾi (d. 1992)
were in Najaf; Gulpayigani (d. 1993), Shariʿatmadari (d. 1986) and MarʿashiNajafi (d. 1991) in Qom; and Khunsari (d. 1985) in Tehran.23 Among them,
Khuʾi24 was known as an opponent of Khomeini’s principle of vilāyat-i faqı̄h (the
government of the jurist), and he remained in Najaf until his death. In Qom,
Azeri-born Shariʿatmadari25 was the main challenger to Khomeini’s principle,
and he, like Khuʾi, found a significant following outside Iran by offering education to non-Iranian students. It is little wonder, then, that Khomeini wished
to weaken the overseas influence of his rivals by bringing non-Iranian student
affairs under his control.
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According to Fischer, there were over 6,500 seminary students in Qom in
1975, and although the percentage of foreign students was small, they represented diverse ethnicities. As well as the Turkish-speaking Azerbaijanis, Iraqi
Shiʿa exiled by the Baʿth regime had a considerable presence in Iranian seminaries.26 Others were from Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Lebanon, Tanzania,
Turkey, Nigeria, Kashmir and Indonesia. Foreign students came to Qom through
the personal connections between local clerics and high-ranking mujtahid in
Qom. It is worth noting that marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d in Iran were competing over their
reputations outside the country. Ayatollah Shariʿatmadari, who found many
followers outside Iran, enhanced his profile abroad by hosting foreign students
at his own seminary, named Dar al-Tabligh (House of Islamic Propagation), as
well as by distributing Shiʿi literature throughout the world.27 Dar al-Tabligh
was established in the mid-1960s, and, unlike traditional seminaries, it offered
a five-year programme using a credit system with course examinations. Its curriculum included secular subjects such as psychology, philosophy, mathematics
and English, and the language of instruction was Arabic. According to Fischer,
Shariʿatmadari accepted visitors from as far away as Lucknow and Karachi in
the east, and from Cairo and Fez in the west.28 Ayatollah Gulpayigani launched
overseas activities in the 1970s, including the distribution of monthly stipends
to students in India and the purchase of land for a madrasa in Kashmir.29
Concurrent with the rise of Qom has been a decline in the number of seminary students in Najaf. The decrease in the number of students during the 1950s
continued in subsequent years due to the Iraqi Baʿth government’s pressure on
the Shiʿi population, especially Iranian nationals living in the Iraqi shrine cities
known as the ʿatabāt.30 Among those deported to Iran were clerics and seminary
students.31 Accordingly, the total number of students and teachers in Najaf
decreased to less than 150 in the mid-1980s.32

Restructuring the Seminaries for the “Export of the Revolution”
The Islamic revolution brought fundamental changes to the traditional religious hierarchy in which the marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d enjoyed autonomy from the state.
Returning to Iran after fifteen years in exile, Khomeini, who had distinguished
himself as a political leader through the anti-monarchist movement, launched
his project of establishing a regime based on his principle of vilāyat-i faqı̄h
through two referenda: the first, held in March 1979, on the creation of an
Islamic republic; and the second, in December 1979, on the approval of the
constitution of the Islamic Republic. Both were approved, and Khomeini succeeded in creating a state based on his principle, under which he was bestowed
absolute political and religious authority, and the major government posts were
occupied by fellow clerics. Though Khomeini seemed to be in an incontestable
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position, Shariʿatmadari nevertheless questioned the referenda on the ground
that the concept of vilāyat-i faqı̄h was not indisputably established in Shiʿi
jurisprudence. His opposition to Khomeini heightened the tension between
his supporters, mostly living in Azerbaijan, and those of Khomeini. Khomeini
ended Shariʿatmadari’s challenge by stripping him of his rank as marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d
in April 1982. Backed by state power, Khomeini pressured the other competing
marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d not to publicise religious interpretations that were at odds with
vilāyat-i faqı̄h, and thus give it an unchallenged status.33
In this context, the clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic established the
Management Council of the Qom Seminaries (Shura-yi Mudiriyat-i Hawza-yi
ʿIlmiyya-yi Qom) in 1980 in order to extend control over the existing seminaries. The council formulated various proposals for restructuring the management
style and curricula of seminaries, but it failed to effect substantive changes due
to resistance from the seminary heads, who were circumspect about accepting grants from the state treasury due to the possible consequences for their
autonomy.34 Facing resistance from the seminary heads, the clerical leaders of
the Islamic Republic started their project of asserting control over seminary
affairs and reforming the curricula, especially through the management of the
affairs of non-Iranian students. It was in this context that Shariʿatmadari’s
Dar al-Tabligh was confiscated by the regime and became a base for the
Islamic Propagation Office of the Qom Seminaries (Daftar-i Tablighat-i Islami-i
Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya-yi Qom) in charge of the training of Iranian preachers of
both genders.35
Although the number of non-Iranian students studying at Qom on the eve
of the Islamic revolution was relatively small, the clerical leaders of the Islamic
Republic expected them to act as ambassadors who would disseminate the revolutionary message, believing Iran’s Islamic revolution to be a universal model for
the emancipation of the oppressed from despotic rule.36 Iran’s foreign policy in
the 1980s was known as “the export of the Revolution”, this being the political
manifestation of the underpinning belief. Iran tried to pursue this goal by its
own example, by supporting liberation movements and through propagation.37
Acceptance of non-Iranian students into Iranian seminaries fell under the first
and third methods for the export of the revolution, and the clerical leaders
prioritised seminary education for non-Iranians both inside and outside the
country.38
To fulfil this agenda, Hujjatiyya Seminary, established by Ayatollah Hujjat
Khukamari39 in the early 1940s, was transformed into an international seminary for non-Iranian students by Ayatollah Muntaziri (d. 2009), a disciple of
Khomeini. Hujjatiyya Seminary served as a major host of non-Iranian male
students in the 1980s and taught five schools of Sunni and Shiʿi jurisprudence,
though it laid great emphasis on the Shiʿi Jafari school of jurisprudence.40
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In conjunction with the creation of a seminary exclusively for non-Iranian
students, the clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic established the Council for
Supervising Non-Iranian Seminary Students (Shura-yi Sarparasti-yi Tullab-i
Ghayr-i Irani) in 1979, aiming to monopolise the recruitment of non-Iranian
students. This council operated until it was reorganised into the ICIS in 1986.41

Institutionalisation of the Education of Non-Iranian Students
The establishment of ICIS strengthened the unified management of non-Iranian students’ affairs and facilitated the systematic recruitment of non-Iranian
students, especially Shiʿi youth from regions such as Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Iraq, Lebanon and Gulf countries, where Shiʿa were marginalised by Sunnidominated governments. The Shiʿi youth in these regions were also emboldened by the success of the Iranian revolution and were eager to come to Qom.
Non-Iranian students were offered a different programme, which emphasised
the Islamic ideology.42
Politics was not the only factor that attracted non-Iranian Shiʿa. The flood of
Pakistani and Afghan youths, whose opportunities for higher education in their
communities were limited due to political instability and economic difficulties,
demonstrated that seminary education was seen as an alternative form of higher
education. In my interviews with Pakistani and Afghan Shiʿi youths in Quetta
in the late 1990s, I found that going to Qom was the most realistic way of getting
into higher education, even though it had become rather competitive by the
1990s. Since Qom’s seminaries experienced an over-representation of Pakistani
and Afghani youth in the 1980s, ICIS gradually had to tighten the criteria for
acceptance for both countries in order to diversify nationalities.43 MIU adopted
the ICIS policy by emphasising the admission of students from countries from
where MIU did not have students.44
A new chapter in the history of ICIS began when Ayatollah Khameneiʾi
took over the post of Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic upon the death of
Khomeini. Khameneiʾi was one of Khomeini’s disciples and served as president
of the Islamic Republic of Iran from 1981 to 1989. He was elected as the new
Supreme Leader by the Assembly of Experts on 4 June 1989. His appointment
was controversial because, at that time, his theological qualifications fell short
of mujtahid or ayatollah.45 This lack of theological qualifications hampered his
claim to be a legitimate successor because the constitution required the Supreme
Leader to be a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d. To solve this problem, the constitutional requirement of being a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d was replaced by “being an expert on Islamic
jurisprudence”, and being in possession of “appropriate political and managerial skills” was added as a new qualification for being Supreme Leader. This
constitutional amendment made it possible for Khameneiʾi to be Khomeini’s
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successor, although his legitimacy continued to be questioned by many leading
marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d of the time. The appointment of a Supreme Leader who did not
hold the highest rank in the religious hierarchy ended the theocratic regime in
which the Supreme Leader embodied both religious and political authority. To
compensate for this weakness, two major steps were taken: the reinforcement
of the Supreme Leader’s political power via constitutional amendment; and the
introduction of Ayatollah Araki46 (1894–1994) as a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d, so that laypeople could follow Khameneiʾi on political issues and Araki on religious issues.
After the death of Araki, several clerics, including Khameneiʾi, were nominated for marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d by the clerical supporters of the regime.47 Meanwhile,
Khameneiʾi, suffering from his lack of religious credentials, hastened to expand
his influence outside Iran.48 This led to the office of the Supreme Leader gaining
direct control of ICIS, so enabling Khameneiʾi to apply centralised management49 to non-Iranian student affairs.50
Another of Khameneiʾi’s projects was the modernisation of seminary education. The ICIS constitution stressed that its mission was to train non-Iranian
preachers, trainers, teachers, researchers, interpreters, mujtahids and administrators, who are refined, aware of the important issues of the day, able to run
scientific and cultural magazines, and learned in Islamic sciences, humanities
and Ahul al-Bait studies.51
This statement implies an extension of the scope of education beyond beliefs,
rituals and personal affairs to the realm of public affairs; that is, to teach Islamic
sciences and humanities to prepare students for various roles in the public
sphere. The implications of this mission become more apparent when we consider the student admission criteria. The applicants must be Muslim, and have
to pledge allegiance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. They have to have at least
a secondary school certificate, be aged between 18 and 22, and be single. They
are also required to pass entrance examinations and attend interviews. It was
important for ICIS to seek capable students from all over the world in order to
diversify the student body in terms of nationality.52
To locate students who satisfied the above-mentioned criteria, ICIS adopted
three methods of recruitment. First, it sent out recruitment missions in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; these missions were empowered to
administer both written and oral examinations, as well as interviews. Secondly,
candidates living in a country where ICIS does not send out recruitment missions could be accepted through direct correspondence, by way of emails or
upon the request of a foreign representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in
case they could meet the standards set by ICIS. Thirdly, candidates living in
Iran could make contact with ICIS directly.53 ICIS was distinct from traditional
seminaries in that it set clear admission criteria and administered examinations.
Those accepted were entitled to receive various services, including an education
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subsidy allowance, a housing subsidy allowance, medical services and travel
expenses.54 Although ICIS retained its basic identity as a seminary, its certificates were confirmed by the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology,
which benefited the graduates when they returned home. Khameneiʾi’s efforts
to apply central management to the seminary also extended to the seminaries
for Iranian students, both male and female.55

ICIS as a Predecessor of MIU:
Its Educational Courses and Affiliated Colleges
ICIS was a forerunner of MIU, and the concepts and structures underpinning
the latter institution took shape as a result of the experiences of the former. ICIS
adopted the academic system of the modern university, based on credits and
semesters, and provided five levels of courses equivalent to university degrees:
Level 1 (Associate of Arts); Level 2 (Bachelor of Arts); Level 3 (Master of Arts);
Level 4 (PhD); and Level 5 (ijtihād). Currently, non-Iranian students have to
undertake a preparation course before starting Level 1, in which they receive
intensive Persian and Arabic lessons along with the basic Islamic sciences. Level
2 is composed of two majors: Islamic Sciences and Humanities. Level 3 is also
divided into two, Islamic Sciences and Humanities, along with the obligatory
presentation of a thesis. Those who wish to continue their studies can sit the
examination for Level 4. Level 4 is a five-year course in which students study
Islamic jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence along with their own
major for three years, with the last two years being devoted to writing a thesis.
The final course is for the training of mujtahid.56
ICIS is the central organisation for controlling non-Iranian students’ affairs,
and education takes place in institutions and learning centres under its umbrella.
Among them, the most important institution for males is the Imam Khomeini
School for Higher Education (Madrasa-yi ʿAli-yi Imam Khomeini), founded
in 1992 by order of Khameneiʾi. It offers courses from Levels 1 to 4. Hujjatiyya
Seminary was renamed the Islamic Law and Knowledge School (Madrasa-yi
ʿAli-yi Fiqh va Maʿarif-i Islami) in 2002 and offers courses from Levels 1 to
4. The Specialty School of Islamic Law and Islamic Jurisprudence (Madrasa-yi
Takhassusi-yi Fiqh va Usul) started its activities within the structure of Marʿashi
Seminary in 2004 as an institution specialising in Islamic jurisprudence with
four educational courses: Islamic law and jurisprudence; Islamic judicial law;
law; and Islamic economic law.57 Rasul al-Akram College is a higher education
institute for the adherents of four schools of law, namely, Hanafi, Shafiʿi, Maliki
and Hanbali. It was established in 1996–7 in the city of Gorgan in Golistan
province, facing the Caspian Sea. In the beginning it accepted students from
Central Asia and Russia for a five-year course, but in 2005–6 it opened its doors
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to students from all over the world, with a new education programme recognised
by the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology.
Bint al-Huda School for Higher Education (Madrasa-yi ʿAli-yi Bint al-Huda)
is a seminary exclusively for non-Iranian female students established by a group
of clerics under the leadership of Ayatollah Muhammad Mahdi Asifi in 1982.
Originally it offered Arabic-medium courses, mainly for students from Iraq
and the Gulf region. In 2000, it was placed under the supervision of ICIS
and introduced courses in the Persian language to facilitate the acceptance
of students from all over the world; by 2008, 550 students from twenty-five
countries were engaged in study there.58 The Centre for Language and Islamic
Education (Markaz-i Amuzish-i Zaban va Maʿarif-i Islami) has been engaged in
Persian-language education for non-Iranian students since its establishment in
1982–3. The Persian language course lasts six months and teaches non-native
students without intermediate languages or translation. Those who finish this
course can proceed to the 6–8-month basic Islamic study course. The Institute
for Humanities (Muʿassasa-yi ʿUlum-i Insani) started its activities in 2005–6
in order to teach the humanities to seminary students. In addition to these
institutions, for the promotion of distance learning for overseas residents, the
Imam Khomeini International Islamic Virtual University (Danishstan-i Imam-i
Khomeini) began activity in 2001. The Centre for Short-Term Education
and Research Opportunities (Muʿassasa-yi Amuzish-ha-yi Kutah Muddat va
Fursat-ha-yi Mutalaʿati) provides short-term education for clerics in order to
enhance their knowledge, and provides research opportunities for scholars on
sabbatical.59
ICIS has offices in Mashhad and Isfahan which directly supervise a number
of seminaries. The Mashhad Office supervises non-Iranian students, both male
and female, studying at seminaries in Mashhad – such as the Madrasa-yi ʿAli-yi
Baradaran (Higher Institute for Brothers), the Markaz-i Amuzish-i Khaharan
(Education Centre for Sisters), Madrasa-i ʿIlmiyya-yi Baqiya al-Allah (Baqiya
al-Allah Seminary), Madrasa-yi ʿIlmiyya-yi Ahl al-Bait (Ahl al-Bait Seminary)
and the Maktab-i Narjis (Narjes Seminary for Women). The Isfahan office was
opened in order to raise the educational level of non-Iranian students who had
been instructed in traditional methods at seminaries in Isfahan.60
Beside educational institutions, ICIS comprises a research centre; ICIS Press;
the Centre for Family Affairs and Housing Complex, which provides education
and religious services for the spouses and children of non-Iranian students; and
the Centre for Student Counselling and Guidance, which gives students guidance on both personal and educational issues.61
The basic objective of ICIS is to bring under its control the seminaries
that already accept non-Iranian students, while also adding new institutions to
create a vast, modern education complex exclusively for non-Iranians.62 One of
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the striking features of ICIS is that it educates non-Iranian students separately
from Iranian students under a curriculum designed especially for them. One
male former student commented that the provision of separate classes is a protective measure for non-Iranian students, stemming primarily out of consideration for the handicaps that non-Iranian students face at their time of entrance:
studying in Persian is a challenge for non-Persian-speaking students, and if they
are also weak in Arabic this will be an additional burden. In addition, Iranian
students – particularly humanities majors – already have considerable knowledge of religious sciences before coming to the seminaries, due to the Iranian
high school curricula, whereas the majority of non-Iranian students come to
Iran with minimal knowledge of religious sciences.63
To what extent are non-Iranians separated from Iranians? According to the
testimony of the same student, non-Iranian male students are encouraged to join
in with the discussions among students and scholars taking place in the holy
shrine of Fatima Maʿsuma. In addition, many of the instructors teaching introductory classes are in fact senior Iranian students with whom non-Iranian students have friendly relations, and it is not accurate to say that non-Iranians are
forced to remain isolated.64 Indonesian scholars who have studied in Qom provide testimony that the non-Iranian students who were enrolled at Hujjatiyya
Seminary in the 1980s and in the early 1990s enjoyed freedom due to the fact
that the Hujjatiyya Seminary had not yet converted to the credit system. They
were encouraged to participate in classes and seminars held outside Hujjatiyya,
and were able to study with Iranian students. However, transformation to the
credit system in the mid-1990s made it difficult for non-Iranian students to take
classes outside the seminary, which limited their opportunity to mingle with
Iranian students.65 In the case of the female non-Iranian students with whom I
had conversations, they indicated that they are not as free as male students and
that their association with Iranian students is much more limited.66

The Establishment of MIU
Al-Mustafa International University was established in 2008 to strengthen the
overseas propagation of Iranian-style Shiʿism by integrating ICIS and OOSS.
The domestic activities of MIU were adapted from ICIS by placing ICIS’s nine
schools and centres under its direct supervision, with some restructuring and
renaming.67 Like ICIS, MIU is categorised as a private university, drawing its
budget mainly from the profits from factories that it owns, as well as from investments, religious endowments68 and government funding.69
The change of name from ICIS to MIU was strategic. First, “al-Mustafa” is an
epithet of the Prophet Muhammad, which means “the Chosen One” in Arabic,
the lingua franca of all Muslims. The use of Arabic and the non-sectarian
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name increases the appeal of MIU in the Muslim world. A similar tactic can be
observed at work in the university’s official prospectus, which states that one of
the five main policies of MIU is “to respect Islamic sects on the basis of Islamic
unity policies”.70
Secondly, the change from “centre” to “university” signifies al-Mustafa’s
determination to create a new model of Islamic teaching in which humanities
subjects are taught from an Islamic perspective, along with Islamic sciences. It
also aims to improve the social status and work opportunities of graduates by
providing them with a university degree.
MIU is a “mission-oriented”71 institution that aims to train preachers who can
take on the task of “disseminating Islamic viewpoints and divine teachings and
expanding Islamic culture as well as moral and spiritual traits”.72 The prioritisation of training for Islamic propagation distinguishes MIU from the traditional
Shiʿi seminaries, whose ultimate goal is to train mujtahids who are entitled to
issue legal opinions – although advancement to the status of mujtahid is open
to MIU students. According to the president of MIU, Alireza Aʿrafi (1959– ),73
ten to twenty students are currently studying to be mujtahid at Level 5.74
President Aʿrafi has identified three core characteristics of an MIU education: (1) rational, philosophical and analytical observation (nigāh-i ʿaqlānı̄
va falsafı̄ va tah∙ lı̄lı̄); (2) comparative studies (mut∙āliʿāt-i tat∙bı̄qı̄) and dialogue
between religions (ādyān) and branches of Islam (madhhab); and (3) interest
in humanities and social sciences (tavajju-yi ʿulūm-i insānı̄ va ijtimāʾı̄). It is
these, he claims, that distinguish MIU from al-Medina and Umm al-Qura in
Saudi Arabia, al-Azhar in Egypt and the International Islamic University in
Pakistan.75
The MIU’s emphasis on philosophy can be traced back to ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi
(1903–81), who began teaching Islamic philosophy in Qom in 1946. He was an
Islamic philosopher in the tradition of Ibn Sina (known as Avicenna, 980–
1037) and Mulla Sadra (1572–1640), and came to Qom to fight against Western
materialism, which was popular among intellectuals at that time.76 Though his
teaching of philosophy was contested by jurists including Burujirdi, the sole marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d at that time, he developed a large following, many of whom – such
as Ayatollah Mutahhari (1919–79) – would later become the leading figures of
the Islamic revolution.77 Khomeini’s attachment to philosophy and mysticism
helped to integrate their study into the curriculum of the Qom seminaries, in
which Tabatabaʾi’s works are used as textbooks. It is remarkable that Tabatabaʾi
and his students consider metaphysics to be the foundation for the study of the
totality of knowledge.78 It is also worthy of note that in the 1960s Tabatabaʾi
expounded the Platonic idea of government by philosopher-kings, a decade
before Ayatollah Khomeini made public his theory of vilāyat-i faqı̄h, said to
have been inspired in part by Plato’s Republic.79 This linkage of philosophy and
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vilāyat-i faqı̄h is essential to Qom’s model of seminary education, which MIU
has embodied. Additionally, Tabatabaʾi’s Islamic ontology provided the philosophical basis of post-revolutionary Iran’s endeavour to overcome the sense of
self-alienation engendered by the shah’s Westernisation policy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic based on the slogan of “Neither West nor
East”.80
The emphasis on comparative study and the dialogue between religions and
sects can also be traced back to Tabatabaʾi, who studied various doctrines of
Western philosophy in order to refute them – especially Marxism, which had
become popular among Muslim youth.81 Although Marxism is no longer the
main concern of Iranian seminarians, the protection of Islam from Western
cultural influence (especially secularism and materialism) through the teaching
of Islamic philosophy, and the provision of answers for all manner of questions,
is still of vital importance for the Qom seminaries.82 MIU’s emphasis on a comparative perspective can thus be seen as a continuation of this effort.
This is not to imply that MIU totally rejects Western culture and scholarship,
however. MIU asserts that shedding light on the “congruity between the Islamic
sciences and the humanities”83 is one of its missions. President Aʿrafi has stated
that MIU never prohibits its students from learning about Western culture and
sciences, but that it does encourage them to examine them critically. In other
words, his position towards the humanities is neither total rejection nor uncritical acceptance. What is important for students is to know that their “religion
has to have its view in every realm”.84
The other characteristic of MIU’s curriculum is its introduction of new fields
of Islamic jurisprudence, such as Islamic jurisprudence in medicine, environmental science, international affairs, management, education and economics,
especially at MA level.85 As one of the frontrunners in the new field of Islamic
jurisprudence, President Aʿrafi asserts that the provision of legal answers to
emerging problems is a duty of the Islamic jurist, and in order to provide the
relevant answers the Islamic jurist must have sufficient knowledge of contemporary issues.86 MIU inherited its basic curriculum from ICIS, and currently offers
a BA programme with two majors: Islamic Studies, with ten programmes, and
Humanities, with thirteen programmes.87 Subjects taught in each programme
are divided into “seminary”, “general”, “common with other programmes/core”
and “specialised”. Seminary studies (durūs-i h∙ awzavı̄) includes Arabic morphology and syntax, logic, Islamic philosophy, commentary, Qurʾanic studies, Nahj
al-Balagha (Peak of Eloquence),88 reading comprehensions and Islamic law,
though a number of units differ from course to course.89 General Studies must
be taught in every programme, and includes Islamic thought, the analytical
history of early Islam, Khomeini’s socio-political viewpoints, Persian literature,
physical education, Islamic ethics, thematic commentary on the Qurʾan, family
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management and foreign languages. MIU has introduced a number of more
practical classes, such as foreign languages or IT, which enable non-Iranian students to engage effectively in propagation activities in their home communities
after graduation, especially “in the fields of the media, academic dialogues, and
the artistic arena”.90
Teaching a wide range of humanities alongside seminary education is of
vital importance for MIU to meet the criteria for being a “university”, despite
the fact that MIU claims to be the inheritor of a 1,000-year history of seminary
education.91 The design of MIU’s curriculum enables its students to compete
with other university graduates and prevents them from being out of touch with
international academia.92 Iran’s fusion of religious studies, humanities and the
social sciences is at the heart of the project known as “Seminary and University”
(h∙ awza va dānishgāh), in which the Islamisation of the social sciences and
humanities is pursued alongside the updating of religious science to meet contemporary needs. The adaptation of the university system and its curricula in
seminaries is also part of this project.93 These changes in the system and curricula enable ICIS and MIU graduates to expand the scope of their activities from
traditional face-to-face teaching and preaching in their home communities to
indirect methods including “virtual propagation” through television, video and
enriched web pages. Furthermore, the diversification of educational content and
the provision of university degrees have allowed the graduates to branch out
into various fields, and this facilitates their active involvement at the forefront
of their communities.
Although MIU’s hybrid form of education is attractive to the majority of
students who come to Qom, it remains disadvantageous for those students who
wish to advance to the highest level in order to attain the status of mujtahid. In
Shiʿism, no matter how much one studies, if one does not attain the position of
mujtahid one must remain a muquallid, one who follows (taqlı̄d) the guidance of
a mujtahid. Over the last three decades there has been a tremendous increase
in the number of non-Iranian students studying at Qom; but they have seldom
attained the status of mujtahid. This allows Iranian mujtahid to maintain their
dominance within the Shiʿi clerical hierarchy both within and outside Iran.
Another important aspect of education in MIU – as it was in ICIS – is that
the majority of professors and instructors are Iranians, and Persian is the language of instruction. Non-Iranian students are first required to undergo intensive
Persian-language training, because important texts are in Persian, including the
writings of Khomeini and other Islamic revolutionary ideologues – ICIS defined
Persian as “the language of the revolution”, while Arabic is “the language of the
Qurʾan”.94
Teaching in Persian has inevitably enhanced the position of that language in
the Qom seminaries (and elsewhere) and has promoted the “Persianisation” of
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Shiʿi language.95 Thus, students’ success in their studies greatly depends on their
level of proficiency in Persian. Conversely, MIU’s ability to transmit the Iranian
version of Shiʿism and the revolutionary message depends on how well it can
teach Persian to non-Iranian students.

Overseas Outreach
The other important project for MIU is the integration of the overseas activities of OOSS, which was established to promote overseas propagation and
proselytisation by opening educational institutions locally for non-Iranians. It
is estimated that the organisation supervised more than 150 schools in sixty
countries in its first decade, hosting about 10,000 students.96 Due to a lack of
available documentation, however, I was not able to determine the details of
its activity. One of the reasons for the difficulty in ascertaining the overall
scope of OOSS seems to be the ambiguity of its understanding of “supervision”.
Based on my observations, it seems that the religious schools opened by Qom
returnees did have contact with OOSS, but this did not mean that these schools
were fully supervised by OOSS. For example, in 1997 I was visiting a religious
school for girls in Quetta whose principal was a female Qom returnee; and it
transpired that an Iranian woman who claimed to have a religious education was
also visiting the town at that time, along with her husband who was a religious
expert. The principal asked me to come to the school in the afternoon so as to
avoid meeting the Iranian visitors, explaining that it might put her in a difficult situation. When we eventually visited the school, the principal explained
that OOSS sometimes sent a mission on their own initiative to “supervise”
them, even though OOSS had no official connection with the school. Based
on my visit to schools in Lahore in 2006, it seems that the relationship between
OOSS and the Shiʿi schools opened by Qom returnees varied from school to
school. Some claimed to have contact with OOSS, whereas others claimed to
be r elatively independent.
The president of MIU states that “Organising international branches is one of
our priorities that we should pay attention to.”97 MIU’s website lists twenty-four
schools and colleges as affiliated institutions,98 although it seems there are even
more institutions that have direct or indirect connections to MIU. For instance,
the 2009 pamphlet states that MIU “has representation in over 50 countries”,
and has branches in “Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, India, Thailand,
Tanzania, Sri Lanka and other countries”. The same pamphlet also introduces
schools in Bangladesh and Russia with images of their buildings.99 An introductory booklet published in October 2010 refers to the “Islamic University Ghana,
Islamic College London, Teacher Training Centre Burkina Faso, Islamic College
Indonesia”, as well as to “branches in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan,
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India, Thailand, Tanzania and Sri Lanka”.100 Compiling the information about
branches or affiliated institutions mentioned in MIU’s official documents and on
its website, the number of branches in Africa is conspicuous: there are three in
Ghana and one each in Burkina Faso, Benin, Congo, Cameroon, Madagascar,
Malawi and Tanzania. By contrast, there are only two branches in the Middle
East, in Lebanon and Syria. Both countries have close diplomatic relations
with the Iranian government. In Eastern Europe, there are two in Albania
and one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Western Europe, branches can be found in
Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden. There are two in South
America, in Argentina and Brazil. Others are located in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Thailand and the Philippines.101 These
branches vary in size, academic level and in the subjects they teach. Some
schools, such as those in Benin and Bosnia, are boarding schools. The courses
and the type of education offered also vary in the schools, ranging from high
school to graduate degree courses. Some focus mostly on religious training,
whereas others also provide secular courses. Some institutions provide only parttime non-degree schooling. It seems that many of them have Iranian directors,
but in many cases the relationship between MIU and the institution is not clear.
One of the most active institutions in Western Europe is the Islamic College
for Advanced Studies in London. Founded in 1998 by an Iranian doctoral
scholar who had studied at a seminary in Qom as well as at a university in the
United Kingdom,102 it promotes Islamic studies in the West by providing an
“insider’s perspective” on Islam, and trains Muslim scholars for the West. In
2002, the college established a partnership with Middlesex University to offer
an accredited BA (Hons)103 in three courses: Islamic Studies, Muslim Cultures
and Civilizations, and Hawza Studies. The Hawza Studies course aims “to train
students as ministers of religion, religious teachers, or academics by providing its
students with classical Islamic education and spiritual training”. In 2007, MA
courses in Islamic Studies, Islam and the West, and Islamic Law were launched,
and in 2008 the college was renamed the Islamic College.104
The London branch is one of the most important of MIU’s branches105
outside Iran, because London is where rival marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d to Khomeini and
Khameneiʾi have their offices. Khuʾi, for instance, established the al-Khoei
Benevolent Foundation in 1989 and opened a London branch, as well as the
al-Sadiq and al-Zahra Schools in London.106 Ayatollah Sistani (1930– ), the
great disciple of Khuʾi and currently the most popular marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d in Najaf,
also has his office in London, the Imam Ali Foundation.107 Given the rivalry
between marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d, having a branch in London is important for elevating
the prestige of MIU.
MIU has also found its way to Southeast Asia. The population of Indonesia
is predominantly Sunni, but it does have some Shiʿa, mostly of Arab descent. In
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the 1970s, some of them went to Qom to study at Dar al-Tabligh. A few years
after the Islamic revolution, Iran’s clerical representatives arrived in Indonesia
where they met Husein al-Habsyi (1921–94), one of the prominent Shiʿi clerics
from Bangil, East Java. Since their meeting, Indonesian students have been sent
to Qom through him, and many have become leaders of the Indonesian Shiʿa.
After his death, ICIS representatives came to Indonesia to conduct an examination to select students for study in Iran; this increased the number of students
who went to Qom, and so further diversified the composition of the student
body there.108 These developments only emerged, however, after the collapse of
the Suharto regime in 1998.
In conjunction with the increase in the number of Indonesians studying at
Qom, the Iranian presence in Indonesia has also increased. In 2003, the Islamic
College for Advanced Studies in London opened a branch in Jakarta, which was
renamed the Islamic College Jakarta in 2009. Similar to the Islamic College,
London, the Jakarta branch is headed by an Iranian doctoral scholar. The college aims to promote religious values through Islamic philosophy and mysticism,
offering MA programmes in Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism.109
In 2003, an institution called the Islamic Cultural Centre, Jakarta, was established by five Iranians. The centre conducts Persian-language courses and has
been facilitating Indonesian students who wish to study in Iran. Both institutions have worked closely with, and have been run predominantly by, Iranians
or Indonesians of Arab descent who studied at Qom.110
Unlike their Indonesian counterparts, Malaysians who have studied in Qom
might be compelled to practise taqı̄yya (dissimulation), due to the Malaysian
government’s anti-Shiʿi policy.111 Another important centre for propagation
in southern Asia can be found in Thailand, where there are a small number of
Shiʿa,112 mostly descendants from Persians who migrated to the region during
the Ayutthaya dynasty (1350–1767).113 They had been isolated from the rest
of the Shiʿi world until they were “discovered” by a Shiʿi cleric visiting the
Thonburi district of Bangkok after the Iranian revolution. In Thonburi there
is a small Shiʿi community descended from Qom and Lucknow, and there the
cleric established a centre where classes in religion, including the teachings
of Khomeini as well as in the Persian language, were given to both children
and adults. Some of those who studied there have gone on to Qom for further
study.114 Though neither ICIS nor MIU has opened a branch in Thonburi, a
considerable number of Thai youth were sent to Qom.115
MIU’s presence in Eastern Europe, specifically in Albania and BosniaHerzegovina, is a relatively new phenomenon. Iran started its cultural activities
in Bosnia in 1995, as soon as the Bosnian War ended.116 The Cultural Centre
attached to the embassy offers free Persian-language courses. The Mulla Sadra
Foundation promotes Islamic teaching and Shiʿi publications translated into the
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local language.117 The Ibn Sina Institute, established in 1996, has four sections:
the Centre for Philosophy and Gnosis, the Centre for Culture and Civilization,
the Centre for Persian Language and Literature, and the Centre for Balkan
Studies.118 Kewser is a Shiʿi-inclined women’s organisation in Bosnia that issues
its own magazine and runs its own TV and radio stations.119 These institutions
have direct or indirect relations with the Iranian regime and encourage the
creation of a Shiʿi- and Iran-friendly environment in Bosnia. This strategy by
the Iranian regime was reinforced by the establishment of the Persian-Bosnian
College in 1999 in Ljesevo near Sarajevo as one of the branches of MIU. The
college is a secondary school with boarding facilities, and its curriculum is
equivalent to that of other schools in Sarajevo except that it offers Persianlanguage studies and Shiʿi-oriented extracurricular activities, such as a commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn and a field trip to Iran.120 Iran’s
active involvement in cultural and educational activities in Bosnia indicates
that Bosnia is one of its important centres for propagation.
Albania has also been identified as a target for propagation in the region.
Organisations such as the Saadi Shirazi Cultural Foundation, a female high
school named Saadi College, and the Kuran Foundation are active in Albania.121
In 2007, the Rumi Foundation was established as an MIU branch for the promotion of education, research and comparative religion. The first Persian–Albanian
dictionary was published in 2010, and more than ten books have been published
in Albanian, including the works of Sayyed Hossein Nasr, William Chittick and
ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi.122
South Asian non-Muslim countries seem to be the new frontier for MIU.
The MIU Indian Branch has recently opened in New Delhi, aiming to promote
higher education with an emphasis on seminary education.123 In October 2012,
a new branch of MIU was opened in Colombo,124 and MIU is planning to open
another branch in Hyderabad offering courses in Humanities, Islamic Studies
and Persian language.125 East Asia and the Pacific region are another frontier for
MIU: a Tokyo office was opened in May 2013, and I was informed that MIU is
planning to open offices in Canada, the United States and Australia.126
The African continent seems to be the top priority for MIU’s propagation
work.127 The Islamic University College, Ghana,128 started activity in 1988
under the name of Ahul al-Bait Islamic School, as a training institute for Islamic
theology. It was accredited in 2002 by the University of Ghana. Other MIU
branches on the African continent vary in size and in the level of education
they provide. The oldest seems to be the Imam Sadiq School in Madagascar,129
established in 1986. It offers post-high school education in Islamic teachings
in Arabic. A school in Malawi was established in 1994, offering post-high
school education in Islamic teachings, also in Arabic, while Dar al-Mahdi in
Tanzania was established in 2006, offering post-high school education in Islamic
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teaching in Swahili. The date of the establishment of the schools in Cameroon
and Benin are, respectively, 2001–2 and 2002–3. Most of the schools have an
Iranian director. The African countries where MIU has opened its branches are
mostly Muslim-minority countries with a significant shortage of education. In
addition, most of the Muslims in these countries have few links with Shiʿism,
except for certain countries where Shiʿi immigrants from India and Lebanon
can be found. Dr Hakim Elahi, the vice president of MIU, served in Africa for
twelve years, establishing the Islamic University College in Ghana and serving
as director of the Centre for Islamic Studies in Mali. In an interview, he emphasised that the number of Africans attracted by Shiʿism has grown and that
anti-Shiʿi propaganda by Wahhabis has been unsuccessful.130 The distribution
of MIU branches in non-Muslim African countries as well as in Eastern Europe
indicates that MIU is trying to counter the growing influence of anti-Shiʿi
Wahhabism in these countries by creating a sympathetic atmosphere through
cultural and educational activities. MIU’s investment in education activities is
closely related to the Iranian government’s endeavours to strengthen diplomatic
and economic ties with these countries, though MIU claims to be independent
from government. The benefits derived from an education at an MIU branch
vary from student to student, but the most important thing for them is having
the opportunity to get a post-secondary education.
MIU does not have branches in Sunni-dominated countries such as Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, where, historically, local
Shiʿa have had strong ties with the Najaf seminaries. In these countries, the
returnees from Najaf have a strong influence on Islamic education and many of
them run religious schools and classes to disseminate Shiʿism under their own
initiative. Even though the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran has changed
the destination of choice for many advanced students from Najaf to Qom, and
although the younger generation has been more exposed to Iranian influence,
Najaf scholarship still remains an attractive option. The possible reasons for the
absence of MIU branches in these areas are, first, the presence in these countries
of a sufficient number of Qom returnees who are already influencing their community, and, secondly, MIU’s decision to avoid aggravating political tensions
between Iran and countries that may tend to see MIU branches as political
rather than as educational entities. However, it is worth noting that while MIU
may not have branches in these countries, it does maintain representatives.

Returnees from MIU: Their Perspectives
ICIS and MIU have had a complex impact on home communities via returnees
from the Qom seminaries. The role of the returnees in their communities must
be understood in the context of their location. My visits to the Shiʿi madrasas
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in Karachi, Quetta, Islamabad and Lahore131 verified that studying at Qom has
been beneficial for Shiʿi youth in terms of improving their education and future
career prospects, but does not necessarily entail their subordination to Qom.
The majority of students studying at local madrasas are from less privileged
backgrounds, including Afghans, mostly Hazaras, who settled in Pakistan after
the Soviet invasion. The madrasas are essentially free and allow students to
continue their studies with no financial burden. Students who are able to continue on to advanced study at Qom have more promising futures, because Qom
returnees are highly respected in Shiʿi communities.
The opportunity to study in Qom is particularly precious for women, whose
education and career options are much more limited than for men. Many of the
female returnees said that they would never have been allowed to study, were it
not for the seminaries in Qom.
The existence of a strong belief that secular education makes women less religious and that a seminary education is religiously rewarded has encouraged families to send their daughters to Qom. After returning home, many of the female
returnees engage in teaching at a girls’ madrasa or preaching at women’s religious gatherings, and through these activities they gain social respect and financial independence, which helps them to develop a good reputation and higher
status in their family. Many women I have interviewed said that, as a result
of their experiences in Qom, they learned how women can be active in society without challenging the existing male-dominated social order, for females
there are active in teaching, preaching and even administering religious schools,
organisations and circles for women. Though still few in number, some female
returnees, especially the daughters or wives of clergymen, can serve as principals
in girls’ madrasas. It is worthy of note that the support of a man is indispensable
to running a madrasa, because the public religious sphere in Pakistan is dominated by men, and women have limited scope to collect religious endowments
from lay followers and so secure financial support for a madrasa.132
Unlike female returnees, whose activities are mostly confined to a gender-segregated space, male returnees are more likely to be involved in politics.
Since the late 1970s, Pakistani Shiʿa have faced increasing pressure from the
Sunni Islamisation initiated under the government of Zia ul Haq. The success
of the Islamic revolution led by Khomeini emboldened Pakistani Shiʿi to negotiate with the Zia government over a new law on the compulsory deduction
of zakat. In rivalry with the Shiʿi movements, Sunni groups, especially those
influenced by Wahhabism, initiated an anti-Shiʿi campaign that aggravated
sectarian conflict.133 In such circumstances, being a returnee from Qom can be
a double-edged sword. Returnees are respected for having acquired advanced
knowledge about religious science and for having absorbed the revolutionary
spirit, but they might also be seen as advocates of vilāyat-i faqı̄h, and even as
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agents of Iran who follow Khomeini or Khameneiʾi not as a religious leader, but
as a representative of the Iranian government.
Returnees might support the idea of vilāyat-i faqı̄h as an ideal, but most
of the interviewees I spoke with said that such an ideal was inapplicable in a
Pakistani context, where Shiʿa are the minority.134 A Pakistani clergyman who
had studied for twelve years in Qom and now runs a female madrasa in which
his wife teaches, said that he had received permission from Sistani and other
marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d to use zakat and khums to run the madrasa so as to provide free
education. He also said that he had studied under Ayatollah Makarim Shirazi
and Ayatollah Lankarani in Qom, and that he looks to Khameneiʾi in Qom on
political matters, but follows Sistani in Najaf with regard to religion. Despite
his profession of compartmentalised allegiances, portraits of both Khomeini
and Khameneiʾi were on display in his office, showing his special attachment
to Qom. Not all clergy who have studied at Qom reveal their direct attachment
to that place, let alone display portraits of Khomeini and Khameneiʾi. Another
Pakistani cleric with seven years’ study experience in Iran cautiously avoided
mentioning the name of any marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d, stressing in fluent Persian that his
mission was to facilitate dialogue among different religious groups, including
different branches of Islam. This shows how sensitive Pakistani returnees are
about relations with Qom.
It is worth noting that the older generations of Pakistani scholars were
mostly educated in Najaf and that, historically, Pakistanis have followed
Ayatollah Khuʾi in Najaf and, after his death, Sistani in Najaf. Because of this
tradition, many of those who followed Khomeini after the 1979 revolution
returned to Khuʾi after the death of Khomeini. In addition, we may note that
the idea of “following marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d” is itself somewhat equivocal, with many
interviewees saying that the idea that khums should be paid to the marjaʿ-i
taqlı̄d had been popularised by Qom returnees and was relatively new to lay
Shiʿa in Pakistan.
The other factor that has enhanced the value of studying at Qom is the
aggravation of sectarian violence against Shiʿa. More and more Shiʿa feel that
it is necessary to arm themselves with theoretical arguments to defend their
denomination in the face of growing attacks from Wahhabi-influenced Sunni
groups.
In the case of Thailand, where Shiʿa are few in number, returnees face
different challenges. Unlike Pakistan’s Shiʿa, whose population is somewhere
between 17 and 34 million, Shiʿa in Thailand are estimated to number fewer
than 50,000,135 and seem to be in economically moderate circumstances. The
absence of a larger Shiʿi community seems to be the main obstacle to returnees in
establishing a career as a religious teacher or preacher. In such an environment,
the Cultural Centre attached to the Iranian embassy, where Persian-language
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skills are required, has become an important provider of work for returnees and
also runs support seminars and publication activities.136 Golam Ali Abazar, who
has established his career as a leader of the Thai Shiʿa, is no exception and has
maintained ties with Iran.137 Abazar is a nephew of the imam of Masjid al-Huda,
located in Taling Chan in the southern part of Bangkok. He left Thailand in the
mid-1970s to undertake religious study in Pakistan. After spending a few years
there, he moved first to Kuwait and then to Hujjatiyya Seminary in Qom for
advanced studies. He returned to Thailand at the age of twenty-five with ijāzas –
in particular from Sistani – authorising him to collect khums as one of Sistani’s
representatives. He also holds an ijāza issued by the Friday prayer steering committee and signed by Khameneiʾi, stating that he had been appointed a leader
of the Friday congregational prayer, based on a request from the Shiʿi people in
Thailand and the recommendation of the clergy. It also requires him to promote
understanding of the Islamic revolution and unity among Muslims.138 Thanks to
the support of the Qom returnees, the Cultural Centre of the Islamic Republic
of Iran139 in Bangkok functions as an active centre for Islamic propagation in
Southeast Asia. The examples of Pakistan and Thailand show that the relationship between returnees and MIU and Iranian representatives depends on the
circumstances of Shiʿa in their particular locality.

Conclusion: Globalising “Iranised” Shiʿism?
The Shiʿi seminaries known as h∙ awza-i ʿilmiyya have long been a meeting
place for students and scholars of various origins. A perfect example of this was
nineteenth-century Najaf, which attracted Persians, Turks, Arabs and Indians
– although ethnic division did exist in housing, classes and among scholars.140
Twentieth-century Qom is distinguished from nineteenth-century Najaf by the
emergence of “national consciousness”, which engenders a clear distinction
between Iranians and non-Iranians. ICIS’s, and MIU’s provision of separate
educational spaces and curricula for non-Iranians is intended for the benefit of
the majority of the non-Iranian students; however, as discussed, this measure
discourages non-Iranians from studying to the level of mujtahid, and this perpetuates Iranians’ monopoly over that elevated position, while non-Iranians
remain muqallid in the Shiʿi religious hierarchy.
MIU has ensured Qom’s incontestable dominance over Najaf,141 especially
in terms of financial stability and human resources, and this has convinced
some Iranians that Qom has become the “Vatican”142 of the Shiʿi hierarchy. In
spite of its achievements, though, the Shiʿi world is in fact far from monopolised by the seminaries of Qom; and at the same time there are signs of the restoration of Najaf seminaries in today’s Iraq as an alternative centre for learning,
especially for Arab Shiʿa who are uncomfortable with the “over-politicised”
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and “Iranised” forms of teaching.143 Questions about Qom’s strong inclination
towards philosophy and rationalism have also been voiced by scholars, especially in Najaf and Mashhad, who belong to maktab-i tahkı̄k,144 although it is this
very inclination that has attracted the younger generation of Shiʿa in Lebanon
and elsewhere.145
Even those who see vilāyat-i faqı̄h as an ideal are well aware that the Iranian
model of Shiʿism developed within a country where the overwhelming majority
of Muslims are Shiʿi – a fact that is neither applicable nor relevant to the rest of
the world. The graduates of MIU are struggling to reshape and reinterpret what
they have been taught in the light of their local needs and realities.
In addition, the language of instruction is also a matter of great concern,
especially for Arabs, and this has created a new opportunity for seminaries outside Iran. For instance, a new Shiʿi seminary has emerged in Damascus, where
the Zainab Shrine is located, a popular site of Shiʿi pilgrimage. Since the mid1970s, students expelled from seminaries in Najaf by the Iraqi authorities have
been finding refuge at the shrine and numbers have grown rapidly. Zainabiyya
Seminary was established in order to accommodate these students, and has now
expanded to house 250–300 students from some twenty to twenty-five nationalities, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Iran and
countries in Africa. This seminary has differentiated itself by making Arabic the
sole language of instruction.146
President Aʿrafi is aware of the criticism of MIU’s educational strategies,
and has emphasised that “Shiʿism is a matter which transcends nationality”. At
the same time, however, he also averred that there is an important proximity
between Iranian culture and Shiʿism as concerns their rational, philosophical
and mystical proclivities. It is precisely this tendency to identify Iranian culture with Shiʿism that is troubling for Shiʿa outside Iran, and is at the root
of non-Iranians’ hesitation to see Qom as the sole reference point in religious
sciences.147
Additionally, unlike those extremists who believe that Islam and nationalism
are incompatible, President Aʿrafi maintains that people can maintain their
national identity while still regarding themselves as belonging under the broad
umbrella of Islam. Again, the problem here is whether people from different
nationalities can have a shared image of what that umbrella really is, if Iranians
equate aspects of Islam with Iranian culture.
MIU provides us with an example of an attempt to globalise a denominational form of education blended with a national agenda, and reveals its
complex effects on various localities. The expansion of MIU has spurred competition and contestation among Shiʿa and between Shiʿa and Sunnis; and it
seems likely to continue to spur such rivalry in the future, rather than bringing
them closer.
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Chapter 3

Protector of the “al-Wasatiyya” Islam:
Cairo’s al-Azhar University
Masooda Bano

Introduction
It was in the tenth century that the Ismaili Shiʿi Fatimid dynasty laid the
foundation of the al-Azhar Mosque; its endowment, shortly afterwards, with a
number of teaching positions1 marked the birth of the centre of Islamic learning that was to become al-Azhar University. Few people, and certainly not its
founding dynasty, would have envisioned that this institution would one day
become the leading authority in the world of Sunni Islam.2 This mixed origin,
along with a range of other factors – such as Egypt’s strong tradition of cultural
pluralism; the geopolitical developments that led to Cairo becoming the geographical centre for convergence of Muslim scholars between the ninth and the
eleventh centuries; and the controversial, but decisive, twentieth-century stateled reforms of al-Azhar – have all played important roles in the rise of al-Azhar’s
“al-Wasatiyya” Islam. This “middle-way” Islam is central to al-Azhar’s positioning within the spectrum of Muslim institutions speaking on behalf of Islam
today. The university’s current leadership3 is very conscious of its international
stature as a “tolerant voice of Islam”,4 providing Sunni Muslims across the globe,
and increasingly even within Egypt, with an alternative to the exclusionary
tendencies and the rigidity associated with Wahhabi-inspired Salafism, as well
as the orthodoxy and armed militancy at times associated with movements
representing political Islam, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.5
Every year, al-Azhar attracts over 30,000 students6 from around one hundred countries, many sponsored by their national governments. The university’s
fatwas draw the attention of Muslim scholars and ordinary believers alike from
all over the world;7 it is approached by Western heads of states to galvanise
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support for their policies vis-à-vis Muslim communities at home; and its curriculum has been adopted by Islamic institutions – and in the case of Malaysia by
the state (see Chapter 8) – in many countries. This chapter documents how the
pursuit of al-Wasatiyya Islam has been important in shaping al-Azhar’s global
following, and tries to explain what has enabled al-Azhar to stay steadfast in
this pursuit. First, the chapter defines what al-Wasatiyya Islam means to scholars inside al-Azhar, as well as to its wider following. Such analysis will help us
to understand the basis of al-Azhar’s global influence, while also showing that
it is al-Azhar’s organic process of evolution over the centuries that has enabled
it to maintain a more complex relationship with the state and society at home
and abroad than is possible for either al-Medina and al-Mustafa (discussed in
Chapters 1 and 2, respectively).

Al-Azhar’s Domestic and International Stature
Although it retained its autonomy as a waqf-supported centre of Islamic learning
for over nine centuries,8 al-Azhar University today is a national university regulated by the Egyptian state, and the Shaykh al-Azhar, the most senior position
in the university, holds office as a minister. A series of reformist measures introduced by successive governments starting from the mid-nineteenth century9
culminated in the nationalisation of al-Azhar in 1961. Under the reign of King
Faud I, an ordinance issued in 1930 divided al-Azhar’s teaching role into three
distinct departments: Arabic Language, Shariʿa and Theology. Meanwhile, the
ideas of reformist scholars such as Muhammad ʿAbduh10 also began to influence the curriculum, notably through the influence of two of his students –
al-Maraghi and al-Zawahiri11 – who held senior positions at al-Azhar from 1928.
The most dramatic transformation, however, followed the Egyptian Revolution
of 1952, when Nasser introduced the 1961 Ordinance, nationalising al-Azhar,
thus giving it the formal status of a national university, while also bringing it
under the direct control of the state.12
Under this ordinance, the religious education faculties became subject to state
regulation, and at the same time al-Azhar had to expand its teaching faculties to
incorporate modern subjects, opening colleges of medicine, engineering, economics, etc. This move towards the provision of modern education did not, however,
change al-Azhar’s primary identity as the seat of Islamic learning. For the Egyptian
government, al-Azhar remained the most important institution that it could use to
secure religious legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Similarly, with regard to popular perceptions, it is the three faculties of Islamic Studies that continue to attract
the best students in the field,13 and the fact that the international students at
al-Azhar are also concentrated in those faculties demonstrates the global demand
for its teaching in this area. At any given time al-Azhar hosts close to 30,000
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international students. These students come for four-year undergraduate degree
courses, and many also pursue the two-year master’s degree. Few, however, stay on
to take the PhD, since the requirements for continuing at that level are viewed as
quite demanding. A few international students also join al-Azhar’s primary and
secondary institutes, thereby gaining entry into the system at a very young age.
While the total number of international students shows the level of global
demand for Azhari education, a breakdown of student data by country helps
to better understand the reach of al-Azhar across the globe. In the 2012–13
academic cycle, international students came from 103 countries. Although the
majority of students at al-Azhar come from Muslim majority countries, certain regions and countries show a much higher concentration of students. The
2012–13 international student data gives the following breakdown of the 29,263
students enrolled in that academic year: 5,189 from Arab states, 4,154 from
Africa, 13,321 from Asia, 2,902 from Europe, 2,773 from Russia and neighbouring states, and 924 from the Americas. Southeast Asia is particularly noticeable
in terms of student numbers: in 2012–13, 5,624 students came from Malaysia,
2,830 from Indonesia and another 2,260 from Thailand. The chapters in Part
Three of this volume show how a complex set of factors made Azhari Islam so
influential in this region. In Africa, Nigeria stands out as one of the most prominent student-sending countries, with 2,169 students enrolled at al-Azhar during
the 2012–13 academic cycle. Senegal, Ghana and Kenya are some of the other
African countries which are well represented within the Azhari student body,
with student numbers ranging between 100 and 300. Equally importantly, the
data shows that an increasing number of students are coming from Europe and
the United States. During the 2012–13 academic cycle, there were 410 students
from France, 234 from Holland, 400 from the United Kingdom, 443 from the
United States, and 390 from Canada. This growth in the number of students
from the West shows al-Azhar’s popularity among second- and third-generation
Muslims there, as well as among converts. With 873 students, Turkey was also
well represented during this academic cycle; and there were also 1,093 students
specifically from Russia.
Gender-disaggregated international student data shows that al-Azhar is an
equally popular destination for female students. As noted in recent studies, there
is rapid growth in the demand for textual learning among Muslim women, some
of whom pursue formal Islamic education and become prominent preachers in
their own right.14 This demand for Islamic education among Muslim females is
also reflected in the size of the female population within al-Azhar’s international
student body. In the 2012–13 academic cycle, between 30 and 35 per cent of the
international students were female, and this ratio remains fairly constant across
the different levels of education imparted at al-Azhar.
Although important, the presence of international students is not the
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sole barometer of al-Azhar’s global influence. One other important vector of
al-Azhar’s influence overseas takes the form of the appointment of al-Azhar
faculty members to teaching positions in universities in other countries. These
overseas appointments, which are awarded for a few years at a time, are relatively competitive. The Shaykh al-Azhar personally takes an active role in the
selection of candidates for these overseas appointments, which are made in consultation with the Egyptian embassies in those countries. The selection process
for these appointments is stringent, because those so appointed also come to act
as ambassadors not only for al-Azhar, but for the Egyptian state and society more
generally. The International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan, is one of
the institutions that has benefited from the expertise of Azhari scholars through
such appointments.
As with any Islamic institution, the most stringent test of al-Azhar’s religious
authority rests in the demand for its fatwas. It is in this domain that al-Azhar’s
influence is most clear. Individuals from around the globe seek al-Azhar’s fatwas
on a diverse set of questions, as do the Egyptian government and the governments of other Muslim-majority and Western countries. In recent years,
al-Azhar has introduced a telephone hotline in a number of European languages to provide fatwas for a diverse range of followers based in different
parts of the world. This service manifests the increasing demand for al-Azhar’s
fatwas among second- and third-generation Muslims in European countries, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
In addition, al-Azhar’s ideas are also widely disseminated through its two
major publications: Al-Azhar Magazine, which is produced monthly, is now
eighty-four years old; while Saut al-Azhar (Voice of al-Azhar) is a weekly publication that covers important news events from al-Azhar’s perspective. Efforts are
currently afoot to make past issues of the monthly magazine available online for
at least the last ten years and to make it more accessible to Muslims worldwide.
The World Association of al-Azhar Graduates is similarly a widely diffused but
effective network for the spread of Azhari Islam.
Meanwhile, Azhari shaykhs have a growing presence on the ever-increasing
independent Islamic TV and radio channels. Though the shaykhs appear on
these channels in a personal capacity rather than as spokesmen for al-Azhar,
the plurality of positions they adopt and the extent of textual knowledge of
Islam they demonstrate also helps to boost the image of al-Azhar as the most
prestigious place for higher learning in Sunni Islam. Many of these channels are
now available on regional or international cable TV networks and the Internet.
Thus, the very platforms which some have argued are fracturing Islamic authority15 by allowing a new class of independent scholars to develop large followings,
are also providing opportunities for scholars from the historically influential
institutions to advance their message further.
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If the above considerations were not enough to establish the global reach of
al-Azhar, the great emphasis placed by al-Azhar’s current leadership on its role
as the promoter of moderate Islam on the international stage should remove
any remaining doubts. When asked if al-Azhar’s audience is primarily domestic
or international, its senior scholars are very clear: “Just like the Kaʿba is the
Qibla for the prayers, al-Azhar is the Qibla for Muslims for the study of Islamic
Sciences.”16 Such reference to al-Azhar as the “Qibla” for the study of higher
Islamic sciences arose frequently in all the interviews conducted at al-Azhar for
this chapter. This overwhelming confidence as expressed by the Azhari shaykhs
in their ability to lead the Muslims across the globe arises from the reverence the
institution has enjoyed for centuries from Muslims worldwide.
Last but not least, one of the most important signs of al-Azhar’s global following among Muslims, both at home and abroad, rests in the Egyptian state’s decision to nationalise it, and in Western governments’ attempts in recent decades
to gain legitimacy for policies that are proving to be controversial with their
Muslim constituencies at home. Zeghal presents an insightful analysis of the
way President Nicolas Sarkozy tried to enlist al-Azhar’s support for the banning
of Islamic headscarves in public places in France by seeking a fatwa on the issue
from the Shaykh al-Azhar.17 Most recently, General Abdul al-Sisi’s decision
to have the Shaykh al-Azhar, along with senior Christian leaders, by his side18
when announcing the decision to remove President Morsi’s government, shows
how al-Azhar is seen as commanding enough religious legitimacy within Egypt
to continue to be a useful tool for the Egyptian state.

Basis of Demand: Engineered or Organic?
In nationalising al-Azhar, Nasser revealed a preference for reforming the structure of Islamic authority in Egypt rather than eroding it – the latter being the fate
meted out to the two other influential seats of Islamic learning in North Africa,
al-Zaytuna in Tunisia and al-Qarawiyyin in Morocco.19 As noted by other scholars,20 Nasser’s decision was motivated by a number of domestic and regional
considerations. At home, al-Azhar was seen as an effective counterweight to
the growing appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood. Within the Arab world and
among Muslims in general, hosting al-Azhar was seen as boosting Egypt’s image
as the leader of the pan-Arab movement and so earned the Egyptian leadership
respect from Muslims across the globe. Similar considerations have shaped the
Egyptian state’s engagement with al-Azhar to date, whereby al-Azhar is used
for securing legitimacy for controversial decisions at home, while achieving a
prominent position within the international Muslim discourse. This outlook
has led the Egyptian state to invest in increasing the international outreach of
al-Azhar by offering scholarships for international students and assisting with
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the posting of al-Azhar scholars overseas. It also funds international conferences.
However, when compared with the extensive state investments in al-Medina and
al-Mustafa (see Chapters 1 and 2), where the majority of international students
receive quite a generous scholarship, Egypt’s investment in this area seems rather
limited: al-Azhar offers a total of only 1,200 scholarships per annum, whereas its
cohort of international students numbers around 30,000. This means that only
4 per cent of its international students are on al-Azhar scholarships, with the
remaining 96 per cent either funded by their home governments or mobilising
personal or family resources. This financial investment by foreign governments
or by individuals and their families in securing an Islamic education at al-Azhar
again shows the demand for its brand of Islam. It also demonstrates that despite
the compromises it has had to strike since 1961 – its close association with the
Egyptian state, and the requirement that it lend its authority to certain controversial state decisions – al-Azhar has managed to retain a reasonable level of
legitimacy in the eyes of many Muslims worldwide.
The relatively limited investment by the Egyptian state in enhancing the
international outreach of al-Azhar, as compared with the two other universities
discussed in this volume, can be understood in terms of the limited religious
agenda of the Egyptian state, which claims a modernist outlook in contrast to
theocracies such as Saudi Arabia or Iran. The political legitimacy of a theocratic
state is directly dependent on its control over the religious sphere. Given the relatively secular outlook of the Egyptian state, successive regimes have attempted
to use al-Azhar’s authority to legitimise their policies, but have not adopted the
more extensive ambition of promoting a particular brand of Islam via the Azhari
platform. Rather, the Egyptian state has used al-Azhar to defend its modernist
ambitions and to help to present itself globally as the guardian of “moderate”
and “tolerant” Islam. Thus, for the Egyptian state the global agenda has not been
to promote an Islam of a particular kind, but rather to make selected use of the
religious legitimacy enjoyed by al-Azhar to protect the state against critique by
Islamists at home and to claim a prominent standing among Muslim countries.
This has placed limits on the kind of control the state has exerted on al-Azhar,
especially during the Mubarak era, since successive Egyptian governments have
realised that some appearance of autonomy within al-Azhar is important if
it is to retain its legitimacy as an authentic platform for Islamic learning. As
a result, the investment made by the Egyptian state in promoting al-Azhar’s
international outreach has been strategic, but relatively limited.
The basis of demand for Azhari education thus remains very organic: the
prestigious status acquired by al-Azhar over the centuries naturally draws students to it from across the globe. However, it must also be acknowledged that
the shaykhs within al-Azhar play an active role in promoting Azhari teaching
globally. They see their role as being to provide guidance to Muslims across the
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globe, and they take this role seriously. It is widely believed within Islamic circles
that Islam assigns ʿulama a high status because they are the guardians of Islam,
and thus are taking forward the tradition of the Prophet. In turn, the ʿulama
hold themselves responsible for spreading Islamic learning. This understanding
of the importance and responsibility of the role of ʿulama in promoting Islamic
learning is prevalent across the different schools of thought and throughout
the world’s Islamic intellectual strongholds, and the scholars at al-Azhar are no
exception. The ʿulama of al-Azhar are conscious that they reside in a seat of
global Islamic learning and feel it their responsibility to ensure that the wider
Muslim community, and not just Egyptians, benefit from it. As noted by one of
the senior scholars at the al-Azhar Islamic Research Academy:
There is no question within al-Azhar, we think of it as a global and not an
Egyptian institution. As scholars of Islamic sciences it is our responsibility
to make efforts to ensure that the learning we have benefits the Muslim
community as a whole. We therefore patronise a long chain of international engagements. For example, our former students recommend their students to us. There are linkages and alumni associations of al-Azhar graduates
internationally who try to link more students to al-Azhar.
Thus, while the Egyptian state might make some investment in amplifying the
international clout of al-Azhar through providing scholarships to international
students, making provision for international conferences at al-Azhar, and funding appointments of faculty members to universities overseas, the real basis of
demand for Azhari education emerges from a fluid and organic network of student associations and informal religious networks, with a history that extends
back through the centuries. The question that then naturally arises is: what is
so distinctive about the experience of learning at al-Azhar that makes it such a
popular destination for international students?

Defining “al-Wasatiyya” Islam
Although they may describe al-Azhar’s “centrist approach” in different words,
the ʿulama as well as the students interviewed for this volume identified
al-Azhar’s “al-Wasatiyya” Islam as its defining feature and saw it as the basis
of its global following. This image of al-Azhar was defended by the Sorbonnetrained former spokesperson for the Shaykh al-Azhar in simple but forceful
terms: “Centrism, this you can say is the first label of al-Azhar.” This assertion
was repeated in the interviews with all the senior Azhari ʿulama conducted for
this chapter, as well as those with faculty members in the social sciences. Equally
importantly, discussions with students also raised this as the primary basis of
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al-Azhar’s appeal. During interviews, the students mentioned how they had
first learned about al-Azhar via different routes. Some had heard of it because
the institution at which they originally studied had links with al-Azhar, others
through religious scholars in their communities or via the publications of Azhari
scholars. However, what was common across the responses was a heavy emphasis on the appeal of its centrism. As one Indonesian student noted: “I had read
work of some of the senior scholars of al-Azhar in Aceh; I wanted to come and
study with those scholars. And I love it here, it is a moderate place.” Similarly,
a female student from Singapore commented: “I love it here. There are so many
reminders of Islam in everyday life when you are studying at al-Azhar. At the
same time it is a very free place allowing the students to pursue Islam without
enforcing rigidity of behaviour.” A Pakistani student similarly emphasised the
importance of moderation and pluralism as being central to his decision to come
to al-Azhar, averring that “the only person who can go to Medina is a Salafi, and
one who has the signature of support from those who are known in the Salafi
circles. However, al-Azhar is not like that. It admits students from diverse backgrounds.” He remarked that there are many Salafi-oriented students at al-Azhar:
They come mainly to get the stamp of al-Azhar and do not attend the classes
seriously as they are not open to the pluralistic approach promoted here.
However, al-Azhar does not close its door on them. We have many Salafioriented scholars within al-Azhar too, but they teach alongside scholars who
belong to different positions as well as those who have a Sufi orientation. It
is this ability to harness multiple discourses and positions within al-Azhar
that to me makes it a most important international institution for Islamic
learning.
Moving beyond the scholars and students within al-Azhar, and turning instead
to specific cases in which foreign governments have actively drawn on Azhari
Islam, also helps to demonstrate how those seeking a more pluralistic interpretation of Islam tend to gather around this institution. The Malaysian case, which
is examined in detail in Chapter 8, illustrates how the modernising Malay state
found within the al-Azhar curriculum an ideal balance between retaining an
Islamic identity while developing the ability to embrace change and move with
modern times. Similarly, as noted above, President Sarkozy’s decision to reach
out to al-Azhar to seek support for the controversial policy of banning Islamic
headscarves in France shows that al-Azhar is seen by Muslim states as well as
Western governments as one of the most influential platforms for generating a
pluralistic discourse within Islam.
But what does this “al-Wasatiyya” Islam – whether referred to as “centrism”,
“moderation” or “pluralism” – really consist in? An appeal to terms such as
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“moderate”, “liberal” or “orthodox” is always contentious. One standard way to
locate an Islamic institution along the liberal–orthodox continuum is to classify
it on the basis of the emphasis it places on critical hermeneutic interpretations,
as opposed to adopting more literal interpretations of Islamic texts.21 Another
proposal is that al-Wasatiyya be seen as:
an approach that assumes that divine instructions were given to human
beings in their own interest; the correct interpretations of Islamic teachings
and texts will therefore be beneficial to believers. This is an approach that
might be contrasted with the extreme textualism of many Salafi figures . . . it
is effectively a modernist approach that stresses being reasonable, moderate,
friendly to the public interest.22
An equally important route to understanding the appeal of al-Wasatiyya
Islam would be to shift the focus away from the particular position or interpretation that al-Azhar takes on a given issue, and concentrate instead on the more
fundamental matter of the actual process through which al-Azhar sustains this
plurality of discourses within a single space. The defining feature of al-Azhar’s
al-Wasatiyya Islam is the equal representation of the four Sunni schools of Islam
within its curriculum. As we have seen in the two preceding chapters, even universities based around very rigid doctrinal beliefs do allow some level of flexibility and engage with positions from opposing schools of thought in order to retain
some appeal for students from different backgrounds. In the case of al-Azhar,
its emphasis on covering the four key Sunni madhāhib23 makes it appealing to
moderate Muslims who are against the rigidity and exclusionary tendencies of
strictly Wahhabi interpretations. The biggest appeal of al-Azhar thus rests in its
ability to capture the plurality and richness of debates within different Islamic
positions instead of the taqlı̄d (strict adherence) to one school of thought; it is
this that forms the basis of its “al-Wasatiyya” Islam.
Crucial to al-Azhar’s centrism is thus the issue of tolerance and the importance of debate. It starts from having the space to study the major four Sunni
madhāhib, but it does not end there. It also requires having the tolerance to
engage with Shiʿi scholars, even though Shiʿi teachings are not covered in
al-Azhar’s curriculum; and it further requires allowing space to explore Sufism,
while at the same time giving space to Salafi scholars and those with affinities
to the Muslim Brotherhood. Equally importantly, it requires embracing religious
differences and retaining the willingness to coexist with other religious communities such as Egypt’s Coptic Christians. As one Azhari scholar noted:
First of all the most important issue is that al-Azhar has avoided extremism [tashaddud] of thought, unlike in other countries. It has harboured the
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four Sunni madhāhib, as well as the Sufi tradition. Al-Azhar also at times
approaches Shiʿi scholars for consultation on an issue of Islamic fiqh. At times
governments from other countries who send their students overseas to study
Islam find that they have become very rigid after that education, they then
send those very students to al-Azhar to gain a more moderate education.
Similarly, a senior official in the office of Shaykh al-Azhar Ahmed al-Tayeb
noted:
Al-Azhar has always kept a neutral approach. Scholars of al-Azhar never
became extreme. It is always good to have different points of view on a given
issue. Al-Azhar fights extremism. Many people want al-Azhar to play this
role. The Coptic Christians in Egypt seek al-Azhar’s help in protecting them
against extremists, as do the Islamic institutions around the world which are
threatened by extremist tendencies, while governments of Muslim countries
and those in the West also want al-Azhar to provide and to lead the discourse
on moderate Islam. The governments of these countries are behind al-Azhar.
A typical Azhari graduate would normally thus learn to appreciate this plurality
of thought when engaging with Islamic texts, as is demonstrated by the following comment from a former student who is now a faculty member in one of
al-Azhar’s social science departments:
I studied at one of the secondary-level institutes run by al-Azhar and then
moved on to the university level. To me, al-Azhar presents the perfect model
of Islam. It defends tolerance and dialogue among Muslims as well as with
members of other religious communities. It defends the teaching of the major
Sunni madhāhib. It stands for moderate Islam but it also has space for Salafi
scholars. We need to learn to develop a distinction between scientific Salafis
and those who start to focus on the outer expressions of Salafism. Al-Azhar is
not opposed to engaging with Salafi discourse as it is one of the expressions of
Islam. But, at the same time it also nurtures Sufism.
Elaborating on the presence of Salafi scholars within al-Azhar, he continued:
Mohammad Hassan, Syed Ali Raza and Safari Hajazi are some of the very
prominent Salafi scholars who teach at al-Azhar. Most Egyptians love
Mohammad Hassan. There are degrees of Salafism. We are all Salafi, we all
go back to the Qurʾan and the Sunna but there are variations in how it is
applied. These Salafis from al-Azhar speak on many TV channels, such as
al-Rahman and al-Hafiz. Similarly, many shaykhs at al-Azhar have an affinity
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with the Muslim Brotherhood even though al-Azhar stays away from the
Muslim Brotherhood’s politics.
As Zeghal has noted in her influential work on al-Azhar, by harbouring these
multiple discourses within it, al-Azhar is able to provide a buffer zone between
radical and political Islam, on the one hand, and state-defined Islam, on the
other.24
Another interesting route through which to study al-Azhar’s centrism is to
reflect on the al-Azhar Document,25 wherein Shaykh al-Tayeb outlined a set
of principles for post-Arab Spring reforms in Egypt. The document outlined
a framework wherein Islam remained the main reference point for setting the
overall goals, but the day-to-day decisions were left to the will of the people to
be harnessed through a democratic process. Presenting the document to the
Egyptian public on national television, Shaykh al-Tayeb expressed his support
for a “democratic and constitutional” state. The al-Azhar Document contained
eleven main articles, and was meant to serve as a foundation for a new social
arrangement in post-Mubarak Egypt. Shaykh al-Tayeb laid out his support for a
democratic and constitutional state. The document emphasised that:
Freedom of opinion is the mother of all freedoms, and it is most manifest in
the free expression of opinion by all different means, including writing, oratory, artistic production and digital communication. Indeed, it is the manifestation of social freedoms, which goes beyond individuals to include, among
other things, the formation of parties and civil society institutions, the freedom of the press and the media, whether in audio, visual or digital form, and
the freedom to access the information needed for expression of opinion. This
freedom should be guaranteed by constitutional provision so as to transcend
ordinary laws, which are subject to change.
Freedom of religion was also emphasised, as were the rights of women and children. Shaykh al-Tayeb further argued for greater autonomy of al-Azhar from
the state; it was proposed that the Supreme Clerical Committee of al-Azhar
should be given the right to appoint the Shaykh al-Azhar, as was the practice
before its nationalisation. The document also argued strongly against religious
intolerance:
Also, based on the respect for the freedom of belief is the rejection of trends
that exclude others, condemn their beliefs and label them as disbelievers
amid attempts to examine the inner thoughts of those who hold those beliefs.
. . . the freedom of opinion and expression is the true manifestation of democracy, and they call for educating the new generations about the culture
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of freedom, the right to difference, and to show respect for others. . . . To
achieve this, we have to recall the classical civilizations and traditions of
Islamic thought, whose great imams would say, “I hold that my opinion is
right, yet may be wrong, and that the opinion of others is wrong, yet may be
right.”
Having attempted to define what is unique about al-Azhar’s al-Wasatiyya Islam,
it is worthwhile exploring how al-Azhar came to adopt this pluralistic outlook
to the teaching of Islam, which sets it in contrast to most other Islamic discourses which manifest more exclusionary tendencies. Just as the emergence
of Wahhabism and Iranian Shiʿism can be connected to certain contexts and
linked to certain personalities, so the emergence of al-Azhar’s centrism can be
traced to a combination of specific factors and individuals. What, then, led to
the emergence of al-Azhar’s notion of al-Wasatiyya Islam? The answer, which
will not surprise many social scientists, has a great deal to do with the context in
which Islam developed in Egypt.

The Ability to Stay in the Centre:
Domestic and International Factors
A combination of historical factors, strategic interventions and external overarching factors such as geography have contributed to the emergence of the centrism that has come to define al-Azhar. Two factors often identified by Azhari
scholars as crucial for the rise of al-Wasatiyya Islam are the location, and the
culture, of Egypt. Location was critical to the early emergence of al-Azhar and
its attaining prominence over rival institutions. As one of the senior historians
at al-Azhar has argued, it is the location and culture of Cairo that have helped
to maintain centrist Islam at the university:
People stopped here on the way to Mecca and many scholars ended up staying in Cairo for some period of time. This had a great influence in generating
a vibrant intellectual tradition at al-Azhar. Further, the culture of Egyptian
society is also more tolerant and that culture has kept Azhari shaykhs rooted
to a more centrist Islam which is more acceptable within the community.
The tenth–twelfth centuries are thought to represent the Golden Age of
al-Azhar: it was during these centuries that Cairo became the centre of Islamic
learning, and this was chiefly due to its location. The political instability in
Baghdad and Andalusia led to an exodus of Muslim scholars from both the
Mashriq and the Maghrib, and Cairo was their natural point of convergence.
The increasing number of prominent scholars at al-Azhar brought yet more
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scholars there, and this critical mass in turn started to attract students from
throughout the Muslim territories.
Al-Azhar’s organisational structure, which allows for a number of prominent
positions within the institution and thus engenders a degree of division of authority, has also helped to retain the plurality in discourse. No one has ever been fully
successful in enforcing change within al-Azhar from the top down. Muhammad
ʿAbduh, the reformist thinker, met with serious resistance to his proposed
reforms, even when he held the senior position of the Mufti of al-Azhar. Even
the current Shaykh al-Azhar has to carry along other scholars with him, such as
the mudı̄r (editor) of the al-Azhar publications, the senior ʿulama who lead the
al-Azhar Islamic Research Academy, and individually influential ʿulama who
have a public profile due to their publications or media presence. The existence
of these multiple platforms has been critical to retaining the centrist tendencies
within al-Azhar since its nationalisation in 1961. Al-Azhar’s ability to resist the
state’s edicts thus reveals the dynamism of the Azhari shaykhs; yet it also shows
recognition on the part of the Egyptian state that a certain level of autonomy
must be allowed if al-Azhar is to retain its religious authority, and thus on occasion be useful to the state in advancing its political ends.
Here it has to be acknowledged that the relationship with the modern state
since nationalisation, while compromising al-Azhar’s legitimacy in the eyes of
many, has also helped to consolidate its hold through increasing the level of
resources available to it, and, more importantly, by cementing al-Azhar’s position as the main religious institution in the country. Al-Azhar’s primary and secondary network has expanded rapidly since its nationalisation, and at the same
time al-Azhar has been very effective in retaining active links with the informal
religious networks, including independent mosques and Sufi halaqat which has
further helped to consolidate its authority.26
It is this ability to maintain a delicate balance between being dependent on
the state while keeping a certain level of autonomy that has enabled al-Azhar
to retain its global following. In addition, as seen in the widely different level
of respect enjoyed by Shaykh al-Tayeb as compared with his predecessor, the
personality and knowledge of the individual appointed as the Shaykh al-Azhar
also plays an important role in shaping public perceptions of the legitimacy of
al-Azhar.

The Future: Al-Azhar and the Arab Spring
Al-Azhar was cautious during the events of 25 January that forced Mubarak to
resign, but it stepped forward to claim a prominent place within the ensuing
discourses on the future of Egypt. Since the revolution challenged the authority
of existing state institutions in a context where no alternative institution was
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in a position to assert its authority, al-Azhar found itself an important player in
shaping public discourse. Al-Azhar credits itself with having played an important role in bridging differences among rival groups in the post-revolutionary
context. Its desire to influence the future is evident in the production of the
al-Azhar Document, discussed above. As noted by a senior shaykh in an interview conducted in March 2013:
al-Azhar is becoming stronger and stronger, beginning with the revolution of
25 January up to now. It has played a very important role in gathering people
across the divide on a single platform and reducing conflict between different
groups. This has been a very important role. The Shaykh al-Azhar is not a
political position but al-Azhar plays this role for the sake of the people.
The irony, however, is that, as in the past,27 it is precisely the presence
of other competing Islamic groups, namely, the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Salafist parties such as al-Nour, that made al-Azhar such an important player in
this period. The presence of these other Islamic platforms induced the secularists, closely followed by the Christians, to throw their weight behind al-Azhar,
which was seen as the moderate voice of Islam. Al-Azhar’s leadership clearly
took this opportunity seriously and, at the time of the fieldwork conducted for
this volume, was clear about its responsibility to respond to public expectations
that it play a dominant role in advancing the “middle-way Islam” both at home
and abroad. Al-Azhar’s leadership was also confident in its ability to continue
to bring opposing groups together and to play a reconciliatory role in the post-
revolutionary context.
What gave al-Azhar’s leadership particular confidence at the time of the
interviews was the recent legislative decision to give al-Azhar the ultimate
status to interpret Islamic doctrine, along with a clause that restored to al-Azhar
the old practice of the ʿulama selecting the Shaykh al-Azhar, rather than him
being appointed by the state.28 However, it was also argued that the Muslim
Brotherhood had not granted this prominence to al-Azhar by choice; rather
it had been forced to concede on these reforms by the five Azhari scholars
represented on the national constitution committee, who had the backing of
the secularist members. “We were not given this independence, we asked for
it”, asserted a senior official from the office of the Shaykh al-Azhar. Al-Azhar’s
positioning as a counter force to other streams of Islam, which were viewed as
more rigid, was also repeatedly expressed by respondents outside al-Azhar. As
one journalist at al-Ahram newspaper said:
It is in times like this that when one is seeing the failure of Muslim
Brotherhood and the rise of Salafis that one says thank God for al-Azhar.
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Al-Azhar is gaining increased importance and increased respect in the public
eye in the post-Arab Spring context, as it is being seen as a neutral force to
keep the extremist interpretations within the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Salafis at bay.
The relationship between the Shaykh al-Azhar and President Morsi remained
difficult, with the shaykh making many public expressions of his dissatisfaction
with the Morsi government. In March 2012, al-Azhar and its Islamic Research
Academy announced the withdrawal of their representative, the former Grand
Mufti of Egypt Shaykh Nasr Farid Wassel, from the constituent assembly, thus
joining a growing list of parties and figures resigning from the newly elected constituent assembly, claiming it had been marginalised. This followed the rejection of al-Azhar’s proposed eleven-article statement of general constitutional
principles. The most explicit expression of al-Azhar’s disenchantment with
the Muslim Brotherhood, however, came when the Shaykh al-Azhar demonstrated its support for the removal of President Morsi’s government by standing
alongside General al-Sisi.
President Morsi’s relationship with al-Azhar, however, seemed to be shaped
more by his difficulty in dealing with Shaykh al-Tayeb as a person than with
al-Azhar as an institution. The Muslim Brotherhood has never been against
granting al-Azhar an authoritative voice, but critics worried that, once in power,
the Brotherhood would want al-Azhar to promote its own brand of Islam. This
made many scholars doubt that al-Azhar would retain any influence on the
Morsi government: “It is not essential that they will have an ear for us”, a senior
shaykh at al-Azhar had noted. But if al-Azhar was worried about encroachment
from the Muslim Brotherhood, it was equally wary of the rise of Salafis after
the election. In the view of many Azhari scholars, the growth of the Salafis
happened through the unregulated mosques; some being of the view that in the
post-Mubarak period there is going to be even less surveillance of these mosques.
It is thus ironic that at one level it seems that it was more difficult for al-Azhar
to accept an Islamic government than to work with a secular state, since it was
expected that the Brotherhood would come up with its own interpretation of
Islam and desire to impose it on other religious spheres.
However, the recent developments in Egypt, where power has again reverted
to the armed forces after the toppling of the Morsi government, have for now
put an end to al-Azhar’s ambitions to play a prominent role in future social and
political reform. Given the constitutional protections afforded to al-Azhar under
the Morsi government, and despite the tension between the university and the
Brotherhood, Morsi’s rule had made Islam important to the national discourse
and thus enabled al-Azhar to claim a bigger role for itself as the arbiter of what
is considered moderate Islam. This was a natural outcome of a period of extreme
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political change, within which all social and political institutions had scope to
try to reconfigure their positions within society. With the reversal of this democratic process, and concentration of power back in military hands, al-Azhar, like
other civil institutions, will have limited space to do things differently. Thus,
the optimism about al-Azhar’s ability to gain independence from the Egyptian
state, which seemed plausible in the post-revolutionary context, now seems illfounded. Given the use of brutal force by General al-Sisi to crush the protests
staged by the Muslim Brotherhood, Shaykh al-Tayeb will have to show great
skill in balancing his support for this new military regime and retaining the
respect of Islamists, at home and abroad, who are likely to question his support
for the toppling of the Morsi government. However, as in the past, al-Azhar’s
domestic or international following will not be shaped by the individual actions
of the Shaykh al-Azhar, but by the diverse set of responses that generally emerge
from within al-Azhar at such moments of crisis. It is this plurality of thought
within al-Azhar that has always been, and will remain, its biggest strength.

Notes
1. Al-Azhar Mosque was established between 970 and 972. In 989, thirty-five teaching
positions were approved in order to establish the mosque as the leading platform for
the transmission of Ismaili doctrines.
2. Al-Azhar suffered neglect when the Sunni Ayyubid dynasty replaced the Fatimids’
hold over Cairo in 1171; but the Mamluks, who followed the Ayyubids, took an
active interest in al-Azhar and started to invest in stipends for students and teachers,
as well as contributing to the upkeep of the mosque building. One reason for this
was that by 1266 – the date when the Mamluks began actively to patronise al-Azhar
– the university had already shed its association with the Fatimids and Ismaili
doctrine.
3. At the time of fieldwork in March 2013, the current Shaykh al-Azhar, Ahmed
al-Tayeb, who was appointed in 2010 by the Mubarak regime, was seen as a reformist
who advocated a pluralistic and tolerant approach to Islam, in contrast to his predecessor, Mohammed Sayyid Tantawi (who held the position of Shaykh al-Azhar in
the period 1996–2010), who was criticised for endorsing controversial governmental rulings. Despite his Sorbonne education and modernist views, Ahmed al-Tayeb
had been able to retain respect within traditional religious circles because of his
more balanced yet assertive demeanour. Recent reports of ongoing student protests
within al-Azhar suggest, however, that his reputation might have suffered after his
decision to side with the al-Sisi government against the Muslim Brotherhood.
4. Interview with a senior scholar at the al-Azhar Islamic Research Academy, Cairo,
March 2013.
5. Al-Azhar has historically kept its distance from the Muslim Brotherhood. It has
refrained from direct engagement in politics and has been critical of the militant
tactics sometimes employed by the Muslim Brotherhood. See Steve Barraclough,
“Al-Azhar: Between the Government and the Islamists”, Middle East Journal, 52(2)
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11.

12.
13.
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(1998): 236–49; Meir Hatina, “Historical Legacy and the Challenge of Modernity
in the Middle East: The Case of al-Azhar in Egypt”, The Muslim World, 93 (2003):
51–68.
Official data from al-Azhar University, March 2013.
As will be discussed later, the nationalisation of al-Azhar did result in a questioning
of the authority of the fatwas issued from the seat of the Shaykh al-Azhar, who
holds a ministerial position and constantly has to juggle the pressure to endorse
government positions while retaining popular respect. However, the multiplicity of
voices within al-Azhar – which Zeghal credits to “periphery ʿulama” – has helped
al-Azhar to retain its authority despite the pressure to support the official position
on many issues. Muslims across the world continue to seek al-Azhar’s fatwas on critical religious issues. See Malika Zeghal, “The ‘Recentering’ of Religious Knowledge
and Discourse: The Case of al-Azhar in Twentieth-century Egypt”, in Robert W.
Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds), Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics
of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
Until its nationalisation in 1961, Azhari ʿulama exercised relative financial autonomy from the state, since much of al-Azhar’s income came through waqf properties. The ʿulama lost control over these resources when al-Azhar was nationalised,
thereby seriously curtailing their institutional autonomy. Scott Hibbard argues that
the nationalisation of waqf properties also allowed the government to distribute
waqf resources in such a way as to reward those who followed it and punish those
who did not. See Scott Hibbard, Religious Politics and Secular States: Egypt, India and
the United States (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).
The encounter with the colonial powers made successive Egyptian regimes appreciate Western learning and scientific techniques, leading to attempts to reform the
traditional structures of Islamic learning. Given al-Azhar’s prominent position in
the sphere of Islamic learning and the active role played by al-Azhari ʿulama in
resisting French rule, al-Azhar became a target for reform under both the colonial
and post-colonial regimes.
On Muhammad ʿAbduh’s reformist ideas and how his students influenced al-Azhar,
see Indira Falk Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolution
of Modern Sunni Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010).
However, as Gesink notes, many apparently orthodox ʿulama within al-Azhar who
were viewed as being opposed to ʿAbduh’s reformist ideals also actively took part
in supporting the educational reforms during the twentieth century because of their
own convictions about educational advancement. Gesink, Islamic Reform.
For details of subsequent reforms introduced by different governments, see Jakob
Skovgaard-Petersen’s entry in the Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 3, s.v. “al-Azhar,
Modern Period” (Leiden: Brill, 2010).
While for Egyptians al-Azhar remains the most prestigious university for securing
Islamic learning, its modern faculties are arguably second-best compared to other
Egyptian universities such as the University of Cairo. Al-Azhar’s strength is seen as
its being a specialist in Islamic sciences, not modern subjects.
Masooda Bano and Hilary Kalmbach (eds), Women, Leadership and Mosques: Changes
in Contemporary Islamic Authority (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
These new platforms have been associated with the breakdown of religious authority,
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24.
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but more often than not such spaces are occupied by those who have the endorsement of the established structures, including al-Azhar. Thus, it is yet to be seen
whether these spaces are really leading to a genuine breakdown of the authority of
traditional institutions, such that their endorsement would no longer be seen to be
important in shaping the legitimacy of a scholar who preaches online or on cable
TV channels.
Interview with one of the senior shaykhs at al-Azhar.
Zeghal, “The ‘Recentering’ of Religious Knowledge”.
Al-Azhar Grand Shaykh Ahmed al-Tayeb spoke immediately after General al-Sisi’s
televised speech, followed by a representative for the Coptic Christians and then
Mohamed El Baradei, the latter representing the anti-Morsi opposition (National
Salvation Front). All three stressed the need for national unity and reconciliation.
These two were major centres of Islamic learning in North Africa, but were consciously marginalised by the modern states in both these countries. On comparison
of state-led reform of al-Azhar and Zaytuna, see Malika Zeghal, “Public Institutions
of Religious Education in Egypt and Tunisia: Contrasting the Post-colonial Reforms
of al-Azhar and the Zaytuna”, in Osama Abi-Mershed (ed.), Trajectories of Education
in the Arab World: Legacies and Challenges (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 111–24.
Zeghal, “The ‘Recentering’ of Religious Knowledge”; Nathan Brown, PostRevolutionary al-Azhar (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2011).
Zeghal, “The ‘Recentering’ of Religious Knowledge”.
Brown, Post-Revolutionary al-Azhar, p. 11.
Shafiʿi, Maliki, Hanbali and Hanafi.
Zeghal, “The ‘Recentering’ of Religious Knowledge”; Brown, Post-Revolutionary
al-Azhar.
For an analysis of the actors who were involved in the production of major statements and documents that came out of al-Azhar after the January 2011 uprising, see
Gianluca P. Parolin, “Al-Azhar (?) on Fundamental Freedoms”, Islamochristiana, 38
(2012): 117–27.
Zeghal, “The ‘Recentering’ of Religious Knowledge”; Brown, Post-Revolutionary
al-Azhar.
See Barraclough, “Al-Azhar”; Hatina, Historical Legacy.
The new committee that was to select the Shaykh al-Azhar was to consist of forty-five scholars, who had to be Egyptians and have sound knowledge of Islamic
principles, as well as being prominent personalities with significant publications.
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Part Two
Returning Graduates in Negotiation
with the Local

Chapter 4

Ahlussunnah:
A Preaching Network from Kano to
Medina and Back
Alex Thurston1

How and when do Nigerian graduates of the Islamic University of Medina
(IUM) refer to their studies in Saudi Arabia? In what contexts do these graduates invoke the authority of prominent contemporary Saudi and Middle Eastern
religious thinkers? This chapter discusses a network of Salafi leaders in Kano,
northern Nigeria, many of whom graduated from IUM. They are not the only
graduates of IUM in Kano, and not all Nigerian graduates of IUM are Salafis.
But this network is notable for its wide youth following, strong media presence,
and its ability to provoke religious and political controversy. The members
of this network refer to themselves as “Ahl al-Sunna wa-al-Jamaʿa” (Arabic:
The People of the Prophetic Model and the Muslim Community, hereafter
“Ahlussunnah”).2 Non-Salafi Sunni Muslims, including Sufis with whom Salafis
have sometimes debated, also use this phrase to describe their religious affiliations. For many Salafis in Kano, however, the label “Ahlussunnah” carries
a specific connotation. It stresses what they see as the universal applicability
and necessity, across time and space, of the Salafi view of what it means to be
Muslim.
The word “Salafism” derives from the Arabic salaf, or “pious ancestors”:
the companions of the Prophet Muhammad and the next two generations of
Muslims. Following Thomas Hegghammer, I treat Salafism as a “theological, not
a political category”.3 Salafi theology, as elucidated by Bernard Haykel, includes
a conviction that the Qurʾan and sunna (the model of conduct established by
the Prophet, as articulated through hadith reports) provide a universal model
of orthopraxis and an emphasis on the notion of tawh∙ ı̄d, or the unicity of God.4
Salafis oppose Shiʿism and denounce certain esoteric beliefs and ritual practices,
including some associated with Sufi orders.
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As Hegghammer points out, there is an identifiable “Salafi intellectual posture” and “a set of Salafi intellectual traditions”.5 The Salafi intellectual posture
includes a set of methodologies for distinguishing strong versus weak hadiths
and for elevating strong hadiths above other sources of legal thought, even the
established rulings of traditional Sunni legal schools. The intellectual tradition
that constitutes Salafism includes figures from different eras: hadith collectors
and critics from the formative period of Islamic law (such as Imam Ahmad
bin Hanbal, 780–855); the late classical polymath Shaykh ibn Taymiyya
(1263–1328) and his students; the early modern Arabian reformer Shaykh
Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (1703–92); twentieth-century scholars such
as the Albanian hadith master Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914–99); and
senior clerics within the official Saudi religious establishment, such as Shaykh
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz (1910–99) and Shaykh Muhammad ibn ʿUthaymin
(1926–2001). Treating Salafism as a tradition, rather than as a decontextualised
literalist movement, calls attention to the particularities of Salafi expression
in discourse, dress, preaching and other domains. Examining Salafis’ sense of
belonging to a tradition helps to clarify why Kano’s Salafis have stressed the
symbolic connection between their own position as a minority within Kano’s
Muslim community and their perceived predecessors’ positions as minorities
within their communities.
Across different contexts in which they speak, Ahlussunnah leaders in Kano
consistently stress the Salafi themes noted above. As Ahlussunnah leaders
convey these core messages in different formats and to different audiences, however, they highlight different aspects of the Salafi intellectual canon. In messages
aimed at popular audiences, they draw frequently on scripture and on what I refer
to here as the “classical Salafi canon”, that is, the set of thinkers that spans the
period from Imam Hanbal to Shaykh ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. Ahlussunnah leaders
invoke Shaykh ibn Taymiyya with particular consistency. Ahlussunnah leaders
have criticised certain Nigerian politicians and lamented extra-local conflicts
involving Muslims, such as the 2003–10 war in Iraq. Yet within the contemporary Salafi canon, which includes thinkers with diverse attitudes towards political activism, Ahlussunnah leaders’ intellectual allegiances have been to Saudi
and Middle Eastern scholars often described in secondary literature as politically
quietist, rather than to the Sahwa (Arabic: Awakening) movement identified
with Saudi Salafi scholars influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Dr
Safar al-Hawali (b. 1950) and Dr Salman al-ʿAwda (b. 1955/6).6
In contrast to their efforts to acquaint the public and their students with
classical Salafi thinkers, Ahlussunnah leaders most frequently invoke what I
refer to as the “contemporary Salafi canon” – which includes al-Albani, Bin Baz
and ʿUthaymin – in technical discussions concerning the contours of Islamic
orthopraxis and the validity of specific legal rulings. These technical discussions
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include a broader version of the classical Salafi canon, and also make reference
to nineteenth-century thinkers such as the Yemeni scholar Shaykh Muhammad
bin ʿAli al-Shawkani (d. 1834). Technical discussions have occurred in several contexts, notably in Ahlussunnah leaders’ debates with rival Salafis. In
those debates, Ahlussunnah leaders have evoked their learning at IUM, and
the authority of Salafi thinkers from the last two centuries, to undermine rival
Salafis’ religious claims and credentials.
Ahlussunnah’s preaching and literary production present a valuable case
through which to examine how graduates of institutions such as IUM use and
reconfigure their overseas learning after they return home. This chapter focuses
on the lives, statements and teachings of three Ahlussunnah leaders: Shaykh
Jaʿfar Mahmud Adam (1961/2–2007, hereafter “Shaykh Jaʿfar”), his associate
and biographer Dr Muhammad Sani Umar Rijiyar Lemo (b. 1970, hereafter
“Dr Sani”), and his companion Shaykh Abdulwahhab Abdullah (b. 1953, hereafter “Shaykh Abdulwahhab”). I do not claim that IUM exercises hegemonic
influence over its graduates. In terms of their educational formation, Kano’s
Ahlussunnah leaders are products of multiple institutions, including traditional educational settings in northern Nigeria. Graduates of IUM in Kano’s
Ahlussunnah do not, furthermore, represent a deculturised Salafism. Rather,
they mediate between local particularities and phenomena that they portray as
universal. They use Salafi traditions, historical narratives and Islamic scriptures
to read Nigeria’s experiences into the history of Salafism and a global geography
of perceived assaults against Islam. Saudi Arabia is a powerful reference point in
Ahlussunnah discourses, but it remains only one of several.
After tracing the educational trajectories of several Ahlussunnah leaders,
this chapter examines debates between Ahlussunnah leaders and other Salafis.
These rivals include members of the mass-based organisation Jamaʿa Izala
al-Bidʿa wa-Iqama al-Sunna (Arabic: The Society for the Removal of Heresy
and the Instatement of the Prophetic Model, hereafter Izala). Another rival
was Muhammad Yusuf (1970–2009), founder of the violent sect known as Boko
Haram (Hausa: Western Education/Culture is Forbidden; in Arabic: Jamaʿat
Ahl al-Sunna li-al-Daʿwa wa al-Jihad, The Society of Salafis for Preaching and
Jihad). Relations between Kano’s Ahlussunnah and these other Salafi movements have been complex, including both cooperation and conflict. Shaykh
Jaʿfar and Dr Sani belonged to Izala in the 1980s and 1990s, and continued to partner with Izala leaders – including graduates of IUM – during the
2000s. Yet Ahlussunnah leaders rejected doctrinal positions that certain Izala
preachers took, and distanced themselves from the organisation while emphasising a broader Salafi identity. Yusuf, meanwhile, was a student of Shaykh
Jaʿfar until the mid-2000s, at which point the shaykh publicly denounced his
teachings, particularly his assertions that Muslims should not seek government
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employment or “Western-style” education. Ahlussunnah leaders, in debates
with former associates and theological colleagues, emphasised their intellectual connections to Saudi Arabia and their mastery of Salafi traditions and
methodologies. This move helped them to claim that they represented sober,
well-credentialed scholarly authority in contrast to opponents they cast as rhetorically irresponsible and poorly trained. The chapter closes with an examination of how Ahlussunnah leaders shift intellectual registers as they write and
speak to different audiences.

Ahlussunnah Leaders’ Paths to Medina and Back7
Since its founding in 1961, IUM has been a Salafi intellectual centre and a site
for training missionaries meant to carry Salafism back to their home communities (see Chapter 2 on IUM in this volume). Though not all Nigerians who
attend IUM are Salafis, many Nigerians have been influenced by Salafi thought
before, during and after their stay. For example, Dr Sani writes of Shaykh Jaʿfar’s
devotion to the works of Shaykh al-Albani, who taught at IUM briefly during
the 1960s, and whose student and follower Dr Rabiʿ al-Madkhali (b. 1931)
exercised substantial influence at the university when he taught there during the
1980s and 1990s. “Hardly would a new book by Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani
come out than [Shaykh Jaʿfar] would rush to look for it, purchase it, and study
it.”8 Yet Ahlussunnah preachers, once they returned to Kano, were not mere
conduits for Saudi Arabian interests or ideologies. They participated in local
culture and politics, both as agents seeking to translate religious ideals into
social realities and as participants, sometimes unwillingly, in political struggles.
Of the eleven men who were the most prominent Salafi preachers in Kano
as of 2012,9 at least six graduated from IUM.10 This section focuses on five graduates of IUM: Shaykh Jaʿfar, Dr Sani, Shaykh Abdulwahhab, Dr Bashir Aliyu
Umar (b. 1961) and Dr Abdullahi Salih Pakistan. As discussed below, by the
2000s the first four men no longer identified themselves primarily as members of
Izala, while Dr Pakistan remained a senior Izala leader. Since his assassination
on 13 April 2007 by unknown gunmen, Shaykh Jaʿfar’s fame and influence have
continued to grow. He was the most prominent public face (often literally, on
CD and DVD covers) of Salafism in Kano as of 2011–12.
Graduates of IUM have come from different social backgrounds. For example, Dr Bashir’s grandfather and other male ancestors held the Imamate of
Kano, while Shaykh Jaʿfar came from more humble origins. Some, like Dr Sani
and Dr Bashir, are Kano men. Others, like Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Pakistan (of
Daura in Katsina State) and Shaykh Abdulwahhab (of the Republic of Togo)
immigrated to Kano. The Salafi community is politically diverse. Salafi leaders
took different stances towards Kano’s governor Ibrahim Shekarau, who held
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office for the period 2003–11. Shaykh Abdulwahhab served as a member of the
Zakat Committee, the Shariʿa Commission, and the Shura Committee under
Shekarau, while Shaykh Jaʿfar openly opposed Shekarau by 2007. Finally, the
preachers’ educational backgrounds differ, though all of them had experience
of different educational tracks, both formal and informal, and blended them in
their teachings. Some, like Shaykh Abdulwahhab and Shaykh Jaʿfar, studied
extensively inside the traditional system. Others initially had greater exposure
to Western-style schools and universities. Dr Bashir says that his “first contact
with deep Islamic education” came only in his twenties.
The paths these men took to Saudi Arabia varied, although the tightly networked nature of the group means that some went at the suggestion of their
friends. The first to go were Dr Pakistan and Shaykh Abdulwahhab, who in
1981 went, respectively, to Medina and Mecca. Saudi Arabia began its Dawra
(Arabic: “tour”, i.e., educational programmes aimed at recruiting students) in
northern Nigeria in that year. Shaykh Pakistan, who held a secondary certificate from the Arabic Teachers’ College in Gwale, completed a BA in Qurʾanic
Studies at IUM in 1985. From 1986 to 1991, he lived in Pakistan. He completed
an MA at the Islamic University in Islamabad in 1989 and, from 1989 to 1991,
supervised schools run by the Muslim World League. Shaykh Abdulwahhab
attended primary and secondary school in Mecca before proceeding to IUM,
where he obtained his BA in 1991.
Dr Bashir enrolled in Electrical Engineering at Ahmadu Bello University in
Zaria in 1978. He joined Nigeria’s Muslim Students’ Society, many of whose
members became politically inspired by the Iranian revolution of 1979. After
helping his peers destroy the alcohol at the faculty club, Dr Bashir was expelled.
Back in Kano, he worked as a water engineer, but continued to study Islamic
subjects and give religious lectures. He participated in the dawra in 1981, but
declined a scholarship to Saudi Arabia, partly out of fear that abandoning his
career might produce family conflict. After a period of soul-searching, he gave
up his post to pursue the path of Islamic learning. When he made hajj in 1986,
Shaykh Abdulwahhab convinced him to apply to IUM; he joined the Faculty of
Hadith in 1988. He obtained his BA, MA and PhD from IUM, completing the
latter in 2004.
Shaykh Jaʿfar took a different route to Medina. While a youth, he memorised
the Qurʾan as an itinerant student. He then studied with traditional scholars in
Kano, learning Maliki legal manuals like the Mukhtas∙ar of Khalil, but also reading works like Shayh Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s Kitab al-Tawhid (Book
of the Unicity of God). The early 1980s was a pivotal time for Shaykh Jaʿfar. He
studied at an evening literacy programme. At the Egyptian Cultural Centre, an
instructor taught him the recitation of the Qurʾan (tajwı̄d). Undoubtedly this
training played a role in Shaykh Jaʿfar’s victory in a 1987 Qurʾan competition,
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another turning point in his life. After winning the Nigerian competition,
Shaykh Jaʿfar was placed fifth in the international competition in Saudi Arabia.
This accomplishment solidified his status as a rising reformist preacher and
paved the way for his scholarship to IUM. In 1987, Shaykh Jaʿfar obtained a
secondary diploma at the Arabic Teachers’ College of Gwale;11 in 1989, he
obtained a scholarship to IUM, where he joined the Qurʾan College. Dr Sani,
who attended primary and secondary schools in Kano, completed a higher secondary certificate at the Arabic Teachers’ College in 1989 and joined Shaykh
Jaʿfar at IUM the following year. Despite the diverse paths these men took to
Medina, significant commonalities emerge, including exposure to traditional
northern Nigerian Islamic educational curricula and, in almost all cases, some
attendance at Nigerian secondary schools and/or universities.
The Nigerian students found IUM academically challenging and intellectually enriching. In addition to their classroom learning, the Nigerians studied
extensively with scholars in mosques. Dr Bashir said the atmosphere was lively
in Medina during his undergraduate days: “Everything was new to me.” He had
classes from morning until the asr (mid-afternoon) prayer, then he would read at
home. At maghrib (evening prayer), he came to the mosque for lessons. During
his first two years at IUM, a former vice chancellor of the university and an associate of Shaykh bin Baz, Shaykh ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-Abbad (b. 1934), taught
Sahih al-Bukhari, the most famous hadith collection in the Muslim world.12 This
kind of study enhanced the young preachers’ command of scripture and their
ability to cite textual evidence in lectures and debates back home in Nigeria.
Life in Medina and the Nigerians’ relations with Arabs were not free of problems and racial discrimination. Dr Bashir mentioned several incidents of racism
to me, including harassment by Saudi Arabian traffic police. Once, he related,
he was with his son in the library of the Prophet’s Mosque. His son sneezed.
An attendant brought a tissue, but another attendant said he should not bring
children to the mosque, citing a hadith. When Dr Bashir told him this hadith
was weak, the attendant asked who he was, an African, to challenge him on
a hadith. Some Saudis, Dr Bashir said, think Africans have “no background
knowledge of Islam”.
In interviews, Ahlussunnah leaders characterised the religious landscape in
the kingdom both positively and negatively. Shaykh Muhammad Nazifi Inuwa
(b. 1970) mentioned that Saudi Arabian society was more closed to new ideas
than either Sudan (where he also studied) or Nigeria, but he said that this
atmosphere did not make his time there unpleasant.13 Dr Pakistan said that
Saudi Arabia funds charity and social welfare much more lavishly than Nigeria
does, but he added that Nigerian society is more pious. Another difference Dr
Pakistan mentioned is that in Saudi Arabia, the government pays and supervises
preachers and imams. “Therefore”, he said approvingly, “unrest seldom occurs
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there.” In Nigeria, Dr Pakistan continued, people say whatever they want. They
live by what they can get from their supporters, which leads to kadhib (lying) and
dajl (trickery) – a reference to Salafis’ feeling that many Sufi shaykhs are charlatans who exploit their followers.14 Order in the kingdom did not, however, stifle
debate among the students themselves.
Salafi leaders maintained ties to Nigeria throughout their time in Medina,
visiting Nigeria periodically and remaining abreast of developments there
through correspondence. They returned permanently to Nigeria at different
times: Shaykh Abdulwahhab in 1991; Shaykh Jaʿfar in 1993; and Drs Bashir and
Sani, who obtained PhDs in Medina, in 2004 and 2005, respectively.
Following his return from Medina, Shaykh Jaʿfar returned to the teaching
and lecturing circuits to which he had belonged before leaving for the university. He also created new institutions. He became director of the Uthman
bin Affan group, a mosque and school complex established in the Gadon
Kaya neighbourhood of Kano’s old city by one of his local patrons. Shaykh
Abdulwahhab worked closely with him there.15 The mosque in Gadon Kaya
has remained a central institution for the movement. As of 2012, Dr Sani and
Shaykh Abdulwahhab still offered lessons there. Dr Bashir began his preaching
there after his return from Saudi Arabia, before the al-Furqan Mosque, where he
became imam, opened in 2007.16 Graduates of IUM have maintained connections to Saudi Arabia through pilgrimages and visits; in 2011, for example, Dr
Bashir was a royal guest on the hajj.
In a further demonstration of educational hybridity, IUM was often not
the endpoint of the Kano Salafis’ educational trajectories. Shaykh Jaʿfar, after
completing his BA in Medina, later entered (and subsequently left) an MA programme in Islamic Studies at Bayero University, Kano. He completed an MA
at the Africa International University in Khartoum and enrolled (before his
death) in a PhD programme at Usman Danfodiyo University in Sokoto (where
Dr Pakistan obtained his PhD in 2006). The paths that led to Medina often led
back to Nigeria or to other destinations in Africa and/or the Arab world.
Advanced educational credentials placed these graduates in a tiny minority
of Nigerians and helped them to reach diverse audiences. Despite their own
relative youth within a scholarly gerontocracy, Shaykh Jaʿfar and other preachers earned a strong following among Kano youth who have seen them not only
as credible scholars, but also as down-to-earth speakers who address issues like
marriage, sex, family, politics, community conflicts and creed without euphemism or obfuscation. While audiences at study circles have often been primarily
male, Ahlussunnah preachers have reached women through radio, recordings
and co-educational lectures in mosques. Their advanced educational credentials
have earned Ahlussunnah some following among politicians, civil servants and
professionals. The relationships between graduates of IUM and these different
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groups show how Ahlussunnah preachers have partially targeted their lectures
to local audiences’ concerns.
Shaykh Jaʿfar’s popularity and influence began to soar by the end of the
1990s. In 2000, as the Kano State government was moving to re-implement
shariʿa, he served on a ten-man review committee for the draft shariʿa code,
indicating his position as a representative of a major religious constituency.17 By
1999, Shaykh Jaʿfar’s followers had begun to systematically record his lectures,
dozens of which still circulated in Kano as of 2012. By the mid-2000s, after Dr
Sani and Dr Bashir returned home, the Ahlussunnah network had representatives in some of the city’s most prominent institutions, including BUK (Dr
Bashir) and the Shekarau administration (Shaykh Abdulwahhab, Dr Bashir).
Over three decades, this network of young activists became a major force in the
religious and political life of one of Nigeria’s largest cities.

The Invocation of IUM and the Salafi Canon in
Debates between Ahlussunnah and Izala
Ahlussunnah leaders have sometimes broken with other Nigerian Salafis over
Islamic legal issues. In the 1990s, Ahlussunnah leaders partly distanced themselves from the mass reformist movement Izala, to which many of them had
belonged in their youth, due to disagreements with Izala hardliners over ritual
issues connected to Salafis’ interactions with Sufis. In the mid-2000s Shaykh
Jaʿfar denounced his former student Muhammad Yusuf, who founded the group
Boko Haram, over disagreements concerning the permissibility of Muslims seeking Western-style education and working for secular governments (see next section). Some of the most prominent examples of Ahlussunnah leaders invoking
their learning at Medina, their mastery of Salafi canons and methodologies, and
their respect for thinkers in the global Salafi arena have occurred during debates
with other Salafis.
The course of the relationship between Shaykh Jaʿfar, Dr Sani, and other
young preachers, on the one hand, and Izala, on the other, illustrates processes of
de-localisation and re-localisation, processes discussed at greater length below.
In terms of de-localisation, Ahlussunnah has at times downplayed its connections to Izala in favour of asserting an allegedly universal identity as Salafis. Yet
Ahlussunnah has then re-inscribed this universal identity in the local environment by means of connecting local struggles to broader histories and geographies.
An ability to shift between addressing local concerns and claiming transcendent
identities has lain at the heart of Ahlussunnah’s rhetorical power.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, new Islamic tendencies flourished in northern
Nigeria. These tendencies offered alternatives to the Sufi orders that had previously dominated much religious activity in the region. One new movement
— 100 —

A Preaching Network fro m K ano t o M ed i n a a n d B a c k
was Izala, which Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Sani joined in the 1980s. Izala was
founded in 1978 in Jos under the leadership of Shaykh Ismail Idris (1936–2000),
with Shaykh Abubakar Gumi (1924–92), former Grand Qadi (judge) of the
defunct regional government of Northern Nigeria, as the movement’s spiritual
mentor. Izala established branches in other northern cities, including Kano.
Izala’s preachers encountered opposition from Sufis inside Kano’s old city, but
had greater success preaching in areas like Fagge, where Shaykh Jaʿfar partly
grew up.18 Izala’s young preachers, like Shaykh Jaʿfar, taught children and adults
how to read, recite and interpret the Qurʾan, and offered lessons in hadith and
fiqh (jurisprudence).19
In Kano, Izala spread Salafism by assembling a coalition of young preachers
and older businessmen who fought micro-political battles to create alternative
religious spaces to the Sufi-dominated mosques. Kano’s Emirate Council controlled the establishment of mosques, especially Friday mosques, of which there
were only five in Kano by the early 1980s. Izala’s activists established worship
spaces in private homes and broadcast their sermons through loudspeakers.
These tactics brought conflict with Sufis and with the emir, who ultimately
allowed Izala some freedom.20 Izala’s re-inscription of urban space was paralleled by an inversion of older relationships between clerics and businessmen, a
process that has occurred within other Salafi movements elsewhere in Africa.21
Rather than wealthy Sufi clerics “overshadowing” businessmen, businessmen
began recruiting and supporting Izala’s young preachers. In this pattern, “unlike
the Sufi Shaykh, the cleric is not supposed to have any extraordinary powers.
So, spiritually, he is assumed to be the equal of the businessman.”22 Studies
of Izala have sometimes asserted that funding from Saudi Arabia and Shaykh
Gumi’s personal connections to the kingdom played decisive roles in the spread
of the movement. But during the 1980s, many of the movement’s preachers
were trained within northern Nigeria, and much of its funding came from local
business people. It is especially noteworthy that Shaykh Jaʿfar, one of the most
famous Izala preachers to have studied in the Arab world after Shaykh Gumi
himself (who attended Bakht er Ruda Teachers’ College in Sudan in 1954–5),
would eventually reassess his relationship with Izala.
Shortly after its founding, politics and theological disputes began dividing
Izala. In Kano, Ousmane Kane writes, “One patron tried to turn the preachers
into an institutional channel for the negotiation of relations with the state”,
side-lining and alienating some activists.23 The society became divided over
the question of whether Sufis should be regarded as Muslims.24 By the mid1980s, the preachers who would later make up the Ahlussunnah network began
to distance themselves from some elements of Izala. Dr Sani writes: “I had
some heated situations with some of the extremists [mutat∙arrifı̄n] in [Izala], for
I leaned more toward reviving correct knowledge and spreading it than toward
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establishing preaching assemblies.”25 These disagreements grew into Shaykh
Jaʿfar’s and Dr Sani’s decision to break with Izala during their time in Medina.
At IUM, the Nigerian students formed tight bonds with each other and
with other African students. Dr Sani relates that he, Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr
Ibrahim Jallo of Taraba State formed an extracurricular study circle dedicated
to reading works by Shaykh ibn Taymiyya. “One doctrinal affiliation brought us
together, and that was affiliation to [Izala], as duʿāt [preachers] in it. We were
comrades before the university, and we became more connected at the university.”26 At the same time that membership in Izala linked them, however, the
Nigerian students found new opportunities for reflection and debate. At IUM,
the young preachers cultivated the spirit of intra-Muslim pluralism that they
felt Izala lacked. Shaykh Jaʿfar later said: “We would gather books and read, or
we would open a chapter in a book. [Dr Sani] would read or I would read and we
would comment on it to each other. Sometimes we would agree, sometimes we
would differ, and so forth.”27
During their time at IUM, the circle around Shaykh Jaʿfar came to feel that
they had textual evidence to support their stances against the Izala hardliners – a
significant asset in a tradition that prizes textual evidence as the decisive criterion for settling disputes. Dr Sani writes that study and debate in Medina took
on a wider scope than discussions inside Izala circles at home. “When we met
together at the campus of the Islamic University, we would re-examine many
of the preaching issues (al-qad∙ āya al-daʿwiyya) that [Izala] had adopted”, such as
“the issue of prayer behind the heretic (mubtadiʿ), or the one whose status [as a
believer or unbeliever] is unknown (al-mastūr), and the issue of eating something
sacrificed by Sufis.”28 On the latter issue, Dr Sani mentions that he read works
by Shaykh Muhammad Siddiq Hasan al Qinnawji (d. 1890), a thinker from
the Indian subcontinent who belonged to the Ahl-e Hadith movement, which
influenced later Salafi thinkers. Dr Sani also read texts by Shaykh Muhammad
bin ʿAli al-Shawkani (d. 1834), a scholar from Yemen widely cited by Salafis.
Both these authors “increased my conviction [qanāʿati] in my stance”.29
Dr Sani’s invocation of these figures has at least two salient contexts. First,
he mentions them while recalling a legal debate with Izala hardliners in the
1990s; canonical Salafis become intellectual authorities supporting his stances.
Secondly, he mentions these figures in a book attempting to define Shaykh
Jaʿfar’s legacy – and the identity of his successors in the Ahlussunnah network
– after the shaykh’s death. By invoking canonical Salafis, Dr Sani suggests that
time in Medina expanded his and Shaykh Jaʿfar’s command of the canon to a
degree that the Izala hardliners could not match. It is worth reiterating that Dr
Sani’s biography of Shaykh Jaʿfar was written in Arabic, not Hausa. Given the
large number of Nigerian figures and places Dr Sani mentions in the book, often
without providing much contextual information, the general Arabic-reading
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global public might find the book difficult to follow at times, suggesting Dr Sani
may have intended Nigerian Arabophone scholars as his primary audience. It
is also worth noting that in his oral, Hausa-language intellectual autobiography
“Tarihin Rayuwata a Ilmi” (“The History of My Intellectual Life”), Shaykh Jaʿfar
mentions IUM only briefly, and includes little discussion of the Salafi intellectual canon. In “Tarihin Rayuwata” and another lecture, “Gwagwarmaya tsakanin Gaskiya da Karya” (Hausa: “The Struggle between Truth and Falsehood”),
Shaykh Jaʿfar glossed over his circle’s split with Izala, referring to his period of
Izala membership in the 1980s without rancour and, simultaneously, identifying Izala – even in the 1980s – as part of Ahlussunnah.30 In different contexts,
Ahlussunnah leaders have presented different framings of their relationship
with Izala, as well as of the significance of their time in Medina with regard to
that relationship.
In 1991, while Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Sani were at IUM, Izala split into two
camps, based, respectively, in Jos and Kaduna. The sympathies of Shaykh Jaʿfar
and Dr Sani lay with the latter, which they perceived as more moderate and less
authoritarian. The Jos camp, Dr Sani writes, went too far in “excommunicating without any thinking” (“takfı̄r bilā ʿadna tafkı̄r”).31 Significantly, in Kano,
where Izala also split, the leader of those aligned with Kaduna was Dr Pakistan,
an alumnus of IUM. Despite their sympathies for Kaduna, the students around
Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Sani at IUM remained neutral. Dr Sani writes: “When this
split occurred, we decided to meet with all the students in the university belonging to [Izala], and take one stance characterised by neutrality (al-h∙ iyādı̄ya) and
justice (al-ʿadāla), and not support a side against the other side.” They authored
a “letter of advice” (risāla nas∙ı̄h∙ a) to the two sides and delegated Shaykh Jaʿfar to
deliver it.32 Dr Sani describes this episode as a formative experience in Shaykh
Jaʿfar’s career as a preacher:
There is no doubt that this stance that the students took then is what
formed for the brother [Shaykh Jaʿfar], may Allah have mercy on him, an
intellectual basis for launching his preaching after his return to Nigeria. It
created for the Salafi daʿwa a special air, and gave it a distinguished dimension in Nigerian society. After some of the students had been fettered by
the decisions [Izala] issued, they became free in their daʿwa and free in their
approach, not compelled to follow a certain person who would impose his
views on them.33
In the 1990s, as Shaykh Jaʿfar and his circle began to present Ahlussunnah as
a category that transcended the boundaries of Izala as an organisation, their
preaching became accessible to new constituencies, especially professionals and
civil servants. Dr Sani writes:
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There had been among them some who evaded sunna because of the harshness [ghilz∙a] in social interaction, cruelty in expression, and excess in takfı̄r
and driving people out [tanfı̄r] which characterised some individuals of the
Society. Then when they saw a form of daʿwa unaligned with a sect, not
fanatic toward a group, and at the same time one whose leaders were endowed
with the spirit of good treatment toward the one who is different, they appreciated sunna. [Shaykh Jaʿfar], may Allah have mercy on him, was a pioneer
and a leader in this direction.34
The graduates of IUM placed a premium on the ability to demonstrate textual knowledge. In recruiting teachers for lessons at the mosque, Shaykh Jaʿfar
emphasised scholarly credentials, for he “saw the majority of those who undertook daʿwa and instruction as weak in knowledge and poor in understanding”.35
Graduates of IUM were attempting to enforce a new standard for intellectual
accomplishment among reformist preachers, and to shift the tone and focus of
their preaching.
For Shaykh Jaʿfar and his circle, shifting the emphasis from identifying
themselves as members of Izala to describing themselves as representatives of
Ahlussunnah was a way of universalising their identity. As one Nigerian Salafi
graduate of IUM, Shaykh Abdullahi Garangamawa, explained, Izala is, from the
perspective of Ahlussunnah, “only an organisation”, one with a specific history
and context. Ahlussunnah, on the other hand, is “an approach, dating from the
time of the Messenger of God”, distinguished by adherence to the Qurʾan and
the sunna. “Everyone you see inside [Izala] is Ahlussunnah, but it is not necessary for everyone who is Ahlussunnah to be inside [Izala].” Some Ahlussunnah
members preferred not to label themselves as Izala, Shaykh Garangamawa
added, “Because in the past, there was foolishness . . . and excommunications
and some things that had no basis.”36
At IUM, Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Sani underwent at least two intellectual shifts.
First, deepening their disagreements with Izala hardliners, they adopted somewhat greater tolerance for certain interactions with Sufis. Secondly, they began
preaching outside the context of a formalised, hierarchical organisation. IUM
has remained a potent reference point in Dr Sani’s presentation of his circle’s
break with Izala.
Not all Nigerian Salafis had the same experience at IUM. Some members of
Izala found confirmation for their theological stances and remained within the
Izala fold. Still others promoted reform within Izala. Dr Pakistan, who rose to
leadership within Kano Izala after 1991, told me that he moved the society’s
emphasis from takfı̄r (excommunication) to taʿlı̄m (education).37 It is important
also not to exaggerate the extent of the split between Shaykh Jaʿfar’s circle
and Izala. Ahlussunnah continued to work with the movement, especially with
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reformers like Dr Pakistan. Ahlussunnah and Izala leaders are interconnected
through friendship, marriage and kinship. In conflicts with hereditary Muslim
rulers and other adversaries, Izala and Ahlussunnah have often presented a
united front. As illustrated in earlier chapters, the different initial dispositions
of various Nigerian students (as for other nationalities, see Chapter 2) at IUM
have been an important variable in shaping the specific intellectual influences
they absorb while at IUM. Platforms such as IUM can transmit specific Salafi
ideas and traditions globally, but such transmission is not hegemonic and has
inherent limits.

The Invocation of IUM and the Salafi Canon in Debates between
Ahlussunnah and Boko Haram
The emergence of Boko Haram around 2002 in northeastern Nigeria extended
the ongoing fragmentation of Salafism in Nigeria. This sect was originally centred on its founder Muhammad Yusuf, who built a following through personal
charisma, strident rhetoric and, possibly, connections to wealthy and politically
powerful patrons. The sect clashed with authorities in 2003–4 and again in
a massive uprising in 2009, during which Yusuf died in police custody. Since
2010, under the formal leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram has conducted assassinations, bombings and raids directed at Nigerian security forces,
Christians, businesses accused of collaborating with the state, and other targets.
Boko Haram presents itself as a Salafi group. The group’s formal name, Ahl
al-Sunna li-al-Daʿwa wa-al-Jihad, translates as “The People of the Prophetic
Model Who Conduct Preaching and Jihad”. The label “Ahl al-Sunna”, as with
the circle around Shaykh Jaʿfar, evokes Salafi self-presentations as the custodians of the Prophet’s legacy. In further Salafi symbolism, Muhammad Yusuf’s
mosque in Maiduguri was named after Shaykh ibn Taymiyya.
Yusuf was at one time a prominent student of Shaykh Jaʿfar. The latter had
a presence in Maiduguri, where he often conducted tafsı̄r (exegesis) sessions
during Ramadan. Boko Haram’s political stances, however, placed it outside the
scope of mainstream Salafism in northern Nigeria. After Yusuf came to reject
the permissibility of Muslims working for secular governments and the validity
of Western education, Shaykh Jaʿfar broke with him. Boko Haram’s use of the
“Ahlussunnah” label may represent an effort to lay claim to the Salafi daʿwa in
northern Nigeria, in rivalry with Shaykh Jaʿfar’s successors.
The extended public debate between Shaykh Jaʿfar and Muhammad Yusuf
has been analysed in depth by the anonymous author of an article on Boko
Haram. As the author writes, Yusuf, who “was largely self-educated, without
the benefit of formal schooling”, took a “shortcut to prominence by articulating
a new discourse that stridently emphasised Salafi doctrines on a host of issues
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. . . His followers were attracted by his ultra-Salafi doctrines, his heavy reliance
on Ibn Taymiyya . . . and his incredible ability to solidly marshal Salafi arguments in support of his seemingly preposterous positions.”38 Yusuf made several
pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia,39 and took refuge in the kingdom after clashes
between his followers and the authorities in 2003–4,40 but no publicly available
source has asserted that Yusuf attended any Saudi university.
As the anonymous analyst points out, Shaykh Jaʿfar not only disagreed with
Yusuf on technical grounds, he attacked Yusuf’s scholarly credentials and moral
character. It is here that Shaykh Jaʿfar seemed to brandish his education in
Medina and his mastery of the Salafi canon. After quoting a passage in which
Shaykh Jaʿfar castigated Yusuf for his ignorance of the history of Muslims’
struggles across time and space, the anonymous author writes:
By questioning Yusuf’s knowledge, [Shaykh Jaʿfar Mahmud] Adam highlights
the resentment of his cadre, who seem to think they are the only ones entitled to speak for Islam due to their advanced degrees from prestigious Islamic
universities. By questioning the length of time Yusuf has spent preaching,
Adam alludes to the important issue of generating followers by carefully
building a reputation of vast learning and piety over many years of toil in
teaching, preaching, and organizing . . . By quickly generating a mass following with what Adam considers half-baked knowledge of Islam, Yusuf is
in effect an interloper who does not deserve the perquisites that come from
mass followers.41
In this context, Shaykh Jaʿfar invoked the authority of the contemporary Salafi
canon. In one lecture, Shaykh Jafʿar denigrated Yusuf by comparing him both
with scholars in Maiduguri, where the shaykh said many people surpassed Yusuf
in “knowledge”, “piety” and “humility”, and with intellectual authorities on the
global Salafi stage:
He thinks that major scholars in whom the scholarly world trusts, such as
Shaykh bin Baz, Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Shaykh Salih ibn ʿUthaymin, and other major scholars, either in Saudi Arabia or Egypt or other
places, he thinks that all of them are ignorant. What they have studied is not
learning. His own is learning.
Shaykh Jaʿfar, referring to the works of Shaykh al-Albani, attacked the validity of the hadith reports that Yusuf had used in fatwas against government
employment and Western education.42 Through assaults on Yusuf’s knowledge
and character, one of the most prominent exponents of Salafism in northern
Nigeria worked to exclude him from the mainstream Salafi fold. Key to this
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effort was Shaykh Jaʿfar’s ability to invoke intellectual giants of the contemporary Salafi canon to support his own position, and to apply Salafi methodologies of hadith criticism to undermine the textual support Yusuf claimed for
his arguments.

Shifting Registers:
Popular Messages, Salafi Texts and Technical Manuals
That Ahlussunnah referred explicitly to IUM and Saudi Arabia in their debates
with Izala hardliners and with Yusuf underscores the relative lack of such references in other contexts. If invoking IUM is sometimes a powerful tool for asserting intellectual superiority, at other times Ahlussunnah leaders have left their
credentials and connections to Saudi Arabia in the background. One reason for
Ahlussunnah’s success in growing their followership in Kano from the 1990s to
the present, then, has been their ability to present core ideas through different
media and in different registers.
Ahlussunnah leaders have created various intellectual products, including simple manuals of advice, courses structured around classical Salafi works,
manuals on technical worship requirements, translations of Arabic texts, and
advanced original compositions (in Arabic and Hausa) engaging with a particular thinker or issue. Shifting between registers has allowed Ahlussunnah leaders
to offer the general public specifically Salafi solutions to everyday problems
in Kano. Operating in a popular register has helped to localise Ahlussunnah’s
message, but it has also universalised local issues, connecting them to Salafi
conceptions of history and daʿwa.
One example of the popular works that Ahlussunnah leaders have produced
in Kano is their lectures on marital problems. Widespread concern exists in
Kano, among Salafis as well as other Muslims, over what is perceived to be a
high incidence of divorce, as well as increasing difficulty in making successful
matches and avoiding marital conflict. This sense of crisis helps to explain why
one of Shaykh Jaʿfar’s only lectures to be transcribed and published as a book
– and one that remained widely available, in audio and text forms, as of 2012
– is entitled Matakan Mallakar Miji (Hausa: Steps for Controlling a Husband).
Delivered as a lecture at Uthman bin Affan Mosque in 1999 and published
in 2000, the text uses Qurʾanic verses and hadiths to explain how women
can achieve marital harmony. Shaykh Jaʿfar presented these suggestions as
an Islamic (and Salafi) alternative to local practices, which included women’s
visits to people whom Shaykh Jaʿfar called “boka” (Hausa: “spiritual healer”) or
“malamin tsibbo” (Hausa: “charm maker”). In his introduction, Shaykh Jaʿfar
wrote that the Islamic alternative he offered had generated substantial popular
interest:
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Then we said, if Islam forbids going to [spiritual healers and charm makers]
. . . there are prayers that one can do, that do not clash with shariʿa . . . This
cassette spread, and I got no rest due to the amount of calls from different
programmes in the north of this country [asking] about these prayers for

controlling a husband, and where could one find them?43
This work delegitimised certain local practices while offering an accessible version of Salafi practice as a viable alternative. But it did not attempt to offer a
comprehensive account of Salafi views on marriage or of Salafi scriptural methodologies. Aside from occasional references to the thought of canonical figures
like the hadith collector Imam Bukhari and Imam ibn Taymiyya, Matakan
Mallakar Miji presented Salafi thought almost entirely through scripture.
Other writings and lectures by Ahlussunnah leaders have referred more extensively to Salafi thinkers and methodologies. Yet even in more advanced discussions, Ahlussunnah leaders have frequently concentrated on improving students’
knowledge of major classical Salafi texts and figures rather than on introducing
them to the contemporary, global Salafi intellectual landscape. For example,
Ahlussunnah leaders have taught individual texts to their students, translating and explaining texts in mosques and recording these commentaries for further distribution. Some of these courses featured core hadith collections from
the classical period. Shaykh Jaʿfar, for example, taught al-Arbaʿun Hadith (The
Forty Hadiths) and Riyad al Salihin (Garden of the Righteous) by Shaykh Yahya
al-Nawawi (1234–78), Bulugh al-Marum min Adilla al-Ahkam (Attainment of the
Objective According to Evidences of the Rules) by Shaykh ibn Hajar al-Asqalani
(1372–1448), and other collections. Ahlussunnah leaders have also taught wellknown works by classical Salafi thinkers. Shaykh Jaʿfar taught Shaykh ibn ʿAbd
al-Wahhab’s Kashf al-Shubuhat (The Clearing of Doubts) and Kitab al-Tawhid.44
When introducing courses on such works, Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Sani often
assumed little contextual knowledge on the part of their audiences. In 2008, Dr
Sani taught Imam ibn Taymiyya’s al Tuhfa al ʿIraqiyya fi al Aʿmal al Qalbiyya (The
Iraqi Masterpiece on Actions of the Heart) in Katsina. His first lecture introduced
Shaykh ibn Taymiyya’s life and works. This was necessary, Dr Sani explained,
because “there is no doubt, few know who Ibn Taymiyya is” (“Babu shakka,
kadan ne suka san wanene Ibn Taymiyya”). If Ahlussunnah leaders could not
assume that their own students were deeply familiar with major classical Salafis,
then it is little surprise that contemporary Salafi thinkers are not major subjects
in courses and popular works.
Ahlussunnah leaders’ references to contemporary, extra-local Salafi thinkers
like Shaykh al-Albani or Shaykh bin Baz have primarily occurred within technical discussions on specific legal rulings. Examples of this pattern come from
Shaykh Abdulwahhab’s books Ramadan a kan Koyarwar Alkurʾani da Sunnah bisa
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Fahimtar Magabata na Kwarai (Hausa: Ramadan According to the Teaching of the
Qurʾan and the Sunna According to the Understanding of the Pious Forefathers) and
Fatawoyin Aikin Hajji da Umrah da Ziyara a kan Koyarwar Alkurʾani da Sunnah
da Fahimtar Magabata na Kwarai (Rulings on Hajj, Umra [the lesser pilgrimage],
and Ziyara [visiting] According to the Teaching of the Qurʾan, the Sunna, and the
Understanding of the Pious Forefathers).45 In these books, Shaykh Abdulwahhab
not only cited scripture to support his positions, he provided precise references
within canonical hadith collections, such as those of Imams Bukhari, Muslim,
Abu Dawud and others. He discussed the status of each hadith according to
Salafi methodologies of hadith criticism. In this context, approving mentions of
Shaykh al-Albani as an arbiter of a hadith’s strength or weakness became ubiquitous. Debates with rival Salafis, then, are a particularly contested subset of the
technical legal discussions in which Ahlussunnah leaders have mostly strongly
invoked the authority of contemporary Salafi intellectuals.

Local Daʿwa in the Context of Universal History
The tendency of Ahlussunnah leaders to shift registers and move between local
concerns and allegedly universal identities has implications for an understanding
of the relationship between Salafism as a global trend and a set of locally contextualised communities. Identifiably Salafi postures and traditions are shared
across different localities; yet Terje Østebø and Laurent Bonnefoy have argued
persuasively that the rhetorical and organisational strategies and behaviours
of Salafi movements in, respectively, Ethiopia and Yemen, are shaped by their
interactions with local contexts, even as Salafis attempt to undermine local
competitors. In Bale, Ethiopia, Østebø writes, Salafis’ efforts to de-localise Sufi
practices did not represent a move from the local to an “abstract” global sphere.
Rather, one locality influenced another: “A particular variant of Islam, stemming from Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and evolving in the socio-political and cultural
environment of the Arabian Peninsula, was introduced to and expanded in
Bale.”46 Haykel suggests that the appeal of Salafism in diverse contexts originates not in its allegedly “de-territorialised” quality, but in its willingness to discount traditional authorities in the name of scriptural authority.47 This appeal
grows in contexts where Salafis effectively connect the Salafi tradition with
local struggles over practice and authority.
The localisation of Salafism can occur through education and media. In Kano,
where many adult men of diverse theological orientations attend evening prayer
and study sessions called majalisai (Hausa, sing. majalisa, from the Arabic majlis,
“council”), Salafis have organised their own sessions for studying hadith collections, Qurʾanic recitation and other Islamic sciences. Media interventions
and translation constitute other avenues for localisation. The Salafi Shaykh
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Muhammad Nazifi Inuwa, a graduate of IUM, conducted what some informants
called the most popular radio programme in Kano as of early 2012. In weekly
appearances, he translated the Khut∙ba (Friday sermon) in Mecca from Arabic into
Hausa, and then commented on it in Hausa. Giving lectures on topics of widespread local concern, such as marital conflict and divorce, has allowed Salafis to
relate their theological and legal worldviews to the daily lives of local audiences.
Localisation also occurs through the financial and political infrastructures that Salafis construct. The financial patronage of local businessmen has
allowed Salafi preachers to build mosques and schools. While Shaykh Jaʿfar’s
circle received some support from international Muslim charities like al-Muntada al-Islami, local financial support strongly aided their rise to prominence.
Ahlussunnah leaders have also participated in Kano politics in diverse ways.
They have held bureaucratic positions relating to the administration of Islamic
law, publicly criticised elected officials and hereditary Muslim rulers, and contested control of mosques and media.
At the same time that education, media, funding and other processes have
localised Salafism in Kano, Ahlussunnah leaders have urged their followers to
view themselves as part of a broader community of adherents to the allegedly
correct understanding of monotheism. Ahlussunnah leaders narrate local events
in ways that attempt to transcend local chronologies and geographies. The
community to which Ahlussunnah leaders link their local community’s experiences includes the Qurʾanic prophets before Muhammad, but its historical
centre is the Prophet and his companions. The community extends forward in
time from the Prophet to any Muslim, in any place, considered to follow his
sunna. Ahlussunnah leaders have presented their struggles in Kano as part of an
ongoing struggle wherein true Muslims, surrounded by hostile communities and/
or faithless Muslims, are a permanent vanguard and a vulnerable minority. For
Ahlussunnah, a sense of triumphalism – that the true Muslims will overcome
persecution and spread their message – has coexisted with a sense that the
Muslim community is doomed to decline.
Ahlussunnah leaders’ use of hadiths that foretell the future – such as “Islam
began as a stranger and it will return a stranger as it began” – has reinforced a
core theme: that the trajectory of Islam in Nigeria parallels the trajectory of
Islam elsewhere and fits within a larger, foreordained historical arc. In a 2003
lecture titled “Siyasa a Nigeria” (“Politics in Nigeria”), Shaykh Jaʿfar cited a
hadith that predicts a time when, despite the large size of the Muslim community, no nation would fear Muslims because they would have succumbed to “love
of the world and fear of death”. He commented:
Any observant person will notice how the Muslim umma is growing in the
world. We are not shrinking. Here at home in Nigeria before you find one
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person who has apostasised you will find a hundred people who have pronounced the shahāda and entered Islam . . . But at the exact same time,
[Islam’s] problems are increasing, and weakness and humiliation are increasing in the umma.48
As history drives towards its eschatological conclusion – and a sense that
that conclusion may be near at hand permeated some of Shaykh Jaʿfar’s
lectures – textually based creedal purity remains of paramount importance.
Through historical analogy and assertions that prophecies are being fulfilled,
Ahlussunnah preachers have merged past and present, accenting the idea
that true Muslims are under attack. Enemies of the sunna, despite appearing
in different garbs, promote similar messages of heresy and disunity in different
times and places.
For Ahlussunnah, history is not only a template in which they are embedded,
but a process that they can study and use. Dr Sani, comparing the Mongol invasion of Shaykh ibn Taymiyya’s time to the Iraq War, elucidated Ahlussunnah’s
view of history in one lecture:
As Allah says, “Such days we cause to follow by turns among men” [Q 3:140].
History is only a cycle of periods, a cycle of time. As they say, history is
“ah∙ dāth” [Arabic: events] and “asbāb” [Arabic: causes] that combine. Things
that are done and the reasons for their occurrence combine to produce history. Therefore what happened yesterday – if the reason for its occurrence
yesterday reoccurs – will happen again. That is history . . . We study history
so that we may draw some lessons [from it].49
History, for Ahlussunnah, provides a framework for making sense of the present
in religious terms, and a template for religious action: the creation of a ritually
and theologically pure Muslim community that will rebuke heretics and point
Muslims towards the sole path to salvation.
Religious action, for Ahlussunnah, centres on daʿwa, a category that is
intended to be at once an embodiment of an allegedly universal Islamic mission
and a locally situated practice. The Arabic word daʿwa can be translated as the
“call” or “appeal” to Islam. Those who practise daʿwa are duʿāt (sing. dāʿiya). Dr
Sani’s memoir of Shaykh Jaʿfar bears the Arabic subtitle Daʿiya al-Jil wa Mufassir
al-Tanzil (The Daʿwist of the Generation and the Exegete of the Revelation). These
epithets stress two core aspects of Ahlussunnah identity: an activist stance
towards Islamic reform and a mastery of scripture. Ahlussunnah leaders enjoined
followers in Kano to be activists too. In one 2006 lecture, Shaykh Jaʿfar told
the crowd: “Understanding sunna does not mean ‘registering’ with some ‘registration card’ such that if you enter your name, that’s it, you become a member
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. . . The creed of Ahlussunnah wa-al-Jamaʿa does not mean . . . daʿwa with the
mouth alone without any work that makes it real on a daily basis.”50
Daʿwa, in Salafi discourses worldwide, is not limited to converting non-
Muslims to Islam; it includes calling other Muslims to become better Muslims.
The dāʿiya is, for Salafi thinkers in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, a universal
category. An article published in the journal of the Saudi Arabia-based Muslim
World League in 1990, by which time Shaykh Jaʿfar was at IUM, outlined how
the dāʿiya needed to possess certain timeless qualities to succeed, including
“imitation of the traces of the Messenger”. The article presents the dāʿiya’s
struggle as basically unchanging:
For if our pious ancestors [salafuna al ∙sālih∙ ] were fought by ignorant classes
(t∙abaqāt jāhila), failed leaderships (riʾāsāt fāshila), obscure tribes, and belligerent, combative peoples, we today are fought by classes who claim they are
cultured. Indeed we are fought by unbelieving governments who have jointly
decided and jointly stated that they will fight Islam and unite together to
block its daʿwa and to judge its men.51
Ahlussunnah leaders’ conception of daʿwa is similar to this view. Just as
Ahlussunnah leaders have viewed their historical circumstances as fundamentally similar to those of other Salafis, so too have they viewed their core mission
as identical to that of other Salafi figures, past and present.
Daʿwa, however, occurs in a context. African graduates of Saudi Arabian
universities have noted that local contexts shape the challenges each dāʿiya
faces. In 2001, at a conference the Saudi Arabian government held in Kano for
African graduates of Saudi Islamic universities, a Malian scholar outlined five
challenges for the African dāʿiya: converting non-Muslims; purifying Islamic
practices; fighting “Christianisation” (al-tans∙ı̄r) and Westernisation; opposing
Sufism; and confronting “waves of Shiʿism”. In West Africa, the scholar continued, fighting polytheistic beliefs and opposing Sufism were the most salient
challenges, due to the historical linkages between Sufism and Islamisation in
the region.52 Anti-Sufism has frequently been a defining trait of West African
Salafism, including in works such as the 1972 polemical text al-ʿAqida al-Sahiha
bi Muwafaqa al-Shariʿa (Arabic: The Correct Creed in Accordance with the Shariʿa)
by Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, the spiritual patron of Izala.
Localisation also occurs within Africa. The priorities of African Salafis vary
from context to context, or even over the course of individuals’ lifetimes, in
response to external impetuses and strategic concerns. Robert Launay, for example, describes how one prominent Salafi (Launay uses the term “Wahhabi”)
in Côte d’Ivoire transitioned from outspoken anti-Sufism to accommodation
with Sufism as he became a local elder and took on a range of social roles “that
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flagrantly contradicted his Wahhabi ideas”.53 The appearance or escalation of
new perceived threats to Salafi creed may also affect Salafis’ priorities; for example, the outspokenness of some Shiʿi leaders in northern Nigeria, and Sunni–
Shiʿa conflict in Iraq after 2003, have contributed to Ahlussunnah leaders’
strongly anti-Shiʿi views. The imperative of adapting daʿwa to local concerns
and circumstances helps to explain why and how Ahlussunnah leaders have
shifted intellectual registers in their messages to audiences.

Conclusion
Graduates of the Islamic University of Medina within the “Ahlussunnah” network in Kano have made use of their learning at IUM, and of different aspects
of the classical and contemporary Salafi canons, in varied and complex ways.
Ahlussunnah leaders have built a wide audience, including youth, but also married women and certain social and political elites, partly through their ability to
shift intellectual registers. While Ahlussunnah’s popular messages often emphasised scripture in an accessible way, in other intellectual settings Ahlussunnah
leaders demonstrated their mastery of Salafi methodologies of hadith criticism
and engaged a variety of Salafi thinkers. Mastery of Salafi methodologies and
canons proved to be particularly useful to Ahlussunnah leaders in technical
debates with rival Nigerian Salafis, such as “hardliners” from the Izala movement
and the radical preacher Muhammad Yusuf. Ahlussunnah leaders invoked their
learning at IUM and the authority of contemporary Saudi Salafi thinkers in such
debates in order to discredit rivals and present them as intellectually deficient.
These intellectual attacks on their rivals reinforced the self-presentations of
Ahlussunnah leaders as highly credentialed, sober representatives of Islamic
daʿwa.
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Chapter 5

Qom Alumni in Indonesia:
Their Role in the Shiʿi Community
Zulkifli

Introduction
This chapter explains the role of Qom alumni in the development of the Shiʿi
community in Indonesia. The phrase “Qom alumni” refers to those who have
completed courses in Islamic education in the Hawza ʿIlmiyya (College of
Learning) of Qom, which is at present the most important centre of Shiʿi
Islamic education in the world. Today there are more than 200 Qom alumni
in Indonesia, even excluding those who travelled to Qom to attend short-term
courses. The growth in the number of Qom graduates has made a marked contribution to the formation and development of the Shiʿi community in Indonesia;
indeed, the majority of renowned Shiʿi ustadz (religious teachers, from the
Arabic ustadh, teacher) are graduates of the Hawza ʿIlmiyya. As a consequence,
Shiʿi ustadz are frequently identified with the Qom alumni, even though a
number of ustadz were in fact educated in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. For example,
Umar Shahab and his younger brother Husein Shahab, two Shiʿi ustadz who
are connected with prominent Shiʿi foundations in Indonesia where important
pengajian (religious gatherings) are held, are among the most popular Shiʿi
figures engaged in educational and daʿwa activities in Jakarta. Another prominent Qom returnee is Abdurrahman Bima, former director of the Madinatul
Ilmi College for Islamic Studies, a tertiary educational institution located in
Depok, Southern Jakarta, and currently a member of parliament for the leading Democratic Party, led by current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
In Pekalongan, Central Java, Ahmad Baragbah leads a famous Shiʿi pesantren
(traditional Islamic educational institution) called al-Hadi.
Frequently, Shiʿi ustadz who are graduates from Islamic schools in other
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Middle Eastern countries, as well as intellectuals from secular universities, also
come to Qom to take short-term training programmes in order to gain Islamic
knowledge and establish connections with Shiʿi leaders and the ʿulama of
Qom. Hasan Dalil, for example, having finished his undergraduate programme
in Riyadh, took a three-month training programme in Qom. Even the renowned
Indonesian Shiʿi intellectual Jalaluddin Rakhmat and his family stayed in Qom
for a year, during which time he attended learning circles and lectures carried
out by ayatollahs. This illustrates the great importance attached to Islamic education in Qom by the Shiʿia of Indonesia.
The first section of this chapter describes the history and development of
the practice of Indonesian students pursuing their education in Qom; it then
explains the educational system and schooling structure which is prevalent
there. The next section explains the workings of the Qom alumni association.
Finally, the chapter attempts to account for the significant role played by Qom
alumni in the field of Islamic daʿwa and education in Indonesia.

The Proliferation of Indonesian Students in Qom
It is unclear exactly when Indonesian students began to pursue Islamic education in Qom. Efforts had indeed been made to send students to Qom by
Indonesian Shiʿi leaders such as Muhammad Asad Shahab, who met and
established contact with prominent Iranian Shiʿi ʿulama in the 1950s; however, reliable reports suggest that students began travelling to Qom for Islamic
learning only a few years before the Iranian revolution, which began in 1978.
These students were the descendants of Arabs, and lived in various locations on
the Indonesian archipelago. Ali Ridho al-Habsyi, son of Muhammad al-Habsyi
and grandson of Habib Ali Kwitang of Jakarta, studied in Qom in 1974. Six
graduates of the Pesantren al-Khairat of Palu, Central Sulawesi, followed over
the next two years, and in September 1976, Umar Shahab, an Arab descendant
from Palembang, South Sumatra, and today a famous Shiʿi ustadz, came to
Qom to study alongside seven other Indonesian students. In fieldwork conducted in 1975, Fischer also noted the presence of Indonesian students in Qom;
among the foreign students, including cohorts from Pakistan, Afghanistan,
India, Lebanon, Tanzania, Turkey, Nigeria and Kashmir, Indonesians were the
least numerous.1
After the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, interaction
intensified between its government and Indonesian Shiʿi ʿulama. The victory
of the ayatollahs inspired Indonesian intellectuals and ʿulama to study the ideological foundation of the Iranian revolution, namely, Shiʿism; and at the same
time, there was an Iranian policy of “exporting” the revolution, with Iranian
politico-religious leaders aiming to spread Shiʿism in Indonesia and to attract
— 118 —

Qom Alumni in Indonesia: Their Role in the Shiʿi Community
Indonesian students to study in Iran. In 1982, the Iranian government sent
its representatives Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini, Ayatollah Masduqi and Hujjat
al-Islam Mahmudi to Indonesia. Among their activities was a visit to Yayasan
Pesantren Islam (YAPI; the Foundation of Islamic Pesantren) in Bangil, East
Java, where they met with its leader, Husein al-Habsyi; the latter would become
the most important confidant of Iranian leaders and ʿulama in Indonesia. At the
time, Husein al-Habsyi was probably one of the most prominent Shiʿi ʿulama in
Indonesia and he played a major role in the development of Islamic daʿwa and
education. As a result of the meeting, Qom’s Hawza ʿIlmiyya agreed to accept
ten Indonesian students selected by Husein al-Habsyi. From then until his death
in 1994, Husein al-Habsyi was responsible for selecting candidates for study at
Hawza ʿIlmiyya in Qom and in other cities in Iran.
As a result, graduates of YAPI numbered among the Indonesian students who
came to Qom in 1982, alongside the alumni of other educational institutions.
They have become renowned Shiʿi ustadz in Indonesia: of the ten students
referred to in the agreement, nearly all of whom are Arab descendants, six are
alumni of YAPI. The YAPI alumni include Muhsin Labib (Husein al-Habsyi’s
stepson) and Rusdi al-Aydrus, who have become Shiʿi ustadz in Indonesia,
and Husein al-Habsyi’s son, Ibrahim al-Habsyi, who has pursued his studies
in Qom up until the present day. From outside YAPI, Ahmad Baragbah and
Hasan Abu Ammar have also become Shiʿi ustadz in Indonesia. In the years
that followed, graduates of YAPI and/or those recommended by Husein al-Habsyi were still predominant among the Indonesian students who went to Qom.
Between 1985 and 1989, al-Habsyi sent ten students to Qom, and today most
of them have established or are affiliated with notable Shiʿi foundations in
Indonesia and have been recognised as important Shiʿi ustadz. These include
Musyayya Baʿabud, Zahir Yahya (the leader of al-Kautsar Foundation, Malang,
East Java, and formerly the head of YAPI), Miqdad (the head of Pesantren
Darut Taqrib, Jepara, Central Java), Fathoni Hadi (the founder of al-Hujjah
Foundation, Jember, East Java, and currently on the administrative staff of the
Islamic College Jakarta), Muhammad Amin Sufyan (the head of Samudera
Foundation, Surabaya), Abdurrahman Bima (former director of Madinatul Ilmi
College for Islamic Studies, STAIMI, Depok, Southern Jakarta), Husein al-Kaff
(an adviser at al-Jawad Foundation, Bandung), Herman al-Munthahar (the head
of Amirul Mukminin Foundation, Pontianak, West Kalimantan), Muhammad
al-Jufri, and Abdul Aziz al-Hinduan.
In the 1990s, in addition to the alumni of YAPI, graduates of other Islamic
educational institutions, such as the Mutahhari Foundation and al-Hadi, were
selected to continue their education in Qom. This development corresponds
with the growing influence of the Shiʿi intellectuals Jalaluddin Rakhmat and
Haidar Bagir, whose recommendations were taken note of in Iran. Over time,
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the educational background of the Indonesian students studying in Qom has
become more varied. From the outset, most of the students who went there had
completed their secondary education; but more recently a number of graduates
of tertiary schools have also gone there to pursue higher levels of study – among
them are a few alumni of Madinatul Ilmi College for Islamic Studies (STAIMI),
Depok, and we can also find graduates of “secular” universities, such as the
University of Indonesia, Jakarta, and the University of Padjadjaran, Bandung,
studying religious knowledge in Qom. Their educational backgrounds are varied
and include the humanities, social sciences, and even science and technology.
Mujtahid Hashem, for instance, is a graduate of the technical faculty at the
University of Indonesia. Instead of expanding his knowledge in technology,
Mujtahid Hashem came to Qom in 2001 to engage in religious study. While
there, he was selected as the general secretary of the Association of Indonesian
Students (Himpunan Pelajar Indonesia), which was founded in Iran in August
2000.2
In addition to the growing interest on the part of Indonesian students with
regard to studying in Iran, the Iranian government, through the International
Centre for Islamic Studies (ICIS; Markaz-i Jahani-yi ʿUlum-i Islami), has
stepped up efforts to attract international students. Until 1993, the management of the centre was traditional in that h∙ awza was unstructured; but since
1994, ICIS has been under the supervision of the office of the Leader of the
Islamic Revolution headed by Grand Ayatollah ʿAli Khameneʾi, who also has
the authority to appoint its director. Thus, Ali Khameneʾi succeeded in transforming “the previously amorphous and unstructured seminary into a manageable center”.3 With regard to its effort to attract Indonesian students, an ICIS
representative conducts an annual selection process at Islamic institutions,
such as the Islamic Cultural Centre of Jakarta and the Mutahhari Foundation,
Bandung. In addition to academic achievement, Arabic is a prerequisite in the
selection process, since this is an international language for Islamic learning
and also the sole language of instruction at certain madrasas in Qom. Upon
arrival in Iran, students are also required to follow a six-month training programme in Persian, which is the language of instruction at most of Qom’s
Islamic educational institutions.
The number of Indonesian students studying in Qom has increased significantly. By 1990, fifty Indonesian students had reportedly completed their studies
or were still studying in Qom; ten years later, the number of Qom graduates in
Indonesia was reportedly over a hundred. In 2001, fifty Indonesian students were
chosen to continue their studies in Qom,4 and in 2004, ninety additional students were selected. Currently, there are about 250 Indonesian students in Iran,
most of them pursuing Islamic studies in Qom.
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The Education System in Qom
Generally speaking there are two education systems operative at the Hawza
ʿIlmiyya in Qom: the traditional system, which is the most famous and influential; and the modern system. The traditional system’s curriculum includes both
transmitted and intellectual religious sciences: fiqh (jurisprudence), usūl al-fiqh
(principles of jurisprudence), ʿulūm al-Qurʾan (sciences of the Qurʾan), ʿulūm
al-hadith (sciences of hadith), nah∙ w (Arabic syntax), ∙sarf (Arabic morphology),
balāgha (rhetoric), mantiq (logic), h∙ ikma (philosophy), kalām (theology), tas∙awwuf (Sufism) and ʿirfān (gnosis, mystic knowledge). Each subject has its own
standard texts,5 which are studied in halaqat (study circles) under an instructor’s
supervision.
At the muqaddamāt (preliminary) level, which lasts from three to five years,
the emphasis is on providing students with various skills in Arabic that are at
the core of its educational programme. The main subjects taught at the preliminary level include naḥw, s∙arf, balāgha and mantiq. In addition, there are certain
optional subjects, including literature, mathematics, astronomy, and introductory fiqh, taken from one of the risāla ʿamālı̄yya (tracts on practice) of a contemporary marjaʿ-i tāqlı d̄ (pl. marājiʿ-i tāqlı̄d; an authoritative source on matters of
Islamic law). The learning process at this level involves groups of students gathering together around a teacher who goes through the texts with them. Students
are free to choose the teacher who will become their instructor. Usually, teachers at this level are senior students or assistants of marājiʿ-i tāqlı̄d.6
At the sut∙ūḥ level, which usually lasts from three to six years, students are
introduced to the substance of deductive fiqh and usūl al-fiqh, on which their
progress to the next and ultimate level depends. The optional subjects provided
at this level are tafsı̄r (Qurʾanic exegesis), hadith (traditions), kalām, philosophy, ʿirfān, history and ethics. Generally, courses are organised according to the
instructional technique employed and based on the main texts of the two main
subjects, and students are free to select which lectures to attend. The students
may also attend lectures in the optional subjects. Teachers at this level are
usually mujtahid who have just achieved the status of ijtihād and are establishing
their reputations.7
Although the subjects at the ultimate level (dar-i khārij) are also fiqh and
usūl al-fiqh, the method of learning employed is different from that of the two
prior levels. The teaching is done by prominent mujtahid, who deliver lectures
of varying length. Usually they post their own schedules and locations for their
lectures, and students are free to choose whose they will attend. The lectures
delivered by the most prominent mujtahids may well be attended by hundreds of
people, including other mujtahids. A dialectical method is generally employed
in these classes: students are free to discuss and are encouraged to argue points
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with the teacher. At this stage, most students are accomplished in the skill of
abstract discursive argumentation and are trained to have self-confidence. The
culmination of the learning process is the attainment of an ijāza (licence, certification) from one or many recognised mujtahid. It is common for the student at
this level to write a treatise on fiqh or usūl al-fiqh, and present it to a mujtahid
who then considers the student and their work. Based on their evaluation, the
mujtahid may issue the ijāza, which authorises the student to exercise ijtihād.8
Thus, students build up their careers based on their relationships with certain
mujtahid-teachers.
When a student receives the ijāza, making him a mujtahid, the honorific
title ayatollah (“ayat Allah”, “sign of God”) is normally bestowed upon him.
An ayatollah recognised as a marjaʿ-i tāqlı̄d usually receives the title ayatollah
al-ʿuzma (“grand ayatollah”). The common title of an aspiring mujtahid is hujjat
al-Islam (proof of Islam). The structure of the Shiʿi ʿulama is pyramidal: those at
the highest level, the marājiʿ-i tāqlı̄d, are the fewest in number. The traditional
system of education is extremely important in Shiʿi society, given the major role
of marjaʿ-i tāqlı̄d throughout history.
The modern madrasa system is a transformation of the classical system,
adopting the modern regime of education conceived in terms of gradation,
curriculum, classroom learning and rules. Non-traditional madrasas “are set up
to serve needs not supplied by the traditional system”.9 The curriculum consists
of religious and secular sciences presented through a slightly simplified version
of traditional study courses. Unlike the traditional system, this modern madrasa
system is not intended to train students to become mujtahids, but rather to
become Islamic scholars and missionaries. This innovative type of education
has provided an alternative for students who, for whatever reason, cannot follow
the traditional system of the Hawza ʿIlmiyya. International students, including
Indonesians, are generally enrolled in this modern type of programme.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has made educational innovations in Qom’s
Hawza ʿIlmiyya through ICIS, which coordinates programmes for foreign students, assigns students to madrasas, and monitors their needs within the wider
framework for the global dissemination of Islamic knowledge and teachings.
ICIS has organised new programmes for international students based on the
modern madrasa system. The Imam Khomeini College for Higher Education,
for example, offers programmes based on grade systems that include undergraduate and graduate levels equivalent to the tertiary education level of the
modern educational system: this innovation brings Hawza ʿIlmiyya a step closer
to becoming a leading international centre of Islamic learning. Its importance as
a centre of Islamic learning is not only based on the traditional madrasa, but also
on the emancipation of ḥawza in the form of new institutions and universities.10
Both education systems have been attended by Indonesian students. The first
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Indonesian students to come to Iran were enrolled at Dar al-Tabligh al-Islami,
a modern Shiʿi institution founded in 1965 by Ayatollah Muhammad Kazim
Shariʿatmadari (1904–86). As an institution of Islamic learning, Dar al-Tabligh
was known for its large numbers of foreign students and for the efforts it was
willing to make in arranging their visas and residence permits. It operated a
five-year programme with a credit system, and its curriculum included both
religious knowledge and secular sciences such as psychology, philosophy, sociology, mathematics and English. The language of instruction was Arabic. The
educational system of Dar al-Tabligh was therefore modern: although it was
strongly entrenched in the traditional ḥawza system, it did not follow the traditional system of learning. Accordingly, the first group of Indonesian students in
Qom followed the formal modern system of education, although they could also
attend classes or lectures as provided through the traditional Hawza ʿIlmiyya
system.
After the dissolution of Dar al-Tabligh in 1981 – owing to its leader’s opposition to the concept of vilāyat-i faqı̄h (mandate of the jurist) implemented by
Khomeini – Madrasa Hujjatiyya began to provide the same programme for
foreign students. Since 1982, nearly all Indonesian students who came to Iran
have attended Madrasa Hujjatiyya, including the prominent Shiʿi ustadz Husein
Shahab, who was transferred to this madrasa after studying at Dar al-Tabligh for
two years. This madrasa was founded in 1946 by Ayatollah Muhammad Hujjat
Kuhkamari (1892–1963), a student of ʿAbd al-Karim Haʾiri (d. 1936), the
reformer of Hawza ʿIlmiyya.11 Unlike Dar al-Tabligh, Hujjatiyya School follows
the traditional system of education generally employed in Hawza ʿIlmiyya. The
majority of Indonesian students who become Shiʿi ustadz in Indonesia have
completed only the preliminary level and lack a formal diploma.
Although most Indonesian students were registered at Madrasa Hujjatiyya,
a few pursued their learning at Madrasa Muʿminiyya, which also provided a
programme for foreign students. This madrasa was founded in 1701 during the
reign of Sultan Husayn of the Safavid dynasty, and was rebuilt by the Grand
Ayatollah Shihab al-Din Marʿashi-Najafi (d. 1991), known for his role in the
establishment in Qom of a large library, filled with a magnificent collection of
published books and manuscripts. This madrasa formulated its own education
system and curriculum, and provided its own learning materials rather than
utilising recognised textbooks. The Muʿminiyya School also differed from the
Hujjatiyya School in that the former prohibited its students from attending
religious lectures and study circles in the traditional ḥawza system.12
As educational reform has progressed in Qom, a large number of Indonesian
students have registered at the Imam Khomeini College for Higher Education.
Since 1996, this madrasa has been striving to position itself as the principal
education centre for international students. The madrasa, which was established
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after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, uses the modern system of education in
terms of programmes and curricula, in spite of its entrenchment in the traditional ḥawza system. It runs both undergraduate and graduate programmes in
various fields of specialisation within the realm of religious sciences.13
Changes in the education system for foreign students have been designed, in
part, to expand the primacy of Qom as a world centre for Islamic learning. One
such change is the adoption of the credit system and a modern taxonomy of
study programmes – namely, bachelors, master’s and doctorates, as implemented
by Western universities – along with diplomas and formal systems of accreditation. This is meant to provide for the demands of students from all over the
world, and it is also in accord with Qom’s goal to produce Islamic scholars and
preachers with a global appeal. In 2008, the Iranian government transformed
the International Centre for Islamic Studies into al-Mustafa International
University to provide education for all foreign students, including Indonesians.
It now supervises a number of universities such as Imam Khomeini College for
Higher Education and Madrasa Bint al-Huda School for Higher Education.
Indonesian students have thus experienced a variety of changes in the education system: unlike their predecessors, they study in undergraduate or graduate
programmes in particular fields of specialisation with recognised diplomas and
titles; while some do BA degrees, others take master’s programmes, and a few
others seek doctorates. While most male students study at Imam Khomeini
College for Higher Education, female students attend either Bint al-Huda or
Jamiʿat al-Zahra, another institute for religious learning in Qom that offers
bachelors or master’s degrees.
Qom’s transformation of Islamic education into a modern system includes
the use of information technologies in the dissemination of knowledge. In this
regard, Rasiah suggests:
In Qum, the ḥawza has not been immune to these developments, and the
new technology of the so-called “digital revolution” has brought innovations
to the way traditional Islamic knowledge is transmitted . . . Today, digital
means of communication and storage, the form of internet web pages, video
and audio podcasts, email, compact disks, DVDs, CD-ROM software and the
like, are transforming the possibilities of disseminating Islamic knowledge.
With regard to the ḥawza the digitization of knowledge has included three
major interrelated developments: the digital library, the online correspondence course, and the translation of original texts.14
Indonesian students benefit from the transformation of Islamic education in
Qom through their use of the various forms of information technology, and
this has rendered them more progressive than their predecessors. Certainly,
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connections between both generations are more easily made by means of information technology, and this in turn is contributing to the development of
Islamic education in Indonesia.

The Qom Alumni Association
Along with the growing number of Hawza ʿIlmiyya alumni in Indonesia and
the concomitant demand for ways to establish close relationships between them
and so intensify their missionary efforts upon returning home, the Indonesian
alumni of Hawza ʿIlmiyya and of al-Mustafa International University (MIU)
established an association called Ikatan Alumni Jamiah al-Mustafa (IKMAL;
Association of al-Mustafa University Alumni). The association, which was
launched on 7 February 2009, brings together all those who have studied in
Hawza ʿIlmiyya. It is currently (2011–13) chaired by Miqdad Turkan (the chairman of Pesantren Darut Taqrib, Jepara, Central Java), assisted by Husein al-Kaff
(al-Jawad Foundation, Bandung) as vice-chairman and Kholid al-Walid as secretary. The structure of the association incorporates such divisions as education
and daʿwa, welfare and advocacy, media and public relations, and women, each
headed by renowned Qom alumni of the older generation.
According to its statute, the goals of IKMAL are to develop and advance
Islamic propagation as both an individual and a collective obligation; to protect
its members; to increase the quality, competence and prosperity of its members;
to increase the religious knowledge of the Islamic community, particularly the
Indonesian ahl al-bayt community; and to establish harmonious and productive
relationships with alumni of related institutions. To achieve these goals, the
association intends to carry out activities by: (i) improving the performance
of its members through education, research and applications; (ii) promoting
and developing the existence of the Association of al-Mustafa Alumni; (iii)
promoting and preserving the interests and positions of members; (iv) improving communication and cooperation among members; (v) establishing communication and cooperation with institutions, agencies and other organisations,
both within and outside the country; (vi) improving coaching, mentoring and
supervision of members in carrying out missionary and scientific activities; (vii)
carrying out efforts for the welfare of members by coordinating the activities
of the alumni and allocating social assistance; (viii) performing community
service; and (xi) providing information and helping to solve religious problems
faced by communities.
Since its foundation, the association has carried out a range of activities,
including training, workshops, seminars, publications and community service.
One notable activity was the workshop on daʿwa methods and ahl al-bayt syllabi
in Indonesia, which took place in March 2012 with around a hundred participants,
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both members of IKMAL and other Shiʿi activists and propagators. Among the
facilitators were Sayyid Ahmad Fazeli (director of the Islamic College Jakarta, a
branch of al-Mustafa International University), Sayyid Morteza Musawi (director of the Islamic Cultural Centre), and Haidar Bagir (Mizan Publishing House).
The workshop was inspired by the negative responses to Shiʿism in Indonesia
and the sectarian violence that had occurred in several places in Java, including
the burning down of Pesantren al-Hadi in Batang Pekalongan, Central Java
in 2000, and of Pesantren Misbah al-Huda in Sampang, December 2011. The
chairman of IKMAL, Miqdad Turkan, saw these actions as resulting from the
inappropriate implementation of daʿwa by Shiʿi propagators. Misunderstanding
and miscommunication seem to have coloured the implementation of daʿwa
within Shiʿi teaching in Indonesia. In the workshop, for example, Ahmad Fazeli
warned the participants that the correct daʿwa contents would nevertheless
engender misunderstanding if they were c ommunicated to the wrong people by
incorrect methods.
In the field of religious culture, IKMAL has attempted to disseminate the
writings of its members. It publishes an e-journal called Hauzah in which writings on Shiʿi doctrines, jurisprudence, Qurʾanic exegesis, history, traditions
and other topics are provided. In this journal, the alumni express their religious
thoughts, which are strongly based on Shiʿi ideology; scrutiny of its contents
may lead one to conclude that the journal is ideological rather than truly scientific in nature. Qom alumni also continue to produce writings in the form of
books and articles, both translations and original compositions, independently
from IKMAL. Similarly, their involvement in the field of daʿwa and education
is not entirely dependent on their association with IKMAL, and much is carried
out independently.

The Social Structures of Qom Alumni
Most Qom alumni have achieved the status of ustadz, or religious teacher. Early
alumni, such as Umar Shahab, Husein Shahab and Ahmad Baragbah, have
become very prominent Shiʿi figures. In Indonesia, the term ustadz commonly
denotes religious teachers in traditional institutions of Islamic learning (pesantren), formal Islamic schools (madrasas), or in religious gatherings (pengajian).
To the Muslims in the country, particularly those of traditional institutions of
Islamic learning, the term ustadz usually refers to the teachers who have not
achieved the status of ʿālim (meaning a man of religious learning and prestige)15
or kyai (“learned man”, or the leader of pesantren). Therefore, within the leadership structure of pesantren, the position of ustadz is ranked below that of kyai.
Among the Shiʿa in Indonesia, however, the term ustadz denotes both leaders of
Shiʿi institutions and religious teachers, and this term is increasingly being used
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among certain Indonesian Muslim groups to refer to ʿulama and Muslim leaders
in general. In the context of Muslim society in Indonesia, some Shiʿi ustadz,
such as Husein al-Habsyi, have achieved the status of ʿālim.
It is entirely possible that the growing tendency to use the term ustadz is
due to the influence of the Arab descendants within the religious, educational
and cultural fields of the Shiʿi community. This tendency is also evident in the
so-called scripturalist segment of the Indonesian Muslim community, which is
undergoing a process of “Arabisation”. This group prefers to use the term ustadz
according its original meaning in Arabic, rather than using the local term kyai
for ʿulama. In addition, from the perspective of the international Shiʿi intellectual tradition, this may indicate that the education of Indonesian Shiʿi leaders
and scholars has not reached the standard of the fully qualified scholars. It is
evident that their position does not correspond to that of mujtahid or marjaʿ-i
tāqlı̄d. Thus, in the field of jurisprudence, the word ustadz in Indonesia comes
to refer to the muqallid (followers) of certain marjaʿ-i tāqlı̄d in Iran or Iraq.
Nevertheless, the ustadz still enjoys prestige within the Shiʿi community.
There are at least two general characteristics of the Shiʿi ustadz. First, the
educational background of an ustadz generally involves a period at one of the
institutions of Islamic learning where they acquired the various branches of
Islamic knowledge. This means that the person is considered to have gained
basic Islamic knowledge. Several Shiʿi ustadz in Indonesia studied at pesantren
in Indonesia and then pursued further learning in the Middle East, particularly
at Hawza ʿIlmiyya. Since their education in Qom only reached the muqaddamāt
level, few Shiʿi ustadz have pursued their learning at other tertiary institutions
in Indonesia or abroad – only the most prominent among them can lay claim to
this achievement. A number of ustadz entered Islamic universities in Indonesia:
as mentioned previously, four of them – Umar Shahab, Abdurrahman Bima,
Muhsin Labib and Kholid al-Walid – completed doctoral programmes at this
university. We should emphasise that the field of specialisation generally taken
by the Shiʿi ustadz is “Islamic studies” in the classical meaning of the term.
This is understandable, since they are engaged in the field of Islamic daʿwa and
education, which requires a broad understanding of Islam in order to gain or
maintain a prestigious position within the community. In a nutshell, further
education in the field of religious knowledge contributes to establishing and
increasing the prominence of the Shiʿi ustadz.
Secondly, the ustadz devote themselves to the field of daʿwa and educational
activities at the Shiʿi institutions of learning. Many have established their own
institutions and become leaders within them. Some are affiliated with Islamic
institutions, and their main profession is as a religious teacher or even spiritual
guide for the jamaʿa (congregation) of those institutions. They impart religious
knowledge, give guidance and lead religious rituals; with the exception of heads
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of institutions, however, they do not receive a regular salary from these institutions, but instead receive payments for each section of the daʿwa activities they
teach. Most of them rely for their living on endowments or payments from the
institutions and their jamaʿa. This intensive religious instruction and guidance
contributes to the close relationship an ustadz enjoys with the jamaʿa, who
follow his instructions and guidance and pay their respects to him. “Many ustadz
are living comfortably in Jakarta, which has become a center of attraction for
many of them.”16
Although all Qom alumni are members of IKMAL and most of them are
ustadz, the social structure in which they are embedded is complex, and can be
properly understood only through examining a number of its aspects. We may
distinguish the “older” or senior generation from the “younger” or junior generation based on the education system they followed in Qom. The older generation
consists of those who followed the pre-university system of education, which
mainly emphasised the mastery of books or texts in certain fields of Islamic
knowledge – this group comprises those who studied at the Dar al-Tabligh,
Hujjatiyya and Muʿminiyya schools. The younger generation studied in Qom in
or after 1996, via the Imam Khomeini College for Higher Education, which was
the main centre for international students and followed the modern system of
having both undergraduate and graduate programmes. While the first group of
alumni mainly graduated from the muqaddamāt level without diploma and title,
the other group holds the title “licence” (or bachelor) for the undergraduate
level, and a master’s degree or even a doctorate for the graduate level – similar to
alumni from other universities in the Middle East and the West. Consequently,
as noted by Muhsin Labib, a Qom alumnus from the first group, there is a gap
between the two groups in terms of methodological and communication capabilities, due to the different education systems and facilities: the junior group
is more intelligent, critical and communicative than the senior. Muhsin Labib
expresses his experience and concerns as follows:
As a member of the first wave into ḥawza in 1982, I can feel the luck of
students of the 2000 era. Without intending to tell the sorrow of a “guinea
pig”, the situation that I experienced when I first set foot in the city of Qom
really made me, at the time fifteen years of age, shake my head. There was no
reasonable preparation, let alone for the upper group. The madrasa building
we entered was full of dust. Those days the Iranians were busy with military
mobilisation to confront the aggression of Saddam. Here and there was an
audible thump of bombs fired by MIGs 2000 and Mirages at the city. The
residents of Qom seemed busy lining up to receive cooking oil and food.
Classes were often closed suddenly because there were funerals of dozens of
heroes who had died in the battlefield. The curriculum was always changing.
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Apparently, the officials of Shura-ye Sarparasti Tolab-e Ghaire Irani were
confused by the task of finding an educational format that suited foreign
students with different competencies, from Indonesia, non-Shiʿi Arab countries, Africa, and even Europe. Regarding the facilities, do not ask because
it will restore the bad memories. Armed with a chaotic and “confusing”
educational system, the alumni born of the situation should be accepted and
appreciated. Moreover, with their underprivileged education and facilities
(non-diploma again!), they still have to start really heavy duties, clearing
the forest and introducing the ahl al-bayt denominations, with all the risks,
especially the political risks of the New Order which suspected Iran to be
exporting the revolution.17
Despite these sentiments, it is clear from their educational accomplishments
that some among the senior generation had pursued their study at tertiary
institutions in Indonesia or abroad, unlike others from the older group who
relied solely on their education in Qom. Some members of the senior group had
received a diploma from a tertiary education institution in another country,
such as Punjab University in Pakistan, while others had enrolled in undergraduate programmes at the institutes for Islamic studies, whether state or private,
which are scattered in the cities and towns of Indonesia. Many – such as Ikhlas
Budiman, Musa Kazim and Husein al-Kaff – had master’s degrees in Islamic studies as well as in other fields. At least four of them – Umar Shahab, Abdurrahman
Bima, Muhsin Labib and Kholid al-Walid – had completed doctoral programmes
in Islamic studies at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta. For
example, upon completion of his study in Qom in 1980, Umar Shahab continued his undergraduate programme at the Faculty of Islamic Theology, Raden
Fatah State Institute for Islamic studies, Palembang, completing it in 1984. He
graduated with a master’s degree and a doctorate in Islamic studies from Syarif
Hidayatullah State Islamic University in 1991 and 2007, respectively. Similarly,
Kholid al-Walid already held a bachelor’s degree in Islamic theology before
spending about seven years studying in Qom. Upon his return home from Qom,
he entered master’s and doctoral programmes at Sunan Gunung Djati State
Islamic University, Bandung, and Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University,
Jakarta, respectively. By contrast, Abdurrahman Bima and Muhsin Labib were
able to pursue their doctoral programmes at the State Islamic University, Jakarta,
directly after the completion of their study in Qom thanks to the diplomas they
had received from other institutions.
Due to their educational achievements, the above four figures enjoy cultural
and social capital, which can be transformed easily into economic and symbolic
capital. They have become prominent ustadz and lecturers at several universities
and colleges in Jakarta. Furthermore, they were involved in founding, managing
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and lecturing at Islamic universities, including STAIMI in Depok and Sadra
College for Islamic Philosophy (STFI Sadra) in Jakarta.
Further education is not, however, a dominating factor that guarantees the
success of a Qom alumni as an ustadz. Yet, in spite of the fact that they have
not continued studying at a higher level, alumni have been successful in establishing, managing and teaching at Islamic institutions that attract students or
individuals from the Shiʿi community. Take, for example, Ahmad Baragbah,
who relies on his experience at the Hujjatiyya School, and who has succeeded
in leading a pesantren in his hometown. Together with his Qom alumni colleagues, Baragbah, who spent five years studying Islamic knowledge in Qom,
founded al-Hadi in 1989. Baragbah, an Indonesian non-Sayyid Arab, forged
strong connections with the late Husein al-Habsyi, who recommended him
for Islamic education in Qom and supported him in the establishment of the
pesantren. Although Baragbah never studied at YAPI, his relationship with
Husein al-Habsyi may be considered as a student–teacher relationship. Like
him, other Qom graduates have also enjoyed several types of capital: cultural,
social, economic and symbolic.
Other alumni have become renowned ustadz without being permanently
affiliated with specific institutions. Husein Shahab’s case is a notable example.
His career as an ustadz progressed even though he never completed his master’s
degree at ISTAC Kuala Lumpur. After 1999, he chose to live in Jakarta where
the largest numbers of Shiʿa reside. With his cultural capital (that is, his religious education in Qom and Kuala Lumpur), Husein Shahab began to establish
his career by becoming involved in a number of daʿwa and educational activities
in the capital. His good performance in daʿwa activities attracted an audience,
including the organisers, or “leaders”, of Islamic institutions. He then became
a preacher and lecturer at several Islamic institutions, both Sunni and Shiʿi,
such as Paramadina, STAIMI, IIMaN Centre for Positive Sufism, Taqwa Nanjar
Foundation, al-Batul and al-Husainy. In addition, he has become involved in
the religious programmes of several national television and radio stations, and
is a very popular ustadz. As a prominent ustadz, Husein Shahab is hardly ever
absent from national Shiʿi activities in Indonesia: in a single month he might
teach and preach at more than twenty Islamic institutions. Given this large
number of daʿwa activities, he too may become one of those ustadz who can live
comfortably in Jakarta.18
Setting aside the economically and socially successful ustadz, however, it
must be noted that good fortune has not graced all the Qom alumni who are
active in serving the Shiʿi community. This has created envy of the popular
ustadz who are considered to be inactive in guiding the Shiʿi community. There
are yet other Qom alumni who refrain from the main duties of ustadz, but who
instead become involved in business activities.
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The social structure in which Qom graduates are located is notably complex
with respect to the development of Shiʿi organisations in Indonesia. Although
Indonesia is home to only a very small number of Shiʿa as compared with the
vast Sunni majority, there are two national Shiʿi organisations. The first is
Ikatan Jamaah Ahlulbait Indonesia (IJABI; the All-Indonesian Assembly of
Ahlulbayt Associations), established 1 July 2000 and created by Jalaluddin
Rakhmat. The second is Ahlul Bait Indonesia (ABI), established in July 2011.
In the early stages of the process, nearly all the Qom alumni supported the
necessity of establishing a national Shiʿi organisation in Indonesia. Even such
prominent ustadz as Umar Shahab, Husein Shahab and Ahmad Baragbah were
involved in a series of meetings with Jalaluddin Rakhmat intended to formulate
the characteristics and structures of the organisations. However, the general
lack of involvement and support from the wider community, and the later development of IJABI, has created discord within the Shiʿi community, which can in
fact now be classified into the IJABI group and the non-IJABI group – the latter
also known as the Qom group. Qom alumni such as Kholid al-Walid and Ikhlas
Budiman, who had been active in managing IJABI for several years, later left it;
now only a very small number of them are involved.
As I have noted elsewhere,19 there is a range of other related matters that
lead the ustadz to reject IJABI. As Ahmad Baragbah has noted, three issues are
particularly prominent. The first concerns the organisation’s name, which in
this case is intimately related to the identity of the wider community. The critics
of IJABI had proposed that the appropriate name for the organisation would be
Ahlulbait (ahl al-bayt), because it is short and easy to remember, and frequently
used by Shiʿa in general. The second, and more important, issue is the position
of vilāyat-i faqı̄h, the political concept familiar from the Islamic Republic of Iran
that assigns the faqı̄h (jurist) the highest authority over other segments of society.
One widely adopted interpretation of this concept is that the leaders in Iran hold
the highest leadership within the Shiʿi community worldwide, and not simply
in Iran. The Shiʿa in Indonesia should therefore recognise this leadership. Thus,
for these critics, the concept of vilāyat-i faqı̄h ought to be explicitly mentioned
in the organisation’s statutes, thus manifesting its recognition of the authority
of Iran’s Supreme Leader. In fact, the term does not appear in the IJABI statute,
and the ustadz therefore regard IJABI as an opponent of vilāyat-i faqı̄h. The
third issue also concerns authority. According to the IJABI’s statutes the highest
authority is vested in the national congress. The opposing group argues, however, that the highest authority, such as the power to appoint the chair of the
executive council, should rest with the advisory council (dewan syuro), and not
be based on elections at the national congress, since the latter would not reliably
produce excellent results – indeed, it is a fact that the first national congress was
not well organised, as has been admitted by Jalaluddin Rakhmat.20
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While rejecting IJABI, nearly all the Qom alumni have supported and been
involved in establishing ABI. Since mid-2010, a “friendship forum” called
Forum Silaturahmi Nasional Ahlul Bait, consisting of representatives from Shiʿi
pesantren and foundations from all over Indonesia, has been calling for the creation of a mass organisational alternative to IJABI, and this, the ABI, launched
on 15 June 2011. The members of the ABI advisory council are senior Qom
alumni; its chairman is Umar Shahab, while its executive chief is Hasan Dalil
Alaydrus. Since its establishment, ABI has been active in promoting the mass
organisation, seeking friendship and cooperation with existing Sunni organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, and carrying out
dialogues with Sunnis. One of its notable programmes is the promotion of the
moderate face of Shiʿism through the publication of the so-called Buku Putih
Mazhab Syiah (The White Book of Shiʿism) in 2012.21 Nevertheless, it faces obstacles, as Formichi has noted: “It is of utmost interest . . . that ABI is struggling
to obtain formal recognition from the government as they are unable to show
a substantial difference with IJABI and thus demonstrate the need for a new
organisation. Meaning that still now IJABI is the only public face of Indonesian
Shiʿism.”22

Qom Alumni and Daʿwa
Graduates of the Qom seminaries have travelled all over the world in order to
propagate Islam.23 Qom returnees in Indonesia have also contributed to the
development of Islamic daʿwa. Daʿwa literally means “a call” or “an invitation”;
in Indonesia, however, as in other countries, daʿwa has become a more complex
term which includes the specific meaning of tablı̄gh (preaching) and a broader
sense of “the propagation of Islam not only by preaching and publications, but
also by deeds and activities in all areas of social life . . . [or] a comprehensive
Islamization of society”.24 The major role of the Qom graduates in the field of
Islamic daʿwa is in accord with the educational goal of Hawza ʿIlmiyya, namely,
to train students to become missionaries and scholars.
Daʿwa carried out by Qom graduates has become widespread throughout
Shiʿi institutions and organisations. The increasing number of Qom alumni
returning to Indonesia corresponds with the growing number of Shiʿi foundations in the country. Although the establishment of these foundations is not a
direct result of the ustadz or the Qom alumni, it is clear that a large number of
Qom alumni have established their own Shiʿi foundations. To name but a few,
Fathoni Hadi established the al-Hujjah Foundation, Jember, in 1987; Ahmad
Baragbah established al-Hadi in 1989; Abdullah Assegaf founded the al-Wahdah Foundation, Solo, in 1994; and Rusdi al-Aydrus established the Ath-Thohir
Foundation, Surabaya, in 2000. Furthermore, most of the Qom alumni have
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become leaders or ustadz at the existing Shiʿi foundations: these include Zahir
Yahya at al-Kautsar Foundation, Malang, East Java; Husein al-Kaf at al-Jawad
Foundation, Bandung; Abdullah Assegaf at IPABI, Bogor; Muhammad Syuaib
at al-Mujtaba Foundation, Purwakarta, West Java; and Herman al-Munthahar at Amirul Mukminin Foundation, Pontianak, West Kalimantan. It seems
that their missionary zeal has motivated these Qom alumni to establish Shiʿi
institutions so that daʿwa activities are institutionalised and organised.
The better-established foundations usually have one or more permanent
ustadz whose main duty is to give religious instruction and guidance to the
jamaʿa. In this regard, the ustadz becomes a muballigh (preacher) or dāʿı̄ (propagandist, evangelist) in the broad meaning of the term. As mentioned before,
in some cases an ustadz may be a co-founder or owner of an institution; in other
cases, the ustadz occupies a high position within the organisational structure of
the institution. This is in accord with the fact that the ustadz have a prestigious
status in the Shiʿi community. In this regard, the term pembina (adviser) is
sometimes used to indicate a position that is higher than its head. The position
is rather similar to that of the kyai within the pesantren tradition. Like the kyai
in the pesantren, the ustadz is influential in the development of the institution.
In many cases, the ustadz, particularly the prominent ones such as Umar Shahab
and Husein Shahab, are not affiliated with a certain institution, but are hired
by several different institutions at once. As mentioned earlier, a large number
of Qom alumni become ustadz, and many of them occupy high positions in the
Shiʿi institutions throughout the country.
The position of ustadz is crucial for the existence and development of Shiʿi
institutions. The ustadz are influential in planning and realising programmes
within each institution, as well as in establishing connections with other institutions. The main duties of an ustadz can be described as follows: to give religious instruction and guidance, to preach, to lead rituals and ceremonies, and
to give advice regarding the direction of the institution. For these duties, the
qualifications required of the ustadz include a thorough knowledge of religion,
and good skills in preaching and in leading religious rituals and ceremonies. It is
not surprising that the positions of ustadz in most Shiʿi institutions are occupied
by Qom graduates. As a person who is considered to have deep religious knowledge, an ustadz is often seen by his jamaʿa as a figure whose guidance and advice
is to be followed.
The position and role of Qom returnees cannot be dissociated from the
establishment and management of the Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC), Jakarta,
formerly ICC al-Huda, which was founded by five Iranians living in Jakarta in
2000. Its establishment involved the collaboration of several prominent Shiʿi
figures in Indonesia with Iran, with the intention of fostering cultural understanding between Iran and Indonesia. The founding council includes Jalaluddin
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Rakhmat, Haidar Bagir and Umar Shahab. Its current director is Seyed Murteza
Mousavi (an Iranian), who succeeded Muhsen Hakimollah. Beneath the director is a manager, who has always been a Qom alumnus. The present manager is
Abdullah Beik, a graduate of the master’s programme at Imam Khomeini College
for Higher Education. To run its activities, this – the biggest Shiʿi foundation in
Indonesia – employs about thirty staff, some of whom, though not all, are Qom
alumni. The organisation of the centre depends crucially on the character of the
director, not only with regard to authority and responsibility, but also due to its
financial dependence on Iran. Since its establishment, the ICC has organised
celebrations for national Islamic festivals and holy days such as ʿAshuraʾ (the
commemoration of the death of Imam Husayn), arabʿı̄n (the commemoration
of the fortieth day after Husayn’s death) and mawlid (the Prophet Muhammad’s
birthday), as well as various missionary activities. It also facilitates Indonesian
students who wish to study in Qom and other cities. Additionally, ICC has been
active in publishing books, journals and magazines, and provides regular courses
in Persian and Arabic, and on the sciences of the Qurʾan and Islamic traditions.
Another apparent function is that of mediating among the existing Shiʿi institutions and between Iran and the Shiʿi community in Indonesia – a function
that used to be fulfilled by the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta. As Formichi notes,
however, the “ICC had been rejecting co-optation attempts by the Iranian
Embassy for several years, however a recent change in the centre’s directorship
would suggest the beginning of a different relationship.”25
It is through ICC, the Islamic College and the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta that
missionary activities in the form of discussions, seminars, dialogues and workshops are carried out in cities and towns throughout the regions of Indonesia.
Cooperation agreements and friendships have been established with Muslim
organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, as well as with well-known universities. An important form of cooperation that is instrumental in promoting
Iranian culture and Shiʿism is the establishment of the so-called “Iran Corner”
at about twelve renowned universities in Indonesia, including UIN Jakarta,
UIN Yogyakarta, UIN Makasar and Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta.
The Qom alumni play a key role in facilitating such cooperation efforts.
Qom graduates have been active in varied types of daʿwa, which I have
summarised elsewhere as follows:
Since the concept of da‘wa is commonly understood in its widest sense that
includes all missionary activities aimed at realising Islamic society, da‘wa
activities provided by the institutions are quite varied. The varied da‘wa activities can be classified into three types: tabligh (preaching), ta‘lim (teaching,
training or course) and social da‘wa. All these types are frequently interconnected. They may be directed towards either internal or external orientation.
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The realisation of the three types of da‘wa by the existing institutions may be
formulated in the form of either regular or incidental programmes.26
Their missionary activities have, however, generated negative responses from
some segments of Indonesian society, even though some prominent Muslim
leaders have displayed a moderate attitude towards Shiʿism and the Shiʿa.
Tension, conflict and even sectarian violence have marred Sunni–Shiʿi relations in Indonesia, and one of the important factors in these conflicts is fear of
the “Shiʿitisation” of Sunnis. As a result, the practice of daʿwa, including its
syllabi and methods, has become an important topic of discussion among Shiʿi
figures, as in the workshop carried out by IKMAL mentioned previously. Several
daʿwa training sessions have also been carried out in order to promote effective
and successful daʿwa programmes.

Qom Alumni and Islamic Education
In the field of education, the role of the Qom alumni is enormous. This role
can be classified into three aspects: first, they become teachers at existing
educational institutions such as pesantren, madrasas and schools that may or
may not be characteristically Shiʿi (it should be noted that the existing system
of Islamic education in Indonesia comprises three institutions: the pesantren,
the madrasa and the school). Secondly, they establish and manage their own
educational institutions. Thirdly, they teach at the newly founded educational
institutions.
The new educational institutions usually follow the ḥawza model. Pesantren
al-Hadi, which was founded by Ahmad Baragbah in Pekalongan, Central Java,
is a noted example. Since its establishment, al-Hadi has provided students only
with religious education that primarily follows the Shiʿi educational system
of Hawza ʿIlmiyya in Qom, where its founders and teachers had been trained
– particularly in terms of subject matter and instructional materials. The educational programme is organised into six levels with a variety of subjects and drawing on a range of sources. The subjects offered include Arabic, ʿaqı̄da, fiqh, tafsı̄r,
hadith and Islamic history. All instructional materials are standard texts used
in the institutions of Islamic learning in Qom. The basic teachings of Shiʿism,
especially its doctrines and jurisprudence, are taught to the students of the first
level, who are expected, if not required, to practice them in their daily life. As
rituals and ceremonies practised in the pesantren are all Shiʿi, guidance and
training regarding daily obligatory rituals are also provided. All the instruction,
training and guidance of the Shiʿi teachings in al-Hadi are attempts to realise
its main goal: to provide its students with the basic knowledge and skills to comprise a cadre of Shiʿi teachers throughout the country. Furthermore, with the
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knowledge they gain at the institution, its graduates can pursue higher Islamic
education at the institutions of Islamic learning in Qom.
Pesantren al-Hadi and its top leader Ahmad Baragbah have connections
with Iran, with both the office of the Supreme Leader and some individual
ʿulama. This pesantren, following an educational tradition similar to that in
Qom, was said to send regular reports to Iran via its representatives or, at present, the ICC in Jakarta – the latter keeps the pesantren under constant observation, attending to their development, including the execution of curricula
and the activities of students and teachers. Important events that occur in the
pesantren are all reported to the office of the Supreme Leader. The pesantren
also receive financial assistance from Iran, as well as educational equipment,
particularly books and periodicals.27 The interrelationship between them is also
evidenced by the fact that a number of al-Hadi graduates go on to continue their
Islamic education in Qom. Some of them have finished their studies and have
returned to Indonesia: Muhammad in Purwakarta, Ali al-Aydrus in Bandung
and Salman Daruddin in Jakarta, to name a few. All have been involved in the
field of Islamic education and propagation. In addition, representatives of Iran’s
Supreme Leader and individual Shiʿi learned men frequently take the opportunity to visit the pesantren during their visits to Indonesia. On the other hand,
with the Islamic knowledge he gained in Qom, Ahmad Baragbah has been
recognised by Iran as an important Shiʿi figure in Indonesia, who is expected to
play a major role in the spread of Shiʿism. Alongside other prominent figures
such as Jalaluddin Rakhmat and Zahir Yahya, he was appointed a representative
of the Supreme Leader in the accumulation and distribution of khums (tax) in
the country. Together with other influential figures like Jalaluddin Rakhmat,
Zahir Yahya and Umar Shahab, he was also expected to prepare for the establishment of other Shiʿi organisations in Indonesia.
Indonesia is also home to other Islamic education institutions that take
the title ḥawza. One is called Hawzah Ilmiah Khatamun Nabiyyin, which was
founded in Jakarta on 1 January 2000. Under the guidance of Grand Ayatollah
Shaykh Husayn Wahid Khurasani in Qom, the ḥawza runs a two-year academic
programme in Islamic studies, providing subjects like Arabic, mantiq, tafsı̄r,
hadith, fiqh, usūl al-fiqh, kalām and history, as well as secular subjects like sociology, philosophy and research techniques. The students are then expected to
pursue their learning at the ḥawza in Qom or Najaf.
The famous YAPI of Bangil, known as Hawzah Ilmiah Imam Ash-Shodiq and
headed by Ali Umar al-Habsyi, has also adopted the ḥawza institutional model.
It was established on 23 July 2008, with an initial intake of forty students. It
tutors its students in all fields of religious studies, such as kalām, fiqh, tafsı̄r,
Arabic and history. They are also expected to continue their study in Qom or in
another ḥawza in Iran.
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Additionally, the IPABI Foundation led by Abdullah Som has set up the
so-called Hauzah Ilmiah Amirul Mukminin for male students and the Hauzah
Ilmiah Az-Zahra for females. These are situated in an area in Puncak, Bogor,
West Java. As a three-semester programme for senior high-school graduates,
both ḥawza are designed to produce students with good reasoning skills and a
good understanding of scientific practice, and also to prepare them for community service. Guided by a cohort of teachers that includes Qom alumni, students
are taught Arabic, English, mantiq, mathematics, kalām and fiqh. In addition,
they are enrolled in a programme of character-building, and are even trained in
skills like martial arts, computer science, journalism, public speaking and event
organising.
The Qom alumni also take part in the establishment and organisation of
Islamic higher educational institutions, including Madinatul Ilmi College for
Islamic Studies (STAIMI) and the Sadra College for Islamic Philosophy (STFI
Sadra). Founded on 23 May 1997, STAIMI has already produced more than
500 alumni. It offers two subjects at undergraduate level: Islamic education and
Islamic communication and information. Although its present rector is Mahdi
Alaydrus, the STAIMI Foundation is headed by a Qom alumnus, Abdurrahman
Bima. Recently, besides the regular system, STAIMI has implemented a boarding system for its students, who are provided with a number of learning and
training activities such as Qurʾan memorisation, leadership training and martial
arts. This was inspired by the model of Hawza ʿIlmiyya. It should be noted that
STAIMI openly declares its identity as a Shiʿi university, which is designed
to promote and implement the teachings of Shiʿism. As stated on its website,
the STAIMI curriculum integrates the subjects outlined for universities by the
Ministry of Religious Affairs with local content based on the spiritual excellence and character of ahl al-bayt, as well as promoting competency in English,
Arabic and Persian. Furthermore, in addition to the formal curriculum, STAIMI
strives to emphasise science and technology in religion and to create a religious
atmosphere in campus daily life with the nuance of the ahl al-bayt tradition. A
number of Qom alumni take part in teaching and guiding students in Islamic
philosophy and Shiʿi rituals and tradition.
STFI Sadra differs from STAIMI in that it is reluctant to declare its Shiʿi
identity. A number of Qom alumni are engaged in either management or teaching roles at this institution, which is presently headed by the renowned Qom
alumnus Umar Shahab. This is a newly founded institution, launched on 12
July 2012, a date that was marked by an international seminar with a keynote
speech by Professor Nasaruddin Umar, the Deputy Minister of Religious Affairs.
With two undergraduate departments, that of Islamic Philosophy and of Qurʾan
and Hadith Studies, it commenced classes in the academic year 2012. It is little
wonder that an institution with this intellectual bent should have been founded,
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as Qom graduates have a strong predilection for philosophy – a fact that is also
closely related to Hawza ʿIlmiyya’s reputation as a world centre for Muslim
philosophers.28 Umar Shahab and three other doctoral graduates of UIN Jakarta
majored in Islamic philosophy, as is evidenced especially from their dissertation
subjects – Umar Shahab having studied Khomeini’s thought; Kholid al-Walid
having investigated Mulla Sadra’s eschatological views; Muhsin Labib having
looked at Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi’s philosophy; and Abdurrahman Bima
having scrutinised the influence of philosophy on Khomeini’s political thought.
In addition, the role of Qom alumni in the field of Islamic education in
Indonesia can be seen in their involvement in the development of the Islamic
College Jakarta, which is sponsored by an Iranian charity. This was previously
called the Islamic College for Advanced Studies (ICAS), set up in London
in 1998, and the Jakarta branch was founded in 2003. Ali Movahhedi, the
representative of ICAS London, as well as Professor Nurcholish Madjid (1939–
2005), the outstanding Indonesian Muslim intellectual who was then rector of
the University of Paramadina, signed the Memorandum of Understanding on
29 July 2002. The memorandum to run the Islamic Studies programme was then
legalised by the Directorate General of Islamic Institutional Establishment (now
the Directorate General of Islamic Education), the Ministry of Religious Affairs
of the Republic of Indonesia, and later confirmed by the State Secretary of the
Republic of Indonesia. In 2009, along with the establishment of al-Mustafa
International University in Qom, it changed to its present name, the Islamic
College Jakarta.
As stated in the web pages of al-Mustafa International University, the Islamic
College Jakarta is one of the twenty-four colleges of al-Mustafa International
University that are scattered around the world, including in Albania, Argentina,
Denmark, Germany, India, the United Kingdom and Sweden. As a branch of
the college, MIU issues diplomas for graduates of the Islamic College. Further,
its director, Seyyed Ahmad Fazeli, is Iranian (the former director was Mohsen
Mirri). The director is assisted by deputies in the areas of administration and
research, in addition to being aided by staff from Iran especially with regard
to financial affairs, and from Indonesia with regard to academic protocol. The
Indonesians on the staff are usually Qom alumni, and these alumni also play a
role as lecturers at the Islamic College. Thus, the important role of Qom alumni
in the organisation and development of the Islamic College branch of MIU is
very clear.
As for the academic programmes, the Islamic College relies on a raft of agreements with other higher education institutions, all of which have been established in view of the legal status that the programme is perceived to have in the
eyes of Indonesian students and wider society. Since 2003–4 it has had a master’s programme in the field of Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism based
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on the abovementioned memorandum with the University of Paramadina. On
23 October 2010, the University of Paramadina received legal permission from
the Directorate General of Islamic Institution, the Ministry of Religious Affairs,
to organise a master’s programme in Islamic studies. This was a renewal of the
letter of 29 June 2001 from the Directorate of Islamic Institutional Establishment
regarding cooperation, with the aim of establishing a dual programme and pooling human resources between the University of Paramadina and the Islamic
College for Advanced Studies, London.
Cooperation agreements were extended to other universities in Indonesia,
such as Sunan Gunung Djati State Islamic University, Bandung; Alauddin State
Islamic University, Makasar; and Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta.
The Islamic College also cooperates with UIN Bandung in running a BA in
Islamic studies, and cooperates with Alauddin State Islamic University in
Makassar in running a doctoral programme in Islamic philosophy. While the
licence for the doctorate programme is under the authority of UIN Alauddin,
the Islamic College is responsible for budgeting and financing the programme.
It is important to note that one of the doctoral students, Jalaluddin Rakhmat,
is the most prominent Shiʿi intellectual in Indonesia, and worth noting also
that his admission as a doctoral student at UIN Alauddin Makasar met with
a harsh response from leaders in Indonesia who are anti-Shiʿi. In a meeting in
Bandung held on 22 April 2012, the so-called Forum of Indonesian ʿUlama
and Community (FUUI), led by Athian Ali Dai, proposed that the university
should reconsider Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s status as a doctoral student because he
is a known Shiʿi figure. The university dismissed the idea.
Thus, the role of Qom alumni in the field of Islamic education includes teaching at, establishing and managing Islamic educational institutions at elementary,
secondary and tertiary levels. Their educational experience in the Hawza ʿIlmiyya of Qom certainly influences their roles in these capacities, which include the
transmission of knowledge, the adoption of the ḥawza model, and management
and lecturing at the Indonesian branch of al-Mustafa International University.

Conclusion
The complex role of Qom alumni in Indonesia can be summarised as follows:
in relations between Iran and Indonesia, particularly within the Shiʿi community, Qom alumni occupy the position of mediator in the broadest sense. Geertz
sees the kyai as cultural brokers engaged in filtering the appropriate information to the Shiʿi community;29 however, due the massive access to information technologies that characterise the national and international relationships
canvassed in this chapter, Geertz’s view is not appropriate for understanding
the role of Qom alumni in the Shiʿi community. Those alumni connect the
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world’s centre of Shiʿi orthodoxy in Iran to the Shiʿi community in Indonesia
either directly or via Iranian institutions in Indonesia: specifically, the Islamic
Cultural Centre, Jakarta, and the Islamic College Jakarta. It should be noted,
however, that Shiʿism has become a field in which competition and conflict
have coloured the relations between the Qom alumni and others, and indeed
among the Qom alumni themselves. Further, all this is happening in the context
of the strong competition that the Shiʿi groups face from the rival Sunni groups
in Indonesia.
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Chapter 6

Islamic Modernism, Political Reform
and the Arabisation of Education:
The Relationship between Moroccan Nationalists
and al-Azhar University
Ann Wainscott

Introduction
This chapter examines the relationship between al-Azhar University and
the Moroccan nationalist movement. It argues that al-Azhar served as the
institutional link between the Islamic modernist movement1 in Cairo led by
Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashid Rida and the Moroccan nationalists led by
ʿAllal al-Fasi. The infusion of Moroccan nationalism with the ideas of religious reform propagated by the Islamic modernists strengthened the ideological
foundations of the independence movement and contributed to its success.
Once these reformers found themselves in positions of authority in the post-independence government, Islamic modernist ideas continued to guide policy
decisions, particularly with regard to educational priorities. This is most clearly
demonstrated in the Arabisation of Moroccan education that took place during
the second half of the twentieth century.
In addition to Islamic modernism’s influence on Moroccan nationalists
and their subsequent policies, the Moroccan case is significant to scholars of
al-Azhar for other reasons. First, the conversions of the most prominent early
twentieth-century Moroccan nationalists to Islamic modernism illustrate the
various ways that the ideologies taught at al-Azhar University became influential in another country. I highlight three particular ways that Islamic modernism spread to Morocco: (a) directly, through studies at al-Azhar University;
(b) indirectly, through the hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca, which required travel
through Egypt; and, finally, (c) discipleship under a former al-Azhar student.
Interestingly, it was not individuals who physically studied at al-Azhar, but
those who contacted Islamic modernism through the third of these methods,
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discipleship, who have played the most significant role in implementing Islamic
modernist policy in Morocco. This suggests that the pedagogical methods of
al-Azhar and Islamic higher education in general,2 which encouraged close relationships between teacher and student, have been at least as important as the
content of ideology in the spread of Islamic modernism.
Secondly, the Moroccan case is significant to the study of al-Azhar’s regional
impact because the earliest efforts to introduce Islamic modernism in Morocco
failed. It was not until the second introduction of these ideas to the country
that they took root. This situation presents ideal circumstances to assess how
local conditions and power relations affect the ability of al-Azhar graduates and
their disciples to propagate the ideas they gained abroad. Thus, while Islamic
modernism’s role in the Moroccan nationalist movement is undeniable, it is an
oversimplification to attribute its impact to the ideology itself. Rather, a particular constellation of economic, political and social factors created an opportunity
that led to the ideology’s adoption and spread.

Argument
This chapter argues that the adoption of Islamic modernism as the ideological foundation for the nationalist movement created the conditions of path
dependence. Path-dependent arguments are rooted in the idea of “increasing
returns”: small choices can have long-term and far-reaching effects if they close
off other potential opportunities or “paths”.3 The changes in Moroccan society
brought on by increasing European penetration at the end of the nineteenth
century created the perception of an economic, political and social threat that
made intellectuals and elites more open to new ideologies than they had been
in previous decades. Fear of European domination of Moroccan industry and
political institutions created the conception that Moroccan Islam and social
organisation was in danger. The impact of this perception is evidenced in how
differently Moroccan elites responded to the same ideology in the late 1870s,
when they rejected Islamic modernism, and the first decades of the twentieth
century, when they embraced it. Once Islamic modernism had been installed,
and its position solidified through the Berber Dahir crisis of 1930, the choice
had been made. Islamic modernism was locked in as the ideological foundation
for the movement. The installation of this doctrine thus constitutes a critical
juncture in Moroccan history and initiates a need to ask why this particular
model of religious and political reform became influential above other possible
alternatives. There is general agreement among participants that it was this
combination of religious and political reform that contributed to the success of
both movements. Once in a position of power, Moroccan nationalists began to
make policy decisions related to the future of the country. As committed Islamic
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modernists, the ideology became institutionalised in the country’s system of
education. Education thus served as the mechanism through which Islamic
modernism reproduced itself.

Organisation
The introduction concludes with a discussion of the term “Islamic modernism”
and why I chose to use it in place of the term “Salafism”. The central body of the
chapter has three sections: the first describes the development of the relationship between al-Azhar University and Morocco, highlighting the role of trade,
pilgrimage and education. The second examines prominent Moroccan Islamic
modernists, including Abdullah ibn Idris al-Sanusi, Abu Shuʿayb al-Dukkali,
Muhammad ibn al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi and ʿAllal al-Fasi, and their connection to
Islamic modernism. These four graduates are significant for several reasons. First,
they exemplify the three ways that Moroccans came into contact with Islamic
modernism enumerated above. Secondly, the varying success of their efforts to
spread the ideology sheds light on how the conditions of the local community
impacted upon how this ideology was received. Finally, the third part of the
chapter examines the short- and long-term impact of these graduates, with an
emphasis on the ideology underpinning Moroccan educational policy. I argue
that the immediate impact of the spread of Islamic modernism was the combining of two movements, one for religious reform and one for political reform, the
fusion of which strengthened both. Once granted independence, the nationalist
movement became a modern political party that participated in governing the
country. The Islamic modernist tinge of their educational policies provides evidence that the installation of Islamic modernism as the ideological foundation
of the Moroccan nationalist movement created the conditions of path dependence and served as a critical juncture in Moroccan society, the implications of
which remain visible today. The chapter concludes with reflections on what the
study of the Moroccan case contributes to the study of al-Azhar University and
its graduates’ impact on their home communities.

Islamic Modernism and Salafism in Morocco
There are some complications with describing the ideology deployed in the
Moroccan nationalist struggle. Although much of the literature refers to
Moroccan nationalists as Salafists, the ideology was rooted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Egyptian Islamic modernism of Jamal al-din
al-Afghani, Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashid Rida.4 This discrepancy is likely
due to the fact that the major Moroccan nationalist ʿAllal al-Fasi himself used
the term “Salafiyah” in his memoirs (1948). Subsequent scholars, presumably
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relying on al-Fasi, have characterised the nationalists as Salafists. Because al-Fasi’s ideology was rooted in the ideas of al-Afghani, ʿAbduh and Rida, and
because they did not refer to themselves as Salafists,5 I have chosen to use the
term “Islamic modernist”.
Further, in the twenty-first century Salafism refers to groups with very different ideologies than it did at the time of the Islamic modernists and the
Moroccan nationalists. In the twenty-first century, Salafism refers to a retrogressive, puritanical interpretation of Islam resistant to any innovation from the
post-Rashidun6 period. Salafist belief is characterised by rejection of non-Islamic
institutions and insistence on harsh punishments according to narrow interpretations of the faith. The Islamic modernists, on the other hand, had a very
different approach to reconciling their faith with the challenges of the day.
Muhammad ʿAbduh was the most influential of the Islamic modernists
among the Moroccan nationalists. ʿAbduh, the student of al-Afghani, studied at
al-Azhar from 1869 to 1877 and taught there afterwards. ʿAbduh was interested
in mystical theology and was contemplating an ascetic life before he met al-Afghani. After a brief exile, he returned to Egypt where he became committed to
the founding of schools and reforming al-Azhar. ʿAbduh did not reject modern
institutions; rather, he sought to reconcile them to Islamic principles and in so
doing chart a middle course:
ʿAbduh’s purpose, in all the acts of his later life as well as his writings, was to
bridge the gulf within Islamic society [between those who accepted and those
who rejected modern institutions and ideas], and in so doing to strengthen
its moral roots. He thought this could only be done in one way. It could not
be done by a return to the past, by stopping the process of change begun by
Muhammad ʿAli. It could only be done by accepting the need for change,
and by linking that change to the principles of Islam: by showing that the
changes which were taking place were not only permitted by Islam, but were
indeed its necessary implications if it was rightly understood, and that Islam
could serve both as a principle of change and a salutary control over it.7
Since the Islamic modernists accepted European institutions and bodies of
knowledge in the context of Islamic values, referring to their disciples as Salafis
is misleading given the current understanding of the term as militantly against
non-Islamic institutions. Finally, at a time when the media frequently uses the
term “Salafist” as interchangeable with “terrorist” or “extremist” without concern for the content of the ideology motivating the individual, it is prudent to
employ the less politicised term “Islamic modernism”.
One caveat is in order, however. There is one way in which Moroccan
nationalists resemble modern Salafis more than Islamic modernists, and that
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is in their hostility towards Sufism.8 Due to the political and social context
in which Islamic modernism was incorporated in Morocco, where Sufis were
perceived as collaborating with the French colonisers, anti-Sufi elements were
played up among the nationalists more than among the original Islamic modernists. Al-Fasi’s claim that “the manner in which the Salfiyah movement had been
conducted in Morocco had secured for it a degree of success unequalled even
in the country of Muhammad ʿAbduh and Jamal al-Din, where it originated”
should be interpreted as in reference to the success of the movement in taking
a militant stand against Sufism.9 This is not to say that the Islamic modernists
were successful in eradicating Sufism from Morocco, only that the nationalists
opposed it in tangible ways.10 Further, al-Fasi’s stance against Sufism did not
prevent him from instrumentalising French acceptance of the brotherhoods.
In fact, an early nationalist secret society was known as a zaouia, a term used as
a meeting place for Sufis, and al-Fasi was sometimes referred to as “Shaykh”, a
term widely used in Morocco to connote the leader of a brotherhood.11
The Islamic modernists on the other hand, and particularly Muhammad
ʿAbduh, were sympathetic to a certain kind of Sufism. ʿAbduh first encountered Sufism at the feet of his father’s maternal uncle, Shaykh Darwish Khadir,
who was a disciple of the Moroccan founder of the Darqawiyya order, Mawlay
al-ʿArabi al-Darqawi.12 There is also some support for the argument that ʿAbduh
was drawn to al-Afghani because of his views on Sufism. The two do appear to
have held similar beliefs on the subject. Both men believed that Sufism could
contribute to proper Islamic practice, but rejected many of the behaviours of
their Sufi contemporaries:
For the true mysticism, as he conceived it, ʿAbduh had a great respect: it was
right that Muslims should interiorize their obedience to the law. But another
type of mysticism he regarded as dangerous to the mind and morals: that type
which gave its devotion to the “saints” (friends of God, awliyaʾ) and their
miracles, and so tended to divert attention from God and to place intermediaries between God and man . . .13
ʿAbduh’s position is so ambiguous that it has led some scholars to conclude that
he was a “salafi Sufi”, a term that is unthinkable in the context of the modern
usage of “Salafi”.14 ʿAbduh’s careful discrimination between appropriate and
inappropriate forms of Sufism has largely been lost by subsequent followers,
including the Moroccan modernists, who were, in general, anti-Sufi.
Similarly, the father of Islamic modernism and ʿAbduh’s teacher, al-Afghani, had a nuanced relationship with Sufism that is frequently oversimplified.
ʿAbduh likely acquired his relationship with Sufism from his teacher, who
both appreciated great Sufi thinkers while questioning the actions of his Sufi
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contemporaries. ʿAbduh writes that al-Afghani was responsible for deepening
his knowledge of Sufism. In particular, al-Afghani is known to have introduced ʿAbduh and several other disciples to the Naqshbandi mystical poet ʿAbd
al-Rahman Jami, an author whose works were not taught at al-Azhar.15 At the
same time, al-Afghani saw Sufis as preventing the Islamic community or umma
from modernising. Although he rarely criticised Sufis directly, his complaints
about the relationship between shaykh and disciple, which required total obedience, and the style of instruction offered at al-Azhar Mosque university, which
relied on rote memorisation, capture his concerns and situate them within his
larger intellectual priorities. He was more concerned with the advancement of
the umma than opposing the brotherhoods. Al-Afghani felt that both Sufism
and rote memorisation prevented the development of the critical faculties and
open mind necessary for rational debate and, hence, were a threat to the progress of the community.16 His anti-Sufi discourse should then be understood in
the context of admiration for European rationalist thought and his hopes for the
renewal of Islamic thought.
The socio-political context encountered by the Moroccan nationalists was
quite different. In early twentieth-century Morocco, a number of Sufi shaykhs
cooperated with the French in order to maintain their positions of authority.17
Thus, the emphasis on the anti-Sufi strain of thought in Islamic modernism in
the Moroccan context was rooted in resistance to French domination, while
al-Afghani’s critique of Sufism was related to his concerns about the decay of the
umma in failing to adopt European institutions and technologies. Although this
anti-Sufism could be used as the basis of an argument that the Moroccan nationalists are best identified as Salafists, a brief review of ʿAllal al-Fasi’s memoir
demonstrates that his ideology is closer to Islamic modernism than Salafism.
Al-Fasi clearly articulated his views of the ideology when he wrote:
The aim of the Salafiyah, as propounded by its founder, al-Hanbali, was the
cleansing of religion from the superstitions that had crept into it and the restoration of its original purity . . . The movement, therefore, aimed at the
reform of the individual as a prerequisite for the perfection of society.
The success of the movement, it was realized, hinges upon the acceptance of
an “open mind” towards innovations and their critical evaluation in light of
the general interest. 18
In al-Fasi’s view, a strict adherence to the core doctrines of Islam will facilitate
a type of personal revival that can serve as the basis for larger social changes.
At the same time, this deep reverence for the faith as practised by the Prophet
and the pious ancestors (or as-salaf as∙-s∙ālih∙ , hence the term “Salafi”) was married
to a measured acceptance of advances in science and technology. Thus, like
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ʿAbduh, it was not a blind acceptance of all things old as normatively good and
all things new as normatively bad. Rather, al-Fasi’s Islamic modernism was a
streamlining of religious belief, a simplifying of practice and a careful filtering of
innovation to move the umma, or Islamic community, forward in a conscious
and intentional way.
Al-Fasi’s Islamic modernism combined unity and tolerance with individual freedom of thought and belief. Politically, it called for self-determination;
cooperation among separate Muslim nations (rather than a unified Arab political entity); the installation of the Arabic language as the dominant language
throughout the Muslim world; shariʿa as the basis for civil law “subject to constant review and interpretation”; a popularly elected assembly; and liberation
from foreign control “both material and moral”. Finally, it is worth noting,
“Above all, the new Salafiyah rejects the idea of a secular state.”19 While there
are some shared positions with modern Salafis, such as the rejection of Islamic
mysticism and the insistence on the Islamic state, the nationalists’ openness to
technological and non-Islamic institutions separate them from modern Salafism
in a fundamental way, making it more appropriate to identify their ideology as a
variant of Islamic modernism.
Although what is known about the relationship between Morocco and
al-Azhar is described in the next section, it must be noted that the presence of
Islamic modernist ideas in Morocco is the primary evidence of the connection
between al-Azhar University and the Moroccan nationalists. While it is difficult
to establish concrete connections between the modernists and particular individuals, it is known that Muhammad ʿAbduh maintained a healthy correspondence with nationalist leaders across North Africa, and that he sent a number of
his publications to North African religious leaders.20

I. Morocco, al-Azhar and Islamic Modernism
Moroccans have been travelling through Cairo on their way to Mecca for centuries. Consequently, it is likely that Moroccan scholars have studied and taught
at al-Azhar University in some capacity for hundreds of years. Early records of
a Moroccan presence at al-Azhar date from the fifteenth century. During that
time, there were at least thirty-six Maghribis at al-Azhar.21 Of those scholars, at
least one is known to have been from the region of present-day Morocco. The
scholar known as Zarruq22 ended up at al-Azhar while on hajj. It is said that his
courses were attended by 600 students.23 Because he completed the pilgrimage
many times and attracted such a following in his lessons, it is likely that he
frequented the university. Ahmad bin ʿAli al-Jazuli (d. 1782) is also known to
have studied at al-Azhar with the father of Egyptian historian al-Jabarti and a
Fassi scholar, Shaykh al-Tawdi bin Suda, who was in residence there.24 These
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scholars set out from Morocco with one another on the hajj, but ended up stopping for a time to study at al-Azhar.25 Cairo’s location on the pilgrimage route
between Morocco and the Hijaz thus encouraged contact between religious
scholars from both regions.
It is not known how many Moroccan students attended al-Azhar, but there
were certainly some.26 In 1902, there were twenty-two Moroccan students present out of a total 645 foreign students.27 Of significant Moroccan nationalists,
at least one is known to have attended al-Azhar university: Hassan Bouayad in
1929–33.28 Although few in number, these students were involved in several
important organisations related to Moroccan nationalism, including a secret
Egyptian group hoping to assist in the liberation of North Africa from French
influence. There are indications that Moroccan students at al-Azhar may have
facilitated communication between the group and Moroccan activists.29 In addition, students at al-Azhar were involved in another Cairo-based group, al-Ittihad al-Maghribi (Maghreb Unity), linked to the Egyptian nationalists Shaykh
ʿAli Yusuf, Ahmad Pasha Sharaʾi and Mustafa Pasha Khalifa. The group, intent
on encouraging rebellion in Morocco, launched an Arabic-language newspaper,
al-Haqq, in Tangier, and the group was later implicated in a plot30 to foment
rebellion in the final days of Ramadan.31 The presence of such a group suggests,
on the one hand, the existence of strong connections between Egyptian and
Moroccan nationalists, and, on the other, highlights how al-Azhar acted informally as a base for facilitating these connections.
In addition to being a centre of religious learning, Cairo was also an important market for Moroccan leather goods. As a result, a large population of
Moroccan merchants, numbering around 2,000, lived in Egypt at the beginning
of the twentieth century.32 Even though not formally involved at al-Azhar,
these merchants likely interacted with other Moroccans, since the Moroccan
community in Cairo had a certain amount of cohesion and was not completely
independent of the Moroccan sultan’s influence:
All of the Moroccan expatriate community in Egypt, scholars as well as
merchants, were placed under a Wakil (representative) appointed by the
Moroccan Sultan. In the absence of formal diplomatic relations between
Morocco and the Ottoman empire, he functioned as a kind of ambassador,
resolving disputes within the community, as well as with overseeing the
general welfare of Moroccans residing in Egypt.33
Presumably, he also monitored the activities, both subversive and benign, of his
subjects living in Cairo.
Although the Moroccan community in Cairo appears to have been small,
the links these residents facilitated between Moroccan nationalists and al-Azhar
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were sufficient to result in a significant traffic in ideas between the two. This is
most evident in the large number of subscriptions to Egyptian newspapers in
Moroccan cities:
There were, for example, some fifty regular subscribers to the Pan-Islamic
newspaper al-Muʿayyad (Cairo) at Fez alone in 1911, and those known to be
taking the paper included the then Foreign Minister, Muhammad al-Muqri,
the former Minister of War, Muhammad Ghibbas (usually rendered in
French, Guebbas), and other important officials. Other Egyptian newspapers
circulated among the élite at Fez, including al-Ahram (pro-French), al-Muqattam (pro-British), and al-Liwa (Pan-Islamic). Both the sultan, ʿAbd al-Hafiz,
and his then Grand Vizier, Madani al-Glawi, are known to have been regular
readers of both the Near Eastern and European press. Given the small size of
the Moroccan political élite, and the fact that newspapers were undoubtedly
widely commented on, the significance of the press in Morocco before 1912
seems clear.34
In coming decades, other newspapers became more significant. Halstead, for
example, found that “The leading periodicals were al-Manar, al-Fath, and al-Zahra
from Cairo, and ech-Chihah from Constantine (Algeria), and by all odds the most
widely read of these in Morocco was Rida’s al-Manar,35 a monthly review of
philosophy, religion and social affairs reflecting about the same proportion of
political overtones as the reform movement it represented.”36 Three of the four
journals popular during the First World War were Islamic modernist in orientation,37 highlighting the significance of the press in spreading that ideology.
These journals were extraordinarily significant. Al-Manar was the primary
means of conversion to Islamic modernism by nationalists who did not know
al-Dukkali or al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi personally, and was particularly important in
the lives of the following nationalists: Mohammed Hassan al-Ouazzani, Ibrahim
al-Kattani, Omar Abdeljalil, Mohammed Lyazidi, ʿAllal al-Fasi, Ahmed
Mekouar and Ahmed Benani.38 In addition, these publications prepared the
ground for graduates of al-Azhar to spread the Islamic modernist message, particularly among students of al-Qarawiyyin Mosque University in Fez, Morocco.39
The impact of these journals also demonstrates that the newspaper itself was
effective in converting non-graduates and thus was a successful strategy undertaken by Islamic modernists in Cairo.

II. Significant Moroccan Islamic Modernists
While a number of individuals were significant to the spread of Islamic modernism in Morocco, four are of particular importance: Abdullah ibn Idris al-Sanusi,
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Abu Shuʾayb al-Dukkali, Muhammad ibn al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi and ʿAllal al-Fasi.
Al-Sanusi is credited with being the first to try to spread Islamic modernism in
the country. Al-Dukkali was the first to win converts to Islamic modernism
among Moroccan religious scholars, one of whom, al-ʿAlawi, would go on to
be the teacher of many future nationalists. His student ʿAllal al-Fasi led the
Moroccan nationalist movement and the independence party that participated
in governing in the years after the French protectorate.
Abdullah ibn Idris al-Sanusi was a lecturer at al-Qarawiyyin University.
Al-Sanusi reached a position of importance upon return from a pilgrimage to
Mecca in 1870 when Sultan Mawlay al-Hassan appointed him to his Royal
Learned Council.40 During his travels, al-Sanusi was exposed to the ideas of
Islamic modernism, although it is not known how.41 His appointment to the
council suggests that the sultan approved of al-Sanusi’s Islamic modernist
principles. The other members of the council, however, including Ahmad bin
al-Talib bin Sudah and ʿAbdullah al-Kamil al-ʿAmrani al-Hasani, both Sufis,
accused al-Sanusi of being a Muʾtazilite42 and forced him into exile.43 Al-Sanusi
demonstrates how even those who did not formally study at al-Azhar could
come into contact with the ideas propagated there through the pilgrimage and
so attempt to spread those ideas upon their return. More significantly, his experience demonstrates that the conditions in Morocco in 1870 were not ripe for
the spread of a new ideology.
While al-Sanusi is emblematic of those who came into contact with Islamic
modernism through the hajj, Abu Shuʾayb al-Dukkali (1878–1937) actually
studied at al-Azhar following the implementation of ʿAbduh’s reforms.44 In
addition, he was chosen by the rector of al-Azhar to teach in Mecca, suggesting he was an exemplary student. He returned to Morocco in 1907 after being
invited by then sultan ʿAbd al-Hafiz to serve on his Royal Learned Council.45
He began teaching Qurʾanic exegesis (tafsı̄r) at Qarawiyyin University in
1908.46 Al-Dukkali’s return was recorded by the nationalist leader ʿAllal al Fasi
in his memoirs. He wrote, “The Sheikh had returned imbued with a burning
desire to propagate the principles of the Salafiyah reform movement. A group
of young enthusiastic supporters gathered around him. They distributed the
publications of the Salafiyah movement in Egypt and accompanied him on his
tours to pull down trees and shrines which had been made the object of popular
veneration.”47 This quote identifies several strategies employed by al-Dukkali’s
disciples, such as the distribution of Salafi literature and the destruction of sites
venerated by Sufis. Further, these activities highlight the anti-Sufi tone of the
Moroccan Islamic modernists.
Al-Dukkali’s activities focused on religious, not political, revival and were
largely educational initiatives. The most significant of his activities was his
involvement with the Free School movement. The name Free Schools refers
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not to the cost of attendance, but rather to schools free of French ideology. The
curriculum of these schools emphasised Qurʾanic studies with an Islamic modernist interpretation and employed textbooks from Egypt.48 Important graduates
of the Free Schools and future nationalists included: “Abdelakder Benjellous,
Mohammed El-Fassi, Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani, Ahmed Réda Guédira”.49 In
order to raise funds for the schools, theatrical troupes toured the country discussing the need for educational reform and collecting donations for the schools.50
Mohammed Lyazidi, one of al-Dukkali’s students, is responsible for spreading
Islamic modernism from Fez to nationalists in Rabat.51
In addition to his involvement with the Free Schools, al-Dukkali was deeply
concerned with the training of future religious scholars at Qarawiyyin Mosque
University in Fez. Despite his opposition to Sufism, al-Dukkali cooperated with
Sufi Abdelhay al-Kittani in opposing French efforts to reform Qarawiyyin in the
1930s.52 He then enlisted the support of the sultan, ʿAbdul-Hafiz, to oversee his
own reforms to the curriculum:
Through ʿAbdul-Hafiz’s help, Abu Shuʾaib succeeded in adding to the curriculum of the Qarawiyin University the teaching of tafsı̄r; this was indispensable if the Salafis were to have resort to ijtihad (individual interpretation),
the door of which, they believed, contrary to the widely accepted attitude,
was not shut. During the three years which al-Dukkali spent in Fez, he himself taught the subject in the Qarawiyin, and while there a group of enthusiastic disciples formed itself around him. It was to one of these disciples,
Mawlay al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi, that he handed on the torch of the Salafiyya in
Morocco.53
The most significant contribution to Islamic modernism made by Muhammad
ibn al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi, al-Dukkali’s student, was transforming it from a movement of religious reform to one of political reform. As such, he can be seen as
the first Moroccan “neo-Salafi”.54 Al-ʿAlawi, a former member of the Tijaniyya
brotherhood, was converted to Islamic modernism by reading Ibn Taymiyya’s
The Separation between the Disciples of God and the Disciples of Satan as well as
ʿAbduh’s al-Manar.55 He came into contact with al-Dukkali while a lecturer at
Qarawiyyin. He was also a teacher at Collège Moulay Idriss.56 As a committed
Islamic modernist, he participated in the reforms to Qarawiyyin University’s
curriculum in 1933.57 Al-ʿAlawi’s students included many nationalists such as
ʿAllal al-Fasi and Ibrahim al-Kittani.58 In his memoirs, al-Fasi described al-ʿAlawi’s activities: “Ibn al-ʿArabi’s reform circle at Fez and Sheikh Abu Shuʾayb’s
group at Rabat carried on an intensive reform campaign through the media of
public lectures, exchange of visitors, and articles in the press of Algeria and
Tunisia; [since] Morocco did not at that time possess a single newspaper that
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was not under French influence or control”.59 The groups that al-Fasi referred to
were Islamic modernist circles, a type of reading group that had outreach activities such as those listed above. They also wrote op-eds in Islamic modernist publications such as al-Manar.60 It was under al-ʿAlawi’s leadership that Moroccan
reformers went from consuming Islamic modernist publications to contributing
to them. Further, in these reading groups Moroccan nationalists began to view
their struggle against the French and their Sufi collaborators as part of a larger
struggle for religious reform. This fusion of movements for religious and political
reform would help them to gain public support for their position through the
activities described above.
Finally, the fourth major Moroccan Islamic modernist was ʿAllal al-Fasi. His
biography has been detailed elsewhere,61 so I will give only the relevant details.
He was born into a wealthy Fassi family. His father was a teacher at Qarawiyyin
University as well as a merchant who founded the Nasiriyyah Free School in the
city of Fez. The school “offered Arabic and Islamic education based on Arabic
literature and grammar, poetry, and the study of religion as opposed to the new
French protectorate schools which used French as the medium of instruction and
promoted French culture”.62 Al-Fasi was himself a student there, before attending Qarawiyyin University at the young age of fourteen. It was there that he
met al-ʿAlawi and was exposed to Islamic modernist doctrine. He was involved
in a number of nationalist activities from the age of seventeen, including secret
societies and the publication of a nationalist newsletter titled Umm al-Banin, as
well as communication with student organisations in France and Egypt.63 Like
his father and his mentor al-ʿAlawi, al-Fasi was a teacher in the Free School
movement. Al-Fasi’s popularity as a nationalist leader earned him the distrust
of the French and he was exiled to Gabon for nine years. He returned in 1946,
only to leave for Cairo a year later. While in Cairo, al-Fasi lectured regularly at
al-Azhar University.64 These speeches are collected in the volume Min al-gharb
il al-sharq (From the West to the East). He also gave a number of radio talks that
are collected in the work Nida al-Qahira (The Call from Cairo). Al-Fasi’s concern
for Moroccan students to receive an education that was in Arabic and founded
on Islamist values became significant in the post-independence era when he
supported the Arabisation of the Moroccan public school curriculum, discussed
below.
One final actor deserves mention, though he was not Moroccan. Shakib
Arslan, a Lebanese Druze prince and former student of Muhammad ʿAbduh,65
maintained a strong relationship with a number of Moroccan nationalists, including ʿAllal al-Fasi, Mohammed Hassan Ouazzani and Ahmed Balafrej. Out of his
office in Geneva, where Ouazzani worked as his personal secretary from 1930 to
1933, Arslan intermittently published La Nation Arab, a pan-Islamic newsletter
between 1930 and 1938. In contradiction to the publication’s name, the main
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goal of the paper was to promote the idea of pan-Islamism, not pan-Arabism.66
Although Arslan had tremendous influence with Moroccan nationalists, it is
unlikely that he is responsible for introducing Moroccan nationalists to Islamic
modernism. By the time he began his publication, most Moroccan nationalists
had already been converted to Islamic modernism as described above. His significance is in assisting them to translate their grievances into political action and
in building a shared sense of struggle among Muslims across North Africa and
the Middle East, and as far away as Indonesia.

III. Short- and Long-term Effects
Short term: combining religious and political reform
It is not surprising that Islamic modernism, a doctrine focused on the reform of
the individual, became the ideological basis for a political movement. The doctrine itself, as specified above by ʿAllal al-Fasi, but also as described by its founders, argued for an intrinsic relationship between the reform of the individual
and a reform of society. At the same time, factors local to the Moroccan context
provided an added impetus to the adoption of the ideology. In particular, the
surrender of the great Riffian rebel Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi
(d. 1963) in 1927 made it obvious to the nationalists that the French could not
be defeated in military struggle, encouraging them to work for cultural reform.
Some argue that Islamic modernism was then a tactical ideological choice, since
the French attempted to allow the Moroccans a degree of autonomy with regard
to their religious affairs.67 In practical terms, French efforts to not interfere with
religion allowed the young nationalist ʿAllal al-Fasi to give distinctly political
speeches under the veil of religious learning while lecturing at Qarawiyyin
Mosque University, launching his political career.68 The adoption of Islamic
modernism can be seen as a pragmatic choice, because a secular nationalist ideology would not have been afforded the same kind of organisational autonomy.
Secondly, there is general agreement among scholars that a secular nationalist
ideology would not have been capable of mobilising the type of mass support
that Islamic modernism did.
While the need to oppose the French culturally and unite Moroccans along
religious lines are certainly contributing factors to the success of Islamic modernism, the most compelling argument for the effectiveness of Islamic modernism
was French policy and particularly the Berber Dahir crisis of 1930.69 This and
other French policies turned religious reformers into political revolutionaries.70
The Berber Dahir of 193071 was the height of French efforts to establish separate
judicial systems for Berbers and Arabs. The nationalists viewed it as an effort to
divide the umma and they vehemently opposed the reforms. Islamic activists as
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far away as Indonesia joined them in their efforts.72 The whole affair was further
complicated by the fact that there was a vague ethnic and geographic division
between Islamic modernists and Sufis. Islamic modernists tended to claim Arab
descent and live in urban areas, while Sufis tended to claim Berber descent and
live in rural areas.73 The divide between the two thus had political, religious and
ethnic dimensions. These divisions, however, did not prevent their temporary
cooperation during the Berber Dahir campaign of 1930.
The result of the Berber Dahir crisis of 1930 was the short-lived early cooperation between Berbers and nationalists. “Thus, while staunchly Berberist orders
like the Derqawa and its derivative, the Kittaniyya, originally opposed the
French occupation, when they were later confronted by a reforming sultan who
openly sympathised with the aims of the Salafiyyist nationalists, they often
leagued themselves with the French authorities who promised, however ambiguously, to respect their prized autonomy, religiously as well as politically.”74
The sympathy that Mohammed V showed for Islamic modernism thus had a
significant impact on the alliances that developed in the post-1930 nationalist
climate. Although Berbers such as ʿAbd el-Krim originally vehemently opposed
the French presence in Morocco, the anti-Sufi position of Moroccan nationalists
and their champion the sultan encouraged Sufis to cooperate with the French
in the interests of self-preservation. This cooperation then provided fodder for
political grievance between Islamic modernists and Sufis, since the former began
to see Sufis as both political and religious rivals: they represented an impure
Islam and were traitors. This merging of political with religious grievance only
added intensity to the conflict between them. ʿAllal al-Fasi, Mohammed al-Fasi
and Mohammed Lyazidi all argue that this combination of religious and political
grievance is what made both Islamic modernism and nationalism successful in
Morocco.75 While the conclusion of this chapter stresses how local conditions
affected the reception of Islamic modernism, this brief section demonstrates
how Islamic modernism also affected local power relations.

Long term: educational reform
If the short-term effect of the importation of Islamic modernism was the success
of the Moroccan nationalist movement, the long-term effect was no less significant. Islamic modernism’s focus on the reform of the individual believer has
consistently emphasised the role of education as the mechanism through which
societal reform takes place. It is no surprise that a priority of the nationalist
movement and the subsequent independence party, Istiqlal, was the Arabisation
of education, or the transition from an educational system where French or
Spanish was the language of instruction to Modern Standard Arabic (fus∙h∙ ā).
The proposal created such a controversy that it was not fully implemented for
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thirty years. Istiqlal itself was divided over the form and priority of Arabisation,
and the two factions were led by ʿAllal al-Fasi and Mehdi Ben Barka, a leftist
intellectual whose disagreements with al-Fasi would lead him to form a separate
party in the years after independence. Al-Fasi viewed Arabisation as a means
through which to encourage the development of a distinctly Arab Moroccan
culture. Arabisation was a priority for al-Fasi, as demonstrated in his letter-
writing campaign in support of the measure, but it would be an overstatement to
say that he wanted all subjects taught in Arabic. It was later activists (not al-Fasi)
who demanded the “complete” Arabisation of the educational system.76 Indeed,
his own hesitancy over Arabisation is probably best described in the fact that he
chose to send his own children to mission schools, where the primary language of
instruction was French.77 Al-Fasi did not, to my knowledge, publicly defend this
decision. Ben Barka, on the other hand, did not disapprove of Arabisation, but
he viewed it as a lower priority than educational development. For him, French
was the necessary primary language for Moroccan students because of the gaps
in the vocabulary of Arabic.78 He supported some Arabisation, but viewed the
mastery of French as an economic necessity.
The Arabisation of Moroccan public education began in the early years of the
post-independence government, when ʿAllal al-Fasi’s cousin, Mohammed, was
minister of education. He announced the policy at a press conference on 25 June
1956. Beginning the following year, the first year of elementary schooling (cours
préparatoires) was to be given in Arabic, followed by two years of schooling split
between Arabic and French instruction.79 However, there were so few proficient
Arabic speakers in the country that it was necessary to import a large number
of Arabic teachers from Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq.80 In less than a decade, the
process was paused by then Minister of Education Mohammed Benhima due to
concerns over the quality of instruction, not to mention the ideological influence of the teachers from the Middle East, and French was once again made the
language of instruction.81
The process was reinstated under the leadership of Hassan II, not because of
his support for the policy, but due to pressure from various social actors such as
the Istiqlal party, the Union of Higher Education, the National Association of
Moroccan Writers and the public at large, as well as his concern over the spread
of leftist ideologies.82 The World Bank and UNESCO also supported the measure “based on the sound pedagogical notion that literacy is best spread when the
language of instruction is the language of the home”.83 However, the belief that
the language of Arabisation, Modern Standard Arabic, was similar to spoken
Moroccan Arabic or Darija was mistaken.
Istiqlal was at the forefront of the Arabisation campaign. In a communiqué
published on 3 January 1973 in the Istiqlal newspaper al-Alam, ʿAllal al-Fasi
appealed to the Moroccan people to demand that the prime minister Arabise
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education.84 The appeal instigated six months of petitions published in multiple
Moroccan newspapers in both French and Arabic. The campaign was successful. By 1978, Hassan II had become fully committed to Arabisation, stating
that “Arabization should be the irreversible point of departure for educational
reform”.85 Hassan II’s support for Arabisation was rooted in his concern over the
rise of leftist movements on university campuses and the desire for a strengthened Islamic opposition to serve as a bulwark against them.
The process was complete by the early 1990s. The Istiqlal party and specifically ʿAllal al-Fasi are responsible for making Arabisation a national political
issue, but Hassan II is responsible for its actual implementation. Arabisation had
been a priority of the Istiqlal party for decades, but it did not become national
policy until the king threw his support behind it.
Consequently, while al-Fasi fought for Arabisation as part of a larger commitment to Islamic modernism, Hassan II supported the reforms due to his own
political motives, namely, his desire to prevent the development of a unified
opposition. Hassan II’s ulterior motives in implementing the reforms highlight
how the long-term impact of the ideology of Islamic modernism on Moroccan
education and politics was shaped by the political, economic and social context
into which it was imported.

Conclusions: The Moroccan Case
Many scholars have argued that Islamic modernism was accepted in Morocco due
to the country’s tendency to accept ideologies of religious reform. ʿAllal al-Fasi
himself commented: “It appears that Morocco is predisposed more strongly than
any other country to accept reform movements advocating a return to true
religion and the tenets of the faith.”86 Halstead, a scholar who knew many of
the leading Moroccan nationalists, came to a similar conclusion, although he
did not think this proclivity towards religious reform was sufficient to explain
the appeal of Islamic modernism: “Morocco had always leaned towards fundamentalism in religion – the Malekite ritual prevailed there – and hence was
potentially receptive to a movement such as Salafiyya, but during the time of
Djamal al-Din and ʿAbduh it had made little headway because the other conditions were wanting.”87 What were the conditions to which Halstead is alluding?
What conditions explain why Islamic modernism was rejected in one period
but accepted later? What does the Moroccan case demonstrate about why some
graduates of al-Azhar were successful in spreading the ideologies they acquired?
The most important reason why Islamic modernism was rejected when first
propagated by al-Sanusi, but welcomed in later years, was the political context
in which it was introduced. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, intellectuals and scholars did not yet feel threatened by Europe. The country had not
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experienced foreign occupation for over 1,200 years:88 the Ottomans were never
able to occupy Morocco, nor had the country been colonised by a European power.
The first loss of territory to the French did not occur until 1900.89 However, the
first decade of the twentieth century, when al-Dukkali preached Islamic modernism, was characterised by efforts to resist French political involvement, and
by civil war between two competing sultans.90 Thus, the environments in which
al-Sanusi and al-Dukkali called for religious reform were remarkably different.
Calls for religious reform by al-Sanusi were likely rejected because the country
was stable, and there was not yet any reason to believe that that stability was
threatened either internally or externally. By the time al-Dukkali began preaching Islamic modernism at Qarawiyyin in 1908, the Moroccan state had begun to
lose territory to the French and there were serious misgivings about the sultan’s
ability to protect the country from foreign intervention, not to mention challenges to his own political legitimacy. These misgivings are evident in the fact
that the Moroccan ʿulama chose to depose the sultan the year before.91
In terms of social context, the lack of an educated Western elite limited the
spread of reform ideologies in the late nineteenth century. “It now seems clear
that the weakness of the currents of reform, Islamic modernism, and pan-Islam
in Morocco is to be ascribed to the rudimentary level of the system of education.”92 Without this elite, the bureaucracy was less cohesive and the country
lacked non-religious institutions to assist in uniting the educated class. At the
same time, Sufi brotherhoods remained the primary means for social organisation, particularly in rural areas. As the case of al-Sanusi demonstrates, leaders
of these brotherhoods held important advisory positions into the twentieth
century and were willing to oppose ideologies that threatened their existence.
Finally, the dispersed nature of religious leadership meant that coalitions formed
by powerful scholars could side-line ideologies supported by the sultan in the
1880s. This would not be the case several decades later, as Moroccan sultans
came to rely increasingly on European advisers, and Moroccan religious scholars’ influence on affairs of state declined.93
In addition to political and social factors, several economic conditions discouraged the spread of Islamic modernism during the late nineteenth century. In
a general sense, Morocco lacked a middle class or aristocracy.94 Further, the elite
were alienated by a series of reforms undertaken during that time.95 There was
thus no one to embrace or implement reforms spoken in a modernist language.
At the same time, this period saw a near collapse of the Moroccan economy.
Losses in the Hispano-Moroccan war of 1892 required the sultan to pay large
indemnities to Spain, while foreign loans – in 1901, 1902, 1909 and 1910 – further increased Moroccan dependence on European powers.96 In the year before
al-Dukkali began preaching Islamic modernism at Qarawiyyin, Morocco had
experienced a significant economic crisis.
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The contexts in which al-Sanusi and al-Dukkali preached Islamic modernism
were radically different. In a general sense, al-Sanusi was preaching a reformist
ideology in a time of stability and continuity, a time marked by excitement
rather than fear. Al-Dukkali, on the other hand, preached religious reform in
a time marked by instability and a widespread sense of helplessness. European
encroachment seemed inevitable. Leadership from the sultan was weak. It is not
surprising, then, that al-Dukkali attracted a number of followers. The doctrine
preached that practices of personal piety would lead to wider social reforms.
At a time when the course of events seemed out of control, Islamic modernism offered a means for individuals to feel that their efforts were contributing
to larger social goals. Thus, while the context into which Islamic modernism
spread created an opportunity for the ideology, it would be an oversimplification
to say that simply any ideology could have taken root at that time. Islamic modernism was unique in that it identified concrete steps for individual believers to
contribute to the well-being of their society.
The Moroccan case demonstrates that the atmosphere of political and economic crisis created opportunities for al-Azhar graduates and their disciples to
spread ideologies from Cairo to their home communities. The success of the
spread of the ideology, though, seemed to depend less on their activities or strategies and more on the power relations of the home communities, the sources
of political leadership, and the existence of a class of people willing to embrace
and implement reforms. Finally, the Moroccan case suggests that ideologies
of religious reform can be particularly influential when tied to movements for
political reform.
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Part Three
Returning Graduates and
Transformation of the Local

Chapter 7

From Mecca to Cairo:
Changing Influences on Fatwas in Southeast Asia
Yuki Shiozaki

Muslim scholars (ʿulama) and Sufis have long been accustomed to undertaking
extended trans-regional journeys in pursuit of Islamic knowledge. Historically,
such peregrinatory ʿulama have played a significant role in transplanting ideas
and practices to Southeast Asia from the Middle East. Some returned home
after spending years in the Middle East, while others who remained continued to influence the discourse at home by sending written fatwas (replies to
questions on shariʿa issues) in response to questions sent to them from their
originating communities.1 This chapter shows how the shift in intellectual influence away from Mecca and towards Cairo, and in particular towards al-Azhar,
impacted upon the interpretation of shariʿa and the issuing of fatwas within
Southeast Asian Muslim communities. The chapter focuses on the fatwas issued
by Southeast Asian ʿulama from the late nineteenth century to the end of the
1960s. Emphasis is placed on tracing the influence of factors such as the Shafiʿi
School, Salafi methodology and the isnād (genealogy of intellectual succession)
of the Southeast Asian ʿulama in the Middle East2 in order to present a clearer
picture of the transformation in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) methodology and
the networks of ʿulama who used them.
The development of Islam in Southeast Asia has long been influenced by
trends in the Middle East,3 and tracing isnād is thus essential for researching
the exogenous influences upon Islam in Southeast Asia over time, as well as
understanding the endogenous transitions that have also occurred. Although
important texts have been written on this theme,4 there are not many studies
of the intellectual networks connecting scholars within Southeast Asia, the
Middle East and South Asia, especially as regards the field of fiqh. This chapter
aims to illuminate these networks.
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The period from the late nineteenth century through to the 1960s was a
time of tremendous change in both Southeast Asia and the Middle East. It
was during this period that modernisation swept through Muslim societies as a
result of their encounter with European colonisation and intervention.5 In the
case of Malaysia, which achieved independence in 1957,6 the institutionalisation of Islam in government administration and the establishment of Muslim
associations of various sorts changed the relation between Islam and the state.7
In the early twentieth century, the Malay sultanates established administrative
institutions to control Islamic activities; and in the same period there was a
mushrooming of private Muslim associations designed to integrate the existing
Muslim networks. These institutions were intended to act as central platforms
for entrenching Islamic life in society, while also helping people to adapt to the
demands of modernity. Research by Roff8 and Feener9 has demonstrated that
these institutions made efforts to preserve the hold of Islam when confronted
with modernisation, and has documented how they took advantage of new
technologies associated with modernity, such as printing and the mass media,
to advance their message. This chapter discusses the issuing of fatwas and the
adjustments in jurisprudential methodology that can be observed therein; this, I
argue, was another aspect of the struggle to adapt to modernity. This adaptation
can be observed in the fatwas issued by certain influential individual ʿulama, as
well as in those issued by the Majlis Agama Islam (Islamic Religious Council) in
each state of Malaysia.10
The historical period in question was also an era of intellectualism and new
thinking. In the early twentieth century, significant new ideas were brought
from al-Azhar to Southeast Asia, including new methodologies for the interpretation of shariʿa; and these differed from the traditional jurisprudence based on
the Shafiʿi School that was popular in Mecca, the place where Southeast Asian
scholars traditionally went in search of higher learning. This shift influenced
not only the thinking of individual ʿulama, but also had a profound effect on the
newly established Muslim institutions in Southeast Asia.

Mecca as the Gathering Place for Shafiʿi ʿUlama
from Southeast Asia
As the centre for Islamic learning for Southeast Asian Muslims, Mecca reached
its peak in the late nineteenth century. In every mosque in Mecca, students
would read Islam’s classic texts under the guidance of renowned ʿulama. The
halaqah (reading groups) were to be found in every mosque, especially the one
that was most revered, the Masjid al-Haram. The four corners of the Masjid
al-Haram were dedicated to the four Sunni madhāhib (legal schools; sing. madhhab): Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafiʿi.11 In most Muslim countries, this
— 168 —

From Me cca to Ca i r o
traditional system of learning began to face competition in the early twentieth
century due to the spread of a modern, Western-style, education system in the
Muslim world. Some semi-modern schools were even established in Mecca,
mainly by non-Arab ʿulama, especially Indians.12 In 1912, Madrasa al-Falah, a
prominent reformist madrasa that aimed to combine the teaching of Western
subjects with a religious curriculum, was established by an Arab merchant
named Muhammad ʿAli Zaynal Rida. This madrasa became a school for many
Southeast Asian ʿulama in the twentieth century.13 Following Madrasa al-Falah,
some Indonesian ʿulama established madrasas for Southeast Asian Muslims in
Mecca. The most prominent examples of these were Madrasa al-Indonesiyya
al-Makkiyya, established by Janan Muhammad Thaib in 1923, and Madrasa Dar
al-Ulum al-Diniyah, established by Sayyid Muhsin al-Musawwa al-Palimbani in
1934. Such Indonesian madrasas were significant in attracting Southeast Asian
Muslim students to Mecca.14
Mecca was not only the most important centre for the Shafiʿi School, but
also a sanctuary for politically involved ʿulama from Southeast Asia who were
sent into exile when their societies were colonised by Europeans (e.g., Ahmad
Muhammad Zain al-Fatani from Patani and Abdul Qadir al-Mandili, described
below). In 1800, the Dutch East Indies colony was established in Indonesia,
and in 1824 the Anglo-Dutch Treaty was concluded. As a result of this treaty,
the British expanded their rule in the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch concentrated their administration in the East Indies.15 In 1826, Britain and Thailand,
a significant local power, agreed to the first treaty concerning the division of the
Malay Peninsula (the Burney Treaty); and after long confrontation and negotiations, most of the Malay kingdoms in the Malay Peninsula came under the
protection of the British, with the exception of the Sultanate of Patani which
was annexed to Thailand in 1908.16 The rapid increase in the Southeast Asian
Muslim population in Mecca, especially in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, was partly caused by the political incursions of non-Muslim forces
into Muslim lands, especially Patani in southern Thailand and some parts of
Indonesia. Patani ʿulama would thus play a leading role in educating Southeast
Asian Muslims in Mecca.17 At the same time, this increase in the number
of Southeast Asian Muslims in Mecca was also a product of the technological innovations brought by the Europeans, especially the opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869. Steamships promoted the emigration of Arabs – especially from
Hadramaut in Yemen to Southeast Asia – as well as the emigration of Southeast
Asian Muslims to Mecca. Those who migrated to the Middle East for Islamic
education played an important role in the development of Islamic learning in
Southeast Asia, especially in the Malay Peninsula.
Ahmad Muhammad Zain al-Fatani (1856–1908) was a Patani ʿālim who lived
in Mecca and taught many students from Southeast Asia.18 His disciples from
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Kelantan, such as Muhammad Yusuf Ahmad (known as Tok Kenali), would go
on to play crucial roles in Islamic education in their homeland.19 Ahmad al-Fatani’s influence was exerted not only through his students, however, but also, and
equally, through his publications. In collaboration with the Ottoman government, he established a publishing house, Maktab al-Turki Majdiyya al-ʿUthmaniyya, in Mecca. He also established his own private publication enterprise, Maktab
Fataniyya, through which he edited and published Islamic literature in Malay and
Arabic, both classic manuscripts and contemporary writings including his own,
as well as the works of the most prominent scholar from Patani, Daud ʿAbdullah
al-Fatani. Printed texts were imported to the Malay Peninsula and used as textbooks in local Islamic boarding schools (pondok; pl. pondok-pondok). Although
Singapore and Penang also later became centres for Islamic publishing, Mecca
was the main supplier of printed Islamic texts in Malay (kitāb jāwı̄) until the early
twentieth century.20 Another important Southeast Asian ʿālim living in exile
was Abdul Qadir al-Mandili, from Sumatra. Abdul Qadir migrated to Mecca after
studying in Kedah, the northern region of the Malay Peninsula. At the same time
as he educated Southeast Asian Muslims in his school in Mecca, he also criticised
British and Dutch colonisation through his publications and fatwas.21
Until the early twentieth century, it was commonplace for Southeast Asian
Muslims to request fatwas from the ʿulama in Mecca. The oldest printed collection of fatwas issued for Muslims in Southeast Asia is Muhimmat al Nafaʾis
fi Bayan Asʾilah al-Hadith, which was published by Maktab al-Turki Majdiyya
al-ʿUthmaniyya. The fatwas in this collection were issued mainly by a mufti of
the Shafiʿi School in Mecca, Ahmad ibn Zaini Dahlan (1817–86).22 There are
also two more collections by Ahmad al-Fatani among the other printed collections of fatwas for Southeast Asian Muslims: al-Fatawa al-Fataniyya and Fatawa
Binatang Hidup Dua Alam. These fatwa collections were published around the
end of the nineteenth century or early in the twentieth century.
The collection in al-Fatawa al-Fataniyya consists primarily of answers to questions from Muslims in Southeast Asia in the period of transition that characterised the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The collection included
answers on new problems faced by East Asian Muslims due to the consequences
of colonial policies – many questions, for example, focused on the classification of non-Muslim residents – whether they are dhimmı̄ (protected people,
non-Muslims under the protection of Muslim governance), potential dhimmı̄ or
idolatrous non-believers. The fatwas also answered questions regarding measures
to be applied in engaging in social relations with them. The late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries brought a period of social change and modernisation to
Southeast Asia. In the Muslim society of the Malay Peninsula, which fell within
the scope of the protection treaty signed with the British, modernisation displayed peculiar features. Although the process of modernisation was dependent
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on technological innovations such as transportation, communication and printing, just as it was in other regions, the most prominent phenomenon here was
the flow of non-Muslim labourers such as Chinese and Indians, and the rapid
expansion of their presence in socio-economic terms.
Within Muslim communities in East Asia, ʿulama were historically considered to be experts on social problems and were required to issue appropriate
fatwas based on their Islamic knowledge. ʿUlama were trusted not only because
of their expertise in shariʿa, but also because of their overseas experiences.
Although the ʿulama had limited experience of Europe, they knew significantly
more about relatively modernised Muslim nations such as India, Turkey and
Egypt. They were expected to find solutions to modern problems based on their
knowledge of similar phenomena in other Muslim contexts, and this was especially the case for those ʿulama with experience of other Muslim societies.
In addition to these developments, another crucial issue for the region’s
Muslims during this period was the rise of Sufi orders such as AhmadiyyaIdrisiyya in the Malay Peninsula. Questions and responses concerning these
real-life everyday issues feature prominently in al-Fatani’s fatwa collection.
Al-Fatani’s answers were mostly based on the traditional Shafiʿi School, and
the citations upon which he based his arguments referred to the Qurʾan, hadith
and Shafiʿi texts, especially those from Ibn Hajar al-Haythami. The following
fatwa, for instance, was first published in Singapore in 1908.23
Question 44:
What is your opinion on kuffār [infidels] such as the Siam, Chinese, Kuci
[from the southern area in Vietnam], Batak [an ethnicity in Sumatra], or
Pangan [aboriginal residents in forests]? What name is appropriate for them?
Is it permissible for us to buy their daughters, and make them mistresses
[gundik] both in the case when they are purchased from their parents and in
the case when they are purchased from other people? Under what conditions
may they be taken out of their country? What is the rule for such an action?
We request your answer based on shariʿa.
Answer 44:
Kuffār in Siam and China, along with kuffār in Cambodia and Kuci, are called
idolatrous unbelievers [kuffār watanı̄yı̄n], because I heard that they worship
idols. There are two categories among groups such as the Batak and Pangan.
1st Category: If they do not embrace Islam, although the call of Islam has
already reached them, their disbelief [kufr] is certain. If they worship idols or
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do not believe known [maʿarūfat] religions, they are man lā dı̄n lahu [people
without religion].
2nd Category: If the call of Islam does not yet reach them, and they do not
believe in Judaism, Christianity, or similar religions, and if they are related
to ahl al-fatra [people in a period without a prophet], they are not categorised
as disbelievers.
All of the kuffār mentioned above are called h∙ arbı̄yūn [people of dār al-h∙ arb,
the abode of war], as long as they do not have our leaders [al-h∙ all wa al-ʿaqd]
among them [e.g., there are no diplomatic residences nearby] and they do not
have a treaty of protection [ʿaqd dhimma] or a treaty of peace [ʿaqd amān].
If they do not have Muslim captives [ası̄r] or a peace treaty with us, it is permissible for us to buy their children. It is permissible to buy children, except
from their parents, outside of their country or in a situation without guaranteed security, as in the cases of smuggling and unprotected entry.
If we enter their country under their guarantee of security, any actions
prohibited by them, for example, theft of their assets, murder and purchase of
their children after prohibition by their leaders, are impermissible. Purchase
of children from their parents is also prohibited. In such cases, children
are purchased forcibly with the intention of possession [qas∙ad tamalluk].
Possession of acquisitions in their country is only permissible when entry
occurred without guarantee of security [taʾamı̄n].
To make purchased daughters mistresses [pergundik] is permissible after
they embrace Islam, because Muslims may only have intercourse [wat∙ʾ] with
non-Jewish or non-Christian [bukan kitābı̄ya] female slaves [amah] if Islam is
embraced by the slave.
Non-purchased acquisitions obtained by permissible means [e.g., captives
in war] may only be possessed after takhmı̄s [obligatory payment of 20 per cent
of booty to the ruler]. To take daughters out of their country is not a sufficient
condition for making them a mistress. Allah knows best.24
Ahmad al-Fatani issued the above fatwa in response to a question concerning
the best way to respond to the flow of non-Muslims into the Malay Peninsula.
Ahmad al-Fatani classified all non-Muslim newcomers as idolatrous non-
believers (kuffār watanı̄yı̄n), except for ahl al-fatra (those who are ignorant
of Allah’s message). Therefore, they were not considered dhimmı̄ (protected
people, non-Muslims under the protection of Muslim governance) or potential
dhimmı̄.
In another fatwa, Ahmad al-Fatani strictly regulated commercial transactions with non-Muslims. In a fatwa first published in Singapore in 1908, and
in line with Ibn Hajar’s al-Fatawa al-Kubra al-Fiqhiyya ʿala al-Madhhab al-Imam
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al-Shafiʿi, Ahmad al-Fatani banned the rental of property to non-Muslims if they
could be expected to commit sins therein such as idolatry and selling alcohol.25
Question 50:
A person built a house and lent it to a kāfir [infidel] who exploited it as a shop.
The kāfir sold permissible goods such as cloth. He also sold impermissible
goods such as alcohol. He placed idols in the house and worshipped them
according to Chinese custom. What is the rule for such an action? Is it permissible to lend it [the house]? If it is not permissible, what is the best way to
make lending permissible?
Answer 50:
If the Muslim, the owner of the house, gathers or infers that the tenant sells
alcohol or worships idols, it is impermissible for the owner to lend it to the
tenant, whether the tenant is Muslim or kāfir or kāfir h∙ arbı̄ [infidel of the
abode of war, or non-Muslim out of Muslim governance], because lending
means participation in sin without indispensability [darūrāt].
In a fatwa collection that prohibits [h∙ aram] guiding a kāfir who has lost his
way to a place of idolatrous worship, Ibn Hajar explains that such assisting is a
very great sin. In addition, lending is conditional. It is impermissible to lend,
if the property lent does not bring good results. Therefore, jurists [fuqahā]
explain [men-tas∙rı̄h∙ ] that it is impermissible to employ a worker for conveyance of alcohol, or to borrow female slaves to have intercourse [di-wat∙ʾ], and
other similar sins are also impermissible.
The way to avoid such lending is to contract between the owner of the
house and a tenant in front of witnesses. The better way is to contract in front
of a judge [h∙ akı̄m] and to agree on conditions such as the prohibition of selling
alcohol and pork, and the prohibition of setting idols and worshipping them.
If the tenant agrees to the contract, and the owner trusts in the fulfilment of
the contract by the tenant, it is permissible to lend the shop to him. Allah
knows the best.26
Ahmad al-Fatani based these fatwas entirely on the theories of the Shafiʿi
School rather than responding to the changing conditions of life in Singapore.
This meant that by the early twentieth century, many of his fatwas had effectively become inapplicable to life in the Malay Peninsula. Non-Muslims, especially the Chinese, had become a significant economic force in the peninsula,
and as such they were essential for the British economy and required even by
Malay establishments. Under such conditions, Malay Muslims would suffer serious economic hardship if they followed Ahmad al-Fatani’s fatwa. This lack of
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relevance of the fatwas issued by the Shafiʿi scholars based in Mecca is one of
the factors that led to a demand for an alternative interpretation of shariʿa on
the social issues faced by Muslims in the Malay Peninsula.
The establishment of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1924 and rise of
Wahhabism had a further devastating impact on the Southeast Asian ʿulama
based in Mecca. The rise of these new Islamic thinkers and their control over
Mecca made the Southeast Asian Muslims uneasy. Another shocking incident
was the Wahhabis’ killing of ʿAbd Allah al-Zawawi (1850–1924), the Shafiʿi
mufti in Mecca at that time. Before his appointment as the mufti in Mecca, he
had served as the Mufti of Pontianak in Kalimantan (Borneo) Island: he was
therefore well known and widely adored by Southeast Asian Muslims. Although
his death was accidental,27 it nevertheless drove hundreds of Southeast Asian
Muslims to flee Mecca. About 150 Muslims arrived in Singapore and spread
news of the incident throughout the Malay Peninsula.28 These developments
markedly reduced the importance of Mecca as the gathering place for the
Southeast Asian ʿulama.

From Mecca to Cairo: The Influence on Fiqh Methodology
After the acceptance of the first Malay student at al-Azhar in the 1870s,29 the
number of Malays enrolled there increased slowly but steadily. Dodge claims
that in 1902 there were only seven jāwı̄ students among the 645 foreign students at al-Azhar;30 according to Roff, in 1919 there were “fifty or sixty students
in Cairo from Indonesia (mostly West Sumatra), with perhaps an additional
twenty from Peninsula Malaya and Southern Thailand”, and by 1925 there were
at least 200 Southeast Asian students there. Roff supposes that the main cause
of this increase in the 1920s was the improvement in rubber prices and the corresponding growth in parental cash incomes that occurred towards the middle
of the decade.31
Although the increased number of Southeast Asian Muslims at al-Azhar
certainly boosted its influence in the region, the influential reformist Muslim
magazine al-Manar, published by Rashid Rida, also had a significant impact in
shaping the Islamic discourse in East Asia in the early twentieth century. The
reformism advocated by Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashid Rida has often been
described as Salafi due to their emphasis on direct reference to the Qurʾan and
hadith as sources (dalı̄l), and rejection of the four madhāhib, even though their
approach was very different to that of Wahhabi Salafism. This emphasis on
going back to direct references to the Qurʾan and hadith rather than strictly
following one madhhab appealed to certain groups of ʿulama in Southeast Asia,
who saw in this methodology a stronger possibility of finding real-life solutions
than taqlı̄d of the Shafiʿi School.
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Table 7.1 Chronological table of events in the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt and
Southeast Asia
Arabian Peninsula

Egypt

Southeast Asia
1800
1824
1831–2

1892

The publication of
Muhimmat al-Nafaʾis
fı̄ Bayan Asʾilah
al-Hadith

1869

The opening of the
Suez Canal

1898

The launch of
al-Manar

1906–8
1908
1915

1923

1924

1934

The establishment
of Madrasa
al-Indonesiyya
al-Makkiyya
The occupation of
Mecca by Wahhabis

1922

The founding of
the kingdom of
Egypt

1928

The establishment
of the Muslim
Brotherhood

The establishment
of Madrasa Dar
al-ʿUlum al-Diniyya
1952

1961

The Egyptian
Revolution by the
Free Officers

The establishment
of the Islamic
University of
Medina
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1918

Establishment of the
Dutch East Indies
Anglo-Dutch Treaty
Rebellion against
Thailand in Patani

The launch of
al-Imam
The fall of the
Sultanate of Patani
The establishment
of the Majlis Agama
Islam in Kelantan
The launch of
Pengasuh

1945

The Indonesian
declaration of
independence

1957

The establishment
of the Federation of
Malaya
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From 1906 to 1908, al-Azhar-educated ʿulama such as Muhammad Tahir
Jalaluddin (1869–1956)32 and others published a pioneering magazine named
al-Imam. These ʿulama were based in Singapore and promoted reformist thought
in Southeast Asia. Published weekly in its first year and monthly in the second,
al-Imam had the largest circulation ever attained by a Malay journal prior to the
Second World War. At its height, 5,000 copies were circulated in Southeast
Asia every month. Many of the articles in al-Imam were either an elaboration
or a translation of articles taken from al-Manar.33 The reformist thought of
ʿAbduh and Rida made major inroads into Southeast Asia and became widely
accepted.34
In the first decade of the twentieth century, Cairo came to be considered the
centre of reformism based on the Salafi methodology. More and more Malay students were attracted there, leading some Malay rulers to express concerns about
“views which are not desirable from the point of view of the Government”35
spreading to East Asia from Egypt. While the ʿulama involved in the publication
of al-Imam were promoting the Salafi methodology within East Asia, proponents
of the Shafiʿi School were still prevalent in the northeastern region of the Malay
Peninsula, especially in Kelantan. In Kelantan, disciples of Ahmad al-Fatani
(e.g., Tok Kenali and Abdus Samad bin Muhammad Shalih al-Kelantani, known
as Tuan Tabal) were influential in administration and education. In fatwa columns in Pengusah (1918–), a magazine published by Majlis Agama Islam Kelantan,
the main authoritative sources for shariʿa interpretation were the Shafiʿi School
classics, especially Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, Sharbini, al-Qastalani and al-Malibari. The contentions of the following fatwa, issued by the Majlis Agama Islam
Kelantan and published in Pengasuh in 1921, were, for example, entirely based on
the generally accepted theories of the Shafiʿi School. Responding to a question
that suggests a slightly anti-Sufi bent on the part of the interlocutor, the fatwa
defends Sufism (tas∙awwuf) and the tradition of the Shafiʿi School:
Question:
From Mr Daud bin Hajj Muhammad Nor in Kajang, Selangor, 14.5 batu [14.5
miles] from Kuala Lumpur
1. Is Tarsih36 a book written by a Sufi ʿālim or the ʿālim of fiqh and hadith? If
the book contains words written by a Sufi ʿālim and unsuited to the rules of
Islam, may I follow and practice his texts?
2. According to page 182 of Minhat al-Qarib al-Mujib, as described by Ibn
Hajar in Tuhfah,37 a Prophet’s hadith cited on page 238 of chapter 3 of Mugni
Khatib Sharbini,38 and an explanation by Nawawi in Sharh Muslim,39 it is
written that angels do not bring grace to a house that displays the figure of
an animal.
— 176 —

From Me cca to Ca i r o
Answer:
1. Tarsih is a book of fiqh. You can follow it, because the contents of the book
are based not only on the author’s ijtihād but also on texts by ʿulama and other
famous books. In addition to that, Tarsih has been accepted by contemporary
ʿulama.
2. The contents can be characterised as words of ʿulama in fiqh. The parts
containing discourse on tas∙awwuf can be characterised as words of ʿulama in
the Sufi path.
3. The author was well versed in fiqh, Sufi thought and other similar realms. He
was faithful and taught Sufi teaching in the Masjid al-Haram. Contemporary
ʿulama participated in his lectures. By these facts, we can know the superiority and rightness of the author.
4. If there are words written by Sufi ʿulama which are unsuitable to rules of
Islamic law, you must not follow them. However, only the companions of a
Sufi can judge whether the words are unsuitable or not. People like us are not
allowed to judge that they are unsuitable. We just follow words accepted by
famous ʿulama.
5. It has been written that ʿulama admitted the possession of goods with
animal figures on page 184 of Minhat al-Qarib. “And among ʿulama there is
an opinion that ‘goods of animal figures’ means figures drawn on dishes etc.”
Ibn Hajar wrote “Figures which are not h∙aram are carriable” in Tuhfah. Please
read carefully. However, Minhat al-Qarib did not mention the four different
opinions. In Tarsih, the author introduced words by al-Qastalani40 concerning this problem. Therefore, we can say Tarsih is more solid than other books.
6. The author of Minhat al-Qarib explained that there are various interpretations of the phrase “angels do not bring grace to a house that displays the figure
of an animal”. Some people interpret this to mean that angels do not bring
grace to houses which place h∙aram ones among figures of animals. However,
other people think there is no room for compromise on this principle. Page
184 of Minhat al-Qarib, Tuhfah, and Bujayrimi41 should be referred to.42
In contrast to Pengasuh, which was published in Kelantan, the fatwa columns
published in the Singapore-based al-Imam were based entirely on Salafi methodology. Some fatwas in al-Imam criticised Sufi orders. The following fatwa provides
an example of such criticism and was published as an article in al-Imam in 1908:
Question: From Abbas Haj Abdul Rahman, Rawa, Penang
1. During a seloka [suluk, concentrated training in a Sufi order for certain
period] a person asked his master for permission to visit his sick mother.
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However, the person wasn’t allowed to visit his mother until after she passed
away.
2. A lady’s husband became sick during [the period] she was in seloka. She
requested her master’s permission to meet her husband. However, she was not
allowed to meet him until after he passed away.
3. Parents hoped to visit their child during the period of seloka; however, the
child’s master did not allow him to meet his parents.
4. Is it recommended in Islam to practice seloka even if practitioners do not
have knowledge on the proper way and the necessary conditions for prayer?
Answers to Four Questions:
There are people who hold off meeting with parents, husbands, wives and
other family members because they are in the situation of seloka. It is not
recommended in the shariʿa of Islam. If you think something is wrong in the
sacred shariʿa of Islam, the wrong is done only by lazy and ignorant people
in seloka. Therefore, we must teach them that they must not be lazy, because
they need to get a livelihood and the real seloka and Sufi order of the religion lead people to success in this world and the hereafter. The seloka you
mentioned in your question is “the pulling and binding” [tarik ikat, restriction
under the master], not a Sufi order [tariqa].
On matters like rules of prayer and the ways of purification, which are
written in small books [kitāb], you should ask knowledgeable people in your
district. Please ask al-Imam about more difficult matters and problems for
which you cannot find explanations.43
The Salafi methodology of direct reference to the Qurʾan and hadith, its reluctance to follow traditional madhāhib as an authority in jurisprudence and its
unfavourable outlook towards Sufism led to the development of Salafi methodology in fiqh-influenced Sufi activities in Southeast Asia.44 However, the implementation of Salafi methodology was not limited to discourse on Sufism: the
period of transition and modernisation demanded further innovations in Islamic
jurisprudence. During this period, as Ahmad al-Fatani’s two fatwas regarding
non-Muslims revealed, the traditional Shafiʿi School was often hard to apply. In
the generally accepted opinions of the Shafiʿi School, only Christians and Jews
could be dhimmı̄ and coexist in the dār al-Islām (abode of Islam). Here, then,
the Salafi methodology was more suitable for innovative jurisprudence or ijtihād. However, the innovative jurisprudence regarding classifying non-Muslims
should not only be considered the result of the application of Salafi methodology; it must also be noted that political and economic adjustments had facilitated such innovative interpretations of the position of non-Muslims.
— 178 —

From Me cca to Ca i r o
A 1955 fatwa by the Mufti of Terengganu, on political coalitions with
non-Muslims, justified the ruling coalition formed by the United Malays
National Organisation (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association
(MCA). By the mid-twentieth century, classification of non-Muslims as kuffār
watanı̄yı̄n or ḥarbı̄yūn had disappeared. Even the classification of non-Muslims
as dhimmı̄ was considered politically incorrect after the 1960s. In the fatwa,
non-Muslims in the Federation of Malaya were referred to as kāfir dhimmı̄
without any further explanation. It was said that because of the mas∙lah∙ ah, or
the public welfare, realised through the coalition, the coalition satisfied the
objective of shariʿa.45
Salafi methodology was able to provide innovative ways of meeting the
demands of the age through direct reference to the Qurʾan and hadith; indeed,
the flexibility of the Salafi methodology was often considered its most innovative dimension. As we will see in the remainder of this chapter, when modern
political systems attempted to involve Islamic authority in government, Salafi
methodology was frequently applied in fatwas issued by pro-government ʿulama.

Salafi Methodology and the Formation of the Official Fatwa
Institutions in the Malay Peninsula
The institutionalisation of Islamic affairs in the Malay Peninsula can be traced
back to the 1874 Pangkor Engagement, signed between the Malay ruler in Perak
and the British. Article 6 of the treaty declared that the Malay ruler must follow
a British official called the Resident, and only Islamic affairs and Malay customs
remained under the jurisdiction of the Malay ruler.46 As similar treaties were
negotiated between other Malay rulers and the British, by the 1920s the Malay
rulers in each state had reinforced their jurisdiction over Islamic affairs through
the establishment of the Majlis Agama Islam (the supreme body of Islamic
administration). Since the first establishment of the Majlis Agama Islam, in
Kelantan in 1915, fatwas and other Islamic affairs such as education, zakat, institutions such as mosques, awqāf, family law, the shariʿa court, penal enactments
and doctrinal interpretation had come under the authority of sultans and state
governments.
In Kelantan, a notice to regulate issuance of fatwas was issued by the Majlis
Agama Islam in 1917. The notice forbade the issuance of fatwas without the
approval of the Majlis Agama Islam, and provided that all fatwas issued to
followers of the Shafiʿi School must conform to generally accepted opinions of
that school.47 In 1918, the Meshuarat Ulama (ʿUlama Council) was established
as an organ for issuing fatwas under the Majlis Agama Islam of Kelantan (since
renamed the Jemaah Ulama).48 In 1952, the state government of Selangor
passed the Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam (Administration of
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the Muslim Law Enactment), the basic law underpinning the Islamic administration and judiciary. This enactment provided for the appointment of the
mufti by the sultan and the formation of a Fatwa Committee under the Majlis
Agama Islam, while also detailing the process of issuing fatwas and requiring the
observance of the generally accepted opinions of the Shafiʿi School. In addition,
the enactment prescribed that all Muslims in Selangor must follow the fatwas
announced in an official gazette. The law also established a penalty for Muslims
who defied or denigrated fatwas, authorised Islamic teachers, Islamic teaching
and the madhhab or the religion of Islam (this penalty was a fine not exceeding
500 ringgit, imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both). Similar
enactments were also legislated in other states, including Malacca (1959), Pulau
Pinang (1959), Negeri Sembilan (1960), Kedah (1962), Perlis (1964) and Perak
(1965).49
By the middle of the twentieth century, state governments in the Malay
Peninsula had developed a system to monopolise fatwas, which led to Malay
Muslims requesting fatwas from inland ʿulama and facilitated the localisation of
fatwa and shariʿa interpretation.50
The “Islamisation policy”,51 initiated in the 1970s, boosted the number of
Malaysian students studying at al-Azhar (see Chapter 8). One of the reasons
why al-Azhar could attract so many Malaysians was that since the 1950s it had
transformed itself into a modern university that conferred degrees on its graduates. As a result of the bureaucratisation of Islamic administration in Malaysia,
degree certification became indispensable for working in a variety of jobs,
including the Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM; Islamic Development
Agency)52 of the federal government, the Majlis Agama Islam in each state, and
religious schools all over the country. By the end of the 1970s, there were over
3,000 Malaysian students enrolled at al-Azhar.
The institutionalisation of shariʿa interpretation by the government and the
rise of Salafi methodology occurred in the Malay Peninsula almost simultaneously with the expansion of the number of Malay students at al-Azhar University.
The innovative characteristic of Salafi methodology – its flexibility – was suitable for issuing fatwas that favoured the policies of the federal government.53
In particular, policies on ethnic relations and economic development required
justification via Islamic jurisprudence. In the 1950s and 1960s, an ʿ ulama-based
opposition party, the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (the party was later renamed
the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), the Islamic Party of Malaysia) criticised
the ruling coalition (the Alliance), which consisted of Muslims, Chinese and
Indians. The opposition party asserted that the Federation of Malaya under
the Alliance was not an Islamic state, because they believed the coalition was
dominated by non-Muslims.54 The Majlis Agama Islam in Terengganu contradicted the assertions of the opposition party by issuing a fatwa in 1963. The
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fatwa, which had official status, justified collaboration with non-Muslims such
as Buddhists and Hindus without mentioning the theories of the Shafiʿi School.
As the basis for this justification it cited a hadith and adopted the concept of
the public interest.
The following excerpt is from a fatwa issued by Majlis Agama Islam
Terengganu in 1955, the year in which UMNO and MCA formed the Alliance
for the Federal Legislative Council Election (the first national-level election
in the Malay Peninsula). PAS criticised the Alliance for its collaboration with
non-Muslims, while, in the fatwa, Majlis Agama Islam Terengganu defended
the formation of the Alliance:
Question:
...
(2) Is it permissible in Islam to ally with non-Muslims, for example, the
Alliance of UMNO and MCA?
(3) Is it permissible for Muslims to vote for non-Muslims in the state election
and so on?
Answer:
...
(2) The alliance with non-Muslims such as the Alliance of UMNO and
MCA is permissible, because it will bring benefit to the residents of this
country.
(3) Because non-Muslims in this country are loyal to the state law and their
religions do not oppose Muslims, they are kāfir dhimmı̄ [non-Muslims under
protection]. Islam does not prohibit cooperation with such kāfir dhimmı̄
nor voting for non-Muslim candidates for state legislative councils, because
all the nations are under just one ruling system, the democracy, and the
democracy recommends respect for creeds and religions. Non-Muslims can
be elected as members of the state legislative councils, because they are ahl
al-dhimma [people under protection] and have the same rights as Muslims.
They can be elected because their experiences and abilities can make a contribution to all of this country through cooperation.55
This official fatwa mentioned no classical theory of the Shafiʿi School. It justified the governmental policy by reference to public benefit. In addition to
the Salafi methodology, the reference to the concept of the public interest,
or mas∙laḥah, emerged as another influential methodology of fiqh in Malaysia
after the 1960s. Mas∙laḥah is one of the maqās∙ id al-sharı̄ʿa, or the jurisprudential
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objectives of shariʿa. Many official fatwas issued by Majlis Agama Islam and
the National Fatwa Committee after the 1960s mentioned maqās∙id al-sharı̄ʿa
as a source of jurisprudence. In particular, the concept of mas∙laḥah was mentioned frequently as the ground for fatwas in line with government policies on
issues such as economic development. The fiqh methodology based on maqās∙id
al-sharı̄ʿa was also disseminated in Malaysia by graduates of al-Azhar, and the
increase in the number of official fatwas which referred to the concept indicates
the expansion of the influence of Azhari graduates in Islamic administration in
Malaysia.
In the 1950s and 1960s the ruling Alliance continued to be successful in
gaining an elected majority in parliament, while PAS continued to criticise the
coalition and the collaboration it embodied between UMNO and non-Muslims.
To underscore the injustice it perceived in UMNO’s actions from the Islamic
perspective, PAS insisted that UMNO members had become turncoats through
their collaboration with non-Muslims, and labelled the UMNO members kuffār,
or non-believers, according to a text issued by ʿAbdul Qadir Muttalib al-Mandili.56 In 1963, the Majlis Agama Islam Terengganu again issued an official fatwa
designed to rebut the denunciations issuing from PAS, and from which the
following extract is drawn:
Question:
What is the regulation on accusing another Muslim of being kāfir?
Answer:
1. The religion of Islam prohibits Muslims from accusing another Muslim
of being kāfir, because according to a hadith narrated by Abu Zarrah [a
companion of the Prophet Muhammad] recorded in Sahih Bukhari and Sahih
Imam Muslim [both among the most authoritative hadith collections], the
messenger of Allah asserted that somebody who accuses another of being fası̄q
[disbeliever] or kāfir himself becomes fası̄q or kāfir, if the accusation is wrong.
All the ʿulama in Islam have arrived at a consensus that such an action is
a major sin, albeit not one of the biggest sins, because the accuser himself
becomes kāfir as a result of a wrong action. . . .
2. The issue of whether it is permissible to vote for non-Muslims as members
of parliament is not a religious matter. In the states of Malaysia, the regulations of elections are accepted by all the political organisations and are
fitting for the objectives of the Federal Constitution of the Malay land. In
the Constitution, either Muslim or not, all the citizens are admitted to have
the same rights and duties under the state law, if they are loyal to the state
— 182 —

From Me cca to Ca i r o
law and follow it. The Constitution delegates authority on Islamic affairs to
the sultans.
In the light of these facts, we cannot overlook how large is the maslihat
am [public interest] in the election of non-Muslim members of Parliament.
Therefore, from the viewpoint of shariʿa, it is permissible for Muslims to vote
for non-Muslims who are admitted as citizens under the conditions of the
Constitution.57
This official fatwa cited hadith as the basis for its justification; there was no
mention of the classical theory of the Shafiʿi School, and the concept of the
public interest was also deployed. This fatwa shows that by the 1960s the official
institutions of the Islamic administration were no longer bound by the Shafiʿi
School. Most of the official fatwas were based on the Salafi methodology and
turned on direct references to the Qurʾan and hadith, as well as the concept of
maqās∙id al-sharı̄ʿa. This transition in the methodology for shariʿa interpretation
brought with it new flexibility, and in official fatwas this flexibility was applied
mainly to the justification of government policies such as inter-ethnic cooperation and economic development.58
Islam is declared “the Religion of the Federation” in Article 3 of the Malaysian
Federal Constitution. The provision of Islam as the official religion of state, and
shariʿa as the main source of legislation, can be found in the constitutions of
many Muslim countries, including Egypt. However, Malaysia has the peculiarity
that the Malay ruler is designated as “the Head of the Religion of Islam” in the
Federal Constitution (Article 3), and also that it provides for the unlimited
authority of rulers, and of the Majlis Agama Islam under those rulers, regarding
Islamic affairs. As a result of the governmental authority over Islamic affairs,
fatwas have been strictly controlled by the government; and, historically speaking, such unlimited authority over fatwas has been very rare in the Muslim
world. Malaysia is peculiar even within Southeast Asia, and contrasts with
Indonesia where there are Muslim organisations with millions of members –
such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah59 – but no formal state control.
The other characteristic of Malaysia is that it has the highest number of graduates from al-Azhar University, and their influence is manifest in administration,
education and fiqh methodology. This phenomenon is primarily the result of the
government’s promotion of study at al-Azhar.

Conclusion
The period of domination of the Shafiʿi School in Southeast Asia came to an
end after the occupation of Mecca by Wahhabis in 1924; although the Shafiʿi
tradition has remained influential in some institutions such as the Majlis Agama
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Islam in Kelantan, it no longer exercises a monopoly on the interpretation
of shariʿa. Underpinning the spread of the Salafi trend, we may observe the
increasing institutionalisation of the Islamic administrative organisations as a
part of the modernisation of governance in Southeast Asia – the establishment
of the official religious authorities such as Majlis Agama Islam in the Malay
Peninsula is just one example of this. Such religious authorities required a flexible form of shariʿa jurisprudential interpretation in order to justify government
policies. In official institutions such as the Fatwa Committee under the Majlis
Agama Islam, the Salafi methodology was implemented because of its flexibility
and capacity for innovation. The transition of the centre of Islamic learning
from Mecca to Cairo laid the foundations for the absorption of Islamic jurisprudence into the state system, and led to a form of Islamic jurisprudence that was
in line with the Malaysian government’s projects for social engineering. This
example shows how, historically, southeast Asian Muslims have absorbed the
intellectual movements in the learning centres in the Middle East and adjusted
them for their own benefit.
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Chapter 8

“Azharisation” of ʿUlama Training in Malaysia
Hiroko Kushimoto

If one wishes to understand the global influence of al-Azhar, few countries
present a better case study than Malaysia. Of Egypt’s approximately 11,000
Malaysian students, al-Azhar University hosts more than 4,000 in the departments of Religious Studies and Arabic Studies alone.1 The number of Malaysian
students at al-Azhar surpasses even the 3,239 Indonesian students who study
there, and the implications of this become more pronounced when one considers the population size of each country: Malaysia has only 17.3 million Muslims,
comprising 61.3 per cent of the country’s population,2 while Indonesia has the
largest Muslim population of any country, 177 million.3 The difference is tenfold.
The reasons for the popularity of al-Azhar among Malaysian students become
apparent when one looks at the Malaysian system of ʿulama training.4 Malaysian
ʿulama are trained through a religious school system that is separate from the
national system, and the outstanding feature of these religious schools is that
the religious studies and Arabic curriculums follow the system at al-Azhar. The
textbooks are imported from al-Azhar and reprinted in Malaysia; the certification given upon passing the final examination (called STAM)5 for the al-Azhar
curriculum is recognised upon entrance to undergraduate courses at al-Azhar;6
and after the STAM examination, Malaysian students who wish to continue
their study at al-Azhar are provided with orientation information by the state
religious office and sent in groups to Egypt. Most of the students receive scholarships from the various religious bodies within their respective states,7 and the
majority live together in hostels provided by the state religious offices. These
official forms of support make their lives at al-Azhar quite comfortable.
This chapter attempts to provide answers to two broad clusters of questions.
The first cluster concerns why Malaysia developed an education system that
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draws so heavily upon al-Azhar, and why there is such extensive official support
for sending students there. The second cluster concerns what it means for individual students to study at al-Azhar, and how the relationship with al-Azhar is
viewed by Malaysian society. In response to the first cluster of questions, this
chapter shows how the adoption of the al-Azhar curriculum in the nation’s
religious education system was the result of the efforts both of individual ʿulama
and local communities. After Malaysian independence in 1957, however, the
state governments became involved in the religious schools, and subsequently
the federal government also strengthened its role in their administration and in
sending students to al-Azhar. Two factors in particular were responsible for this
growth of support for al-Azhar education at the community, ʿulama and governmental levels: first, the complicated social and educational context of Muslims
in multi-ethnic Malaya (Malaysia); and, secondly, the context of an Islamic
resurgence in Malaysia after the 1970s that stressed the political importance of
Islamic education.
As for what it means to study there, the chapter shows that the increased
access to al-Azhar has dramatically changed the dividends that students can
draw on their return from Egypt. In the 1960s, studying at al-Azhar was a rare
occurrence, and precisely because they were so rare, the generation of Malaysian
students who studied there went on to play important roles both in Islamic
organisations and the government in the 1970s. However, as a result of the
rapid increase in their number, the graduates of al-Azhar now face difficulties in
finding even rather basic jobs such as being a religious teacher in an elementary
school. From the 1960s to the 2010s, what it has meant to study at al-Azhar has
undergone significant change, both at the level of the individual and for society.
The first section of this chapter explains the process of “Azharisation” experienced by the Malaysian religious education system, from its beginnings in
individual efforts in the 1910s, up to the federal involvement of the 2000s. The
second section describes the transformation of the individual experience of studying at al-Azhar, comparing different generations of Malaysian students in terms
of their reasons for studying at al-Azhar, their lives in Egypt, and the roles they
played upon returning to Malaysia. In the conclusion, the chapter analyses the
direct and indirect results of Azharisation. The evidence in this chapter is based
on fieldwork, interviews and archival research conducted in the state of Kedah
in the northern Malay Peninsula from March 2006 to July 2008, and in Kuala
Lumpur from July 2008 to March 2011.

The “Azharisation” of Malaysian Institutions of ʿUlama Training
The early Malay students of Islam regarded Mecca as the climax of their journey for knowledge, and this situation endured for centuries (see Chapter 7 for
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details). Students from the Malay Peninsula would learn the basics of Islam in
the local traditional institutions of Islamic learning, called pondoks in Malay
(sing. pondok, pl. pondok-pondok), then move on to centres of advanced Islamic
learning in northern states such as Kelantan and Patani. After many years of
study in Masjid al-Haram, they would return to Malaya to teach in mosques
or pondoks, or to open new pondoks. These students of Islam from the Malay
archipelago were called jāwı̄ students.
It was in the early twentieth century that the preference for Mecca as the
main destination for higher Islamic education began to change, and many Malay
students began to study at al-Azhar in addition to Mecca. One of the earliest
Malay or jāwı̄ students at al-Azhar was Wan Ahmad Zain al-Fatani (1856–
1908).8 Ahmad al-Fatani is still regarded as one of the most prominent sources
of traditional Islamic learning in East Asia, having edited and published numerous religious writings (kitab, lit. “book”) of the old Malay ʿulama, especially
those who were active in the eighteenth century. The majority of jāwı̄ who
were active ʿulama in the twentieth century and who were educated in Mecca
had studied under Ahmad al-Fatani. However, Malaya began to see a gradual
increase in the number of returning students who had absorbed the reformist
ideals represented by Muhammad ʿAbduh. This approach favoured engagement
with the original Islamic sources with a view to interpreting them in the light
of reason and modern needs, as opposed to taqlı̄d of the Shafiʿi School, which
was the traditional practice in the region. Although this approach was Salafi
in its methodology – given its emphasis on going back to the original texts – it
was considered modernist because it preferred the reinterpretation of the core
texts in the light of modern concerns instead of strict adherence to the positions
taken by a specific school of thought. Tahir Jalaluddin (1869–1956) was the first
such graduate of al-Azhar, and was well known for the propagation of reformism
in the style of Muhammad ʿAbduh through his journal al-Imam (1906–8). Tahir
Jalaluddin and other writers for al-Imam also contributed to the establishment of
modern Islamic schools, which, as with the reforms initiated at al-Azhar under
Muhammad ʿAbduh, combined religious education with modern education.
The first example of these Islamic schools was the Madrasa al-Iqbal, established
in 1907 in Singapore. This model for a modern Islamic school gradually spread
throughout Malaya in the first three decades of the twentieth century.9 Due to
their being modelled on al-Azhar, these modern Islamic schools began to attract
more Malay students to al-Azhar itself.
The spread of modern religious schools and their adoption of the al-Azhar
model should be analysed with two factors in mind. The first is the Malay educational environment, and the other is the modernisation of al-Azhar. Modern
education was introduced to Malaya by Western missionaries in the early nineteenth century. The first of these schools to be opened was Penang Free School,
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established in 1815. These missionary schools were established in urban areas,
using English as the main language of instruction; this, though, made these
schools less accessible for Malay, the majority of whom lived in rural areas.
Malay schools that taught in the Malay language began to be established after
1854, when the British East India Company adopted a new policy for enhancing mother-tongue education in their colonies.10 Malay schools rapidly spread
throughout Malaya at the turn of the century, yet Malay education remained
limited to the elementary level, and secondary education was only provided in
English, excepting certain teacher training colleges that used Malay.
The transformation of al-Azhar into a modern institution for religious education began in the 1870s, with the introduction of new subjects and new
methods of examination. The first significant change in the system came with a
law passed in 1896 under the influence of Muhammad ʿAbduh, who had argued
for the modernisation of al-Azhar. The law introduced a new system of eight
years of secondary education and four years of higher education, with certificate
examinations at each level. However, it was not until 1911 that the process of
drastic transformation into a modern institution really began for al-Azhar. Eccel
refers to the transformation that occurred after the law of 1911 as “bureaucratisation”, and points out that numerous institutions for religious instruction all
over Egypt were arranged into a hierarchy that placed al-Azhar at the top.11 The
whole system was divided into three levels: elementary, secondary and higher
education, which were each allocated four years.12 The economic base of the
education system also changed during this period. After the independence of
Egypt in 1922, the Egyptian government began to control the waqf income that
had supported the autonomy of the ʿulama of al-Azhar. This policy, designed to
break the economic base of the ʿulama, was completed in 1954 under the Nasser
regime.13
The reform contained in the law of 1930 was equally important: it aimed
to ensure employment for the university’s graduates. It was at this time that
the name of the four-year higher educational institution was changed from
“mosque” (jāmiʿ) to “university” (jāmiʿa); the university’s degrees were also
made equal to that of national universities.14 The elementary and secondary
levels were rearranged into four years of elementary (ibtidāʾı̄yya) and five years
of secondary (thanawı̄yya) education. Students who passed the last examination
in the secondary school were given a certificate titled shahāda al-thanawı̄yya,
and the portion of secular subjects was increased to up to 30 per cent of the
curriculum. Eccel refers to this feature of the transformation in the 1930s as
“professionalisation”.15
The development of modern religious schools in Malaya strongly reflected
these shifts. Muslim leaders saw the British schools as problematic, not only
because of the limited opportunities they provided for Muslims, but also because
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of the lack of religious education. Thus, ʿulama trained in the Middle East took
initiatives to establish modern religious schools to provide alternative educational opportunities for Malay children. For example, Madrasa Hamidiah (now
known as Maktab Mahmud) was opened in Alor Star, Kedah, in 1914. The
initiative was taken by Wan Sulaiman Wan Sidik (1874–1935), who studied
in Mecca and served as shaykh al-Islam in Kedah. Wan Sidik invited two Arab
ʿulama, from Mecca and al-Azhar, respectively, to teach in the madrasa, and
imported textbooks from Egypt as well.16 In 1938, a teacher who had graduated from al-Azhar was appointed as principal. He reformed the system of
the madrasa into a seven-year curriculum based on the model of the al-Azhar
secondary school. In 1955, the system was further developed into a twelve-year
programme to prepare students to enter al-Azhar University. The courses were
divided into three levels – elementary, lower secondary and upper secondary –
and each level was four years in length.
Another example is Madrasa Muhammadiyah (now known as Maahad
Muhammadi), opened by the Kelantan Council of Religion17 in 1917. In the
beginning, it had only three grades for boys aged 9–15 years old and used Malay
as the medium of instruction – some textbooks were imported from Egypt and
translated into Malay for that purpose.18 However, in 1937 it was developed
into a four-year course based on the agreement and support of al-Azhar.19 The
madrasa was further reformed into a nine-year curriculum based on the three
levels of al-Azhar education, elementary (ibtidai), lower secondary (idadi) and
upper secondary (thanawi),20 which were each allocated three years. Maahad
Muhammadi’s certification was recognised by al-Azhar in 1960 and some students from the school entered al-Azhar University for the first time at the end
of the 1960s.21
The application of the al-Azhar system was not limited to schools – such as
Maktab Mahmud and Maahad Muhammadi – that were related to the religious
administration of the state government. In the 1930s and 1940s, many similar
schools were established on the model of these famous schools. Most of these
schools were supported by donations from the local community or from the private property of the family of the supreme leader of the school (tok guru). They
received no official support and there were no offices to supervise their administration and curriculum – this was, then, a totally independent effort on the part
of religious leaders to adopt the model of al-Azhar.
However, the schools’ curricula were not necessarily imported directly from
the al-Azhar system, at least not at this stage; rather, they were the product
of a mixture of that system with other models, including traditional Islamic
learning. The modern system of religious schools – with standards, a curriculum
organised by years and examinations – was generally called the nizami (organised) system, in contrast to the traditional umumi (general) system, whether it
— 194 —

“ A zharis atio n” of ʿUlam a T rain i n g i n M a la ys i a
originated from the al-Azhar system or not. The origin of the name nizami is
unclear, but one possibility is that it stems from dars-e-nizami, the systematic
religious curriculum developed in eighteenth-century India.22 The influence
of the Indian madrasa can also be traced through the connection with Mecca.
There were some madrasas in Mecca that had a modern system and accepted
students from Malaya, and one of the famous destinations for these students was
Madrasa Saulatiyah, which was established by an Indian Muslim. Some of the
teachers who developed curricula for the madrasas in Malaya in the 1920s and
1930s were graduates of this madrasa and applied this school’s system in their
own institutions.23
By the 1960s this combination of influences had been transformed into a
single al-Azhar stream of influence. Among the factors playing a role in this
transformation were the new policies of al-Azhar, as well as the establishment
of privileged preparatory courses for al-Azhar in Malaysia. Al-Azhar was further reformed as a modern university under Nasser in the 1950s – al-Azhar
University and its elementary and secondary schools having come fully under
the control of Nasser’s government after the revolution in 1952. The budget
for al-Azhar came to be distributed by the government and its funding was
increased.24 In general terms, opportunities for education and employment
were expanded under the new government. A standardised examination system
was introduced to prepare for the expansion of higher education. This pushed
al-Azhar to place more stress on non-religious subjects in order to ensure the
employment of graduates and attract students. In 1960, al-Azhar opened new
faculties of Commerce, Engineering, Agriculture and Medicine, in addition
to the traditional Arabic and Islamic departments. A 1961 law decreed that a
certificate from the al-Azhar secondary school would qualify a student to enter
any university in Egypt, making the al-Azhar school stream entirely equal to the
government school system. The modern reform of al-Azhar made the institution
part of Egypt’s national education system and so made the ʿulama part of the
bureaucratic school system.
In tandem with this transformation, since the 1920s al-Azhar had been
accepting more and more foreign students. This policy was further accentuated
in the 1950s when al-Azhar provided generous scholarships for foreign students, contributing to a rapid increase in their numbers, especially from Asian
countries.25 The preparatory course for foreign students (Maʿahad Buʿuth) was
established as well. The first college for female students was opened in 1962, and
the number of female foreign students increased in the 1970s.26
The establishment of Islamic higher education institutions in Malaya based
on the al-Azhar model was linked to the developments at al-Azhar itself. In
1955, the Kolej Islam Malaya (Malay College of Islam) was established as the
first institution for Islamic higher education in Malaya. It was the fruit of long
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effort, reaching back to the 1920s, on the part of the Muslim leaders of Malaya;
but although a variety of Muslim individuals and groups were involved, it would
not have been achieved without the support of the sultans (rulers of Malay
states), especially the sultan of Selangor. It should be noted that the sultans’
attitude towards studying at al-Azhar was not necessarily positive. For example,
Roff notes, based on a record of discussions among the rulers in 1927, that there
had been a suggestion from the sultan of Selangor to establish a local college of
higher Islamic education.27 He disapproved of sending students to Egypt, not
only because of the expense, but also “because it introduces them to undesirable
matters” – where the phrase “undesirable matters” implied political influences
such as anti-colonialism and movements towards an alliance with Indonesia as a
result of communication with students from the Dutch East Indies. On the other
hand, Pengasuh, a journal of the Kelantan Council of Religion (the sultans’
advisory council) consistently published articles that recommended sending
students to al-Azhar for higher education and provided reports on students’ life
there.
Irrespective of the intentions behind its establishment, however, Kolej Islam
Malaya functioned as the main gate to al-Azhar due to the consonance between
their curricula. In the beginning, the school had two years of preparatory courses
and five years of higher education. In 1961, Mahmud Saltut, the rector of
al-Azhar appointed by Nasser’s government, was invited to Kolej Islam to discuss the curriculum. He agreed to recognise the higher certificate of Kolej Islam
as equal to al-Azhar’s bachelor’s degree, and to accept holders of that certificate
onto al-Azhar’s master’s course. Al-Azhar also agreed to send two teachers to
Kolej Islam. As a result, ten graduates of Kolej Islam succeeded in entering
al-Azhar master’s course in 1963.28 However, Kolej Islam soon transformed
its educational system in order to concentrate on secondary education, since
it could not maintain its students’ achievements at the higher level. Since
then, Kolej Islam has played a role in gathering superior students from all over
Malaysia in order to provide them with preparatory training and send them to
al-Azhar.29
The establishment of Kolej Islam had the effect of promoting the standardisation of the curriculum of the religious schools, since such schools now
had an opportunity to send their students to universities by preparing them
to enter Kolej Islam, even if by themselves they could not prepare their students for university life. In 1963, the Yayasan Pengajian Tinggi Islam Kelantan
(YPTIK; Kelantan Foundation for Higher Islamic Education) was established in
Kelantan, where it played a role similar to that of Kolej Islam. These institutions
made studying at al-Azhar far more accessible for Malay students.
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Introduction of the al-Azhar Curriculum by
State (Local) Governments
Up to this point, the introduction of the al-Azhar curriculum had been an independent effort without any institutional support. The first active official initiative for standardisation based on the al-Azhar curriculum began in the 1970s.
The state religious councils, which first appeared in Kelantan in 1915, had been
established in all thirteen states by the early 1970s. These religious councils
began to provide financial support to the independent religious schools, and in
some cases provided these schools with concrete sets of guidelines. Kelantan
was one of the earliest states to import the standardised curriculum based on
al-Azhar. One of the reasons for this initiative was the declining popularity
of religious schools, which had resulted from the expansion of educational
opportunities for Muslims in the government school system.
Educational opportunities for Muslims, the majority in Malaysia, rapidly
expanded after the late 1960s. This transformation was connected to the 1961
Education Act and the 1963 Language Act, both of which were designed to
integrate the multi-ethnic citizenry30 and give substance to Article 152 of the
Constitution (1957), which provided that the national language should be
Malay. The language of secondary schools was gradually switched from English
to Malay, and the number of Malay students increased from 2,315 in 1957 to
28,067 in 1964. The abolition of entrance examinations for secondary schools
in 1964 caused the number of students to jump to 294,832 in 1975.31 In addition to the language policy, the New Economic Policy (NEP), initiated in 1971,
further promoted educational opportunities for Malay students. The NEP aimed
to correct the socio-economic imbalance between ethnic groups, particularly
between the Chinese and the Malay, which was believed to have been a factor
in the traumatic ethnic conflict of 1969. These policies led to the establishment
of various universities and colleges in the early 1970s, and to a rapid increase in
the number of Malay Muslim students.
This expansion of educational opportunity in the government school system
resulted in a decrease in the number of students in religious schools. Kelantan,
for example, which for centuries had been the largest centre of religious learning, had 182 religious schools in 1962, but the number dropped to 158 in 1968
and 89 in 1972.32 One of the responses to this was an initiative on the part of
religious schools and state religious offices to introduce the al-Azhar curriculum
more systematically, in order to ensure greater opportunities for higher education. The Kelantan state religious council introduced a standardised curriculum,
examinations and a certificate in 1971. The introduction of a standardised certificate abolished the certificates that had previously been issued individually by
each school. Although other states soon introduced similar policies, the pressure
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for standardisation remained weak. In Kedah, the religious council only offered
guidelines such as a list of textbooks and the choice of curriculum, while the
certification was issued by each religious school.
The situation changed drastically in the 1990s. Although it is rare for the statistics recorded in schools and religious offices to be entirely accurate, it is clear
that the number of students in religious schools had begun to increase in the late
1980s – Madrasa an-Nahdhah, for instance, one of the famous religious schools
in Kedah, never had more than 300 students before 1983, but this number had
doubled by 1986 and reached 1,400 in 1988. This increase was caused by the
Islamic resurgence in Malaysia that emerged in the 1970s, and the so-called
Islamisation policy intensively promoted by the Malaysian government after
the 1980s.33 In the early 1970s, the leaders of Islamic movements – especially
the members of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM; Malaysian Muslim
Youth Association) – began to criticise the education provided in government
schools, which conveyed little Islamic knowledge and had few classes for religious education. Mahathir’s government, established in 1981, employed many
leaders of such movements so as to include Islamic elements in various aspects
of government policy.34
In terms of education, a new curriculum was introduced that stressed Islamic
values, with almost twice as many school hours (240 minutes per week) now
set aside for religious subjects, as well as the integration of Islamic elements
into other subjects and elements of school life. Opportunities to receive Islamic
higher education inside the country were also expanded. The establishment of
the International Islamic University, in 1982, was one of the most symbolically
important results of the Islamisation policy under Mahathir’s government, and
it was a development that elevated parents’ expectations of religious education.
In order to answer the growing demand for Islamic education, the government
not only facilitated Islamic higher education, but also created employment for
graduates of religious schools. These measures enhanced the future options for
the graduates of religious schools, and made religious education, including study
at al-Azhar University, important for finding jobs as religious teachers or in
government offices.
The introduction of the new standardised al-Azhar curriculum at the state
level, which occurred around 1994, further popularised study at al-Azhar.
For example, in 1994 the Department of Religious Affairs of Kedah officially imported an al-Azhar curriculum based on an agreement between the
department and al-Azhar University. It launched a new curriculum called the
“Maʿahad Buʿuth curriculum”, which followed the system of Maʿahad Buʿuth,
the al-Azhar secondary school for foreign students. The examination referred to
as the Sijil Tinggi Agama (Higher Religious Certificate) was also introduced,
and the certificate was issued in the name of the department. The textbooks of
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Maʿahad Buʿuth were imported from Egypt and reprinted in Kedah bearing the
logo of Kedah Council of Religion.35 The textbooks were distributed to the religious schools by the departments. Now it was clear to everyone that studying in
a religious school was, in effect, preparation for studying at al-Azhar; and if they
did not go to al-Azhar, the graduates of religious schools would enter the department of Islamic studies at a local university, which ensured that they would
at least become a teacher of religion in an elementary school. The number of
students in religious schools peaked in the 1990s. Looking again at the example
of Kedah, the number of students in the independent religious schools there
was 21,175 in 1994, and reached a peak of 23,556 in 1995. The number slightly
declined after 1996, but remained in excess of 20,000 until 2001.36
This new curriculum and the associated examination system resulted, for the
first time, in the bureaucratic standardisation of independent religious schools.
Prior to this, the independent religious schools had basically been free in their
choice of educational content: there had been loose guidelines as a condition of
financial assistance from state religious offices, but there was little bureaucracy
in their implementation. Nevertheless, this standardisation was achieved without obstruction, because the independent religious schools already had similar
systems in place as a result of their having adopted the al-Azhar curriculum. In
other words, al-Azhar, as the model for religious education, prepared the independent religious schools in Malaysia for the standardisation and bureaucratisation that was later to come.

National (Federal) Control of Religious Schools
and Study in al-Azhar
In the late 1990s, standardisation did finally begin at the federal level. The
first drastic change was the introduction of a federal standard examination,
the Sijil Tinggi Agama Malaysia (STAM; Malaysian Higher Islamic Religious
Certificate), in 2000. It was based on the memorandum of understanding signed
on 18 November 1999 between al-Azhar and the Ministry of Education Malaysia
to launch the single certificate system in Malaysia. According to officers of the
ministry, al-Azhar had complained that some of the Malaysian students were
entering al-Azhar with a lower level of ability and were taking longer to graduate. Thus, the purpose of introducing the STAM was to “ensure that all of our
students who enter al-Azhar are excellent”.37 The memorandum included the
provisions that al-Azhar would accept only the STAM, instead of the existing twenty-six certificates issued by various religious departments and schools;
the curriculum for the STAM examination would be that of Maʿahad Buʿuth
al-Islamiyya al-Azhar; textbooks used for this curriculum would be those taught
in Maʿahad Buʿuth; al-Azhar would give copyright over the textbooks to the
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Ministry of Education Malaysia; and the examination would be prepared by the
ministry with the assistance of al-Azhar if necessary.38 Moreover, as a part of
the condition for al-Azhar’s acceptance of STAM students, the memorandum
included the provision that students must also pass the Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia
(Malaysian Certificate of Education), the certificate for completion of the secondary education curriculum of the Ministry of Education Malaysia. This meant
that, for the first time, students who had studied only religious subjects were
not allowed to enter al-Azhar; it also meant that the religious schools had to be
serious about the government curriculum for non-religious subjects if they were
to send their students to al-Azhar.
The final move from the federal government to control the religious schools
came with the sudden announcement by Prime Minister Mahathir that in
October 2002 he would withdraw the financial support provided to independent religious schools. The Ministry of Education had provided a modest amount
of financial support to the independent religious schools since the end of 1957,
but the government now said that it was necessary to withdraw that support
in order to review the undesirable level of achievement by their students. It
was also stated that some of these schools were inspiring students with radical
and anti-government sentiments. Although the amount was not so large that
its loss immediately created financial crises for these schools, this withdrawal
of official support made parents hesitant to enrol their children because they
were now afraid of being labelled anti-government. The number of students
in religious schools rapidly decreased, and some small schools were forced to
close. The federal government set up a committee to discuss a resolution to the
situation, and offered the religious schools a choice: they could either be fully
government-supported schools under the Ministry of Education or fully independent schools without any support from the ministry. As a result, by January
2006, 134 out of the 305 independent religious schools had registered as fully
government-supported;39 this meant that the religious schools that chose to be
government-supported became fully integrated into the state bureaucracy.
This Azharisation of ʿulama training was closely linked with the processes of
modernisation and bureaucratisation of religious instruction. Training ʿulama
had been an independent activity since before the introduction of the modern
education system. With the development of the modern secular education
system, religious learning for ʿulama training gradually adopted modern organisational forms. Al-Azhar provided the best model for the new type of ʿulama
training, supplanting the traditional kitab learning which had been based on
the model of Masjid al-Haram. As a result of independent efforts on the part
of some schools to import the al-Azhar model, religious schools throughout
Malaya/Malaysia became more similar to each other, and this paved the way
for the standardisation at the state level based on the al-Azhar curriculum.
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Moreover, the introduction of the al-Azhar curriculum at the state level in turn
conditioned the standardisation at the federal level, again based on al-Azhar.
The Azharisation of ʿulama training was thus first promoted by individual leaders, then by the state religious offices, and finally by the federal Ministry of
Education. At the same time, this process of Azharisation promoted the integration of ʿulama training into the bureaucracy of the modern education system. In
other words, the Azharisation of ʿulama training led to government control of
the ʿulama, so reducing the latter’s scope to criticise the government.

The Experience of Studying in al-Azhar and its
Meaning for Individual Students
The earliest generations, 1900s–1940s
The establishment of an ʿulama training system in Malaysia based on al-Azhar
has changed the experience of the students who study at al-Azhar, while also
transforming the social role and life course of al-Azhar graduates in Malaysia.
The first generation of Malay students who went to al-Azhar in the early
twentieth century prepared the foundations for student life there. They also
provided the first examples of the celebrated careers that could follow such an
educational experience, playing important social roles in Malaya from the first
decade of the twentieth century onwards. Tahir Jalaluddin (1869–1956) was
among the earliest of the outstanding returnees. Born in West Sumatra, he
moved to Mecca in 1880 and studied there for thirteen years. He then continued his study at al-Azhar for four years until 1897. As discussed above, al-Azhar
at that time was experiencing the beginning of significant reform under the
influence of Muhammad ʿAbduh. Jalaluddin took Arabic Studies, Shariʿa and
Mathematics. During his stay in Cairo, he was significantly influenced by the
progressive ideas of al-Afghani, Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashid Rida.40 After
studying again in Mecca for several years, he finally went back to Malaya in 1900
and joined the journal al-Imam, which contributed to the spread of reformist
ideas. He also worked as a teacher and headmaster in various religious schools
in Penang and Perak, and was the administrator of the state religious schools in
Johor.
Returnees from al-Azhar at that time did not necessarily contribute to the
promotion of reformist ideas. There were some returnees from al-Azhar who
played important roles in the Kelantan Council of Religion, which was in favour
of social reform, but clearly kept a traditionalist position in terms of a legal
methodology that adhered to the opinions of the Shafiʿi madhhab. Muhammad
bin Khatib Mohd Said is a salient example here. He was born in 1888 and studied in Mecca and at al-Azhar for ten years before returning to Kelantan in 1914.
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Soon after his return, he worked to establish the council and was appointed as
its first secretary in 1915. He was later promoted to be the prime minister of the
state in the 1920s.41
In addition to these examples of emerging prominent figures, the Malay
al-Azhar students in the 1920s also began to relate their activities through
Malay journals. In the mid-1920s, for example, Pengasuh, the journal published
by the Kelantan Council of Religion since 1918, often published news from the
Middle East. The journal covered a variety of topics, including the life of Malays
in Egypt and what it was like to study at al-Azhar, through the perspective of
Malays in Egypt. Pengasuh repeatedly referred to the benefit of an education at
al-Azhar, possibly contributing to the widespread public sense of longing for
that institution as the place of the highest learning.42 In addition to the reports
in journals published in Malaya, jāwı̄ students in Egypt published their own
journals. One of the most famous of these was Seruan Azhar (Call of Azhar),
first published by jāwı̄ students in October 1925 and circulated among religious
leaders and students throughout the Malay archipelago.43
Through these prominent figures and journals, people in the Malay Peninsula
learned about al-Azhar as a destination for religious knowledge and came to
recognise its authority. The rising reputation of al-Azhar is reflected in the news
about Hijaz during the war between Sharif Hussain and Ibn Saʿud. Pengasuh
repeatedly published the opinions of al-Azhar ʿulama in order to convince
Malays that “Wahhabis” were part of the Sunni Muslim community and not
contrary to any of the four madhhabs.44 The same attitude can be found in
another article which makes reference to al-Azhar ʿulama in support of their
criticism of the secularisation policies of Mustafa Kemal.45 Pengasuh’s attitude
is significant because it was among the few journals that took a clear position
in defence of the traditional method of adhering to the madhhab. Because of
this position, Pengasuh was preferred not only by the Muslim leaders who were
educated in government schools, but also by the traditional ʿulama who had
typically learned in Mecca and taught in pondoks.
The first important development among Malay students in the early twentieth century was the establishment of structures and systems for supporting
their student life. In 1922, jāwı̄ students formed an association, the Jamaʿat
al-Chairiah al-Talabijja al-Azhariah al-Jawiah (Welfare Association of Jawa
students).46 Roff estimates that there were at least 200 Southeast Asian students in Cairo by 1925, while Pengasuh also reports that there were about 150
students from the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and other places.47
The increasing numbers of Southeast Asian students in the Middle East at this
time was strongly supported by the boom in the price of rubber. The number of
pilgrims from British Malaya increased in the 1920s, with the minimum annual
number being 12,184 in 1927.48 In addition to the financial factor, the unstable
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situation in Mecca, caused by the war, also contributed to redirecting students
from that erstwhile centre of learning for jāwı̄ students to Cairo, at least for the
period around 1925.
However, the increase in the number of jāwı̄ students and the formation of
their student associations did not immediately improve their life. As far as students from the Malaya Peninsula were concerned, it was not until 1924 – when
Syed Hassan bin Ahmad al-Attas, a Hadrami descendant from Johor, visited
Cairo – that the effort to improve the students’ lives began. Syed Hassan al-Attas was born in Pahang in 1832, the son of a rich trader, Syed Ahmad Hassan
al-Attas. After studying in Malaya, he travelled to the Middle East and received
part of his education at al-Azhar. He stayed in Egypt for twelve years and then
returned to Malaya to contribute to developing religious institutions, such as
Madrasa al-Attas Johor in 1914 and Madrasa al-Attas Pahang in 1923.49
Syed Hassan visited Cairo in 1924 to find qualified teachers to teach in his
schools. Meeting some senior Malay students, he found their circumstances far
from satisfactory. In making efforts to help them, he came to learn that there
had been a waqf specially donated by a wealthy Egyptian for the sake of jāwı̄
students; the purpose of the waqf had, however, been forgotten over time, and
it had eventually turned into a general waqf. On discovering this, Syed Hassan
met with several well-known Egyptian ʿulama, such as Muhammad Jawhari
al-Tantawi, in order to find a means to use the waqf to help jāwı̄ students. With
the help of these famous ʿulama, Syed Hassan had a meeting with the Minister
of Waqf and Prime Minister Saad Zaghlul to address the problem, as well as to
ask for funds to send teachers to Malaya. After the discussion, the ministers
decided to appoint a committee (lajnah), consisting of various ʿulama as well
as Syed Hassan, to take care of the matter. The committee also pledged that,
instead of sending Egyptian ʿulama to Malaya, they would educate Malay students in Egypt to a sufficient level for them to meet the requirements for teaching in Syed Hassan’s madrasa. Thus, they agreed to make efforts to improve the
situation of Malay students both in their daily lives and with respect to their
studies. Syed Hassan had rented a house to accommodate about ten Malay
students who had been living in the dormitory (riwāq) at al-Azhar, but its condition was not satisfactory. With the help of the committee, they were not only
provided with accommodation, but teachers also came to give special lectures
in their new abode.50
This active support provided by al-Azhar corresponded with the general
policy of that time for promoting the university’s influence all over the Islamic
world. In the 1920s, the Egyptian government and al-Azhar had agreed upon
the gradual increase of the al-Azhar budget and to increase the number of foreign students.51 In fact, the committee that had discussed the matter of the jāwı̄
students had been established as one of the branches under the “committee for
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Eastern students”.52 Under these circumstances, the Malay students were able to
prepare the basic facilities which would be expanded upon by later generations.
Nevertheless, the support they received from Egyptian sources was not sufficient, and the students and the committee repeatedly called for donations from
their homeland.53 It was during this period that the customs were established of
Malay students living together in the hostel and having tutorial studies there in
addition to their formal classes.

Study in al-Azhar in the mid-twentieth century
The number of Malay students at al-Azhar continued to increase, albeit gradually, until the end of the 1960s.54 The experience of studying at al-Azhar in
the mid-twentieth century was strongly related to the development of a modern
education system in Malaya in the 1950s. One of the most important events was
the establishment of the first university, the University of Malaya, in Singapore
in 1949. The main language of secondary and higher education in Malaya had
been English, and thus the educational opportunities for Malay Muslims were
still limited.55 It was not until 1963 that a government Malay secondary school
opened. Despite the limited opportunities for Muslims,56 the establishment of a
university in their homeland motivated Islamic leaders and religious students to
seek higher education in Islamic knowledge. This was the prime motivation for
those students who studied at al-Azhar from the 1940s to the 1960s. Religious
secondary schools, and local institutions of Islamic higher education, such as
Kolej Islam Klang and al-Azhar, played an important role in providing Muslim
students with alternative opportunities for higher education.
The Malay students who had left their homeland by the 1960s had various
routes by which they might reach al-Azhar. The most celebrated path to al-Azhar
was through Kolej Islam Klang. This school was only for the best students from
religious schools in Malaya. Most of the students who studied at al-Azhar in the
1960s and 1970s obtained positions in local universities, government offices or,
at the very least, as religious teachers in government secondary schools, and it
was not uncommon for them to be offered scholarships for further studies at
Western universities in order to obtain master’s degrees and doctorates.
Abdul Hamid Othman (1939–2011) was an example of an al-Azhar graduate
who played a key role in the Islamisation policy of the Mahathir government.57
He was born to a poor family in rural Kedah and finished his elementary education in a government elementary school. His circumstances did not allow
him to proceed to the government secondary school, and thus his only option
was to study in a religious school in Kedah. When he finished his fourth year
at that school, he moved to a more famous religious school in Perak and then
entered Kolej Islam Malaya, which had opened in 1955. He arrived at al-Azhar
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in 1961 and studied in the Faculty of Shariʿa until 1965. Upon his return to
Malaya, he was first offered a teaching position at Kolej Islam and then at the
National University of Malaysia – the latter having been established in 1971 as
the second university in Malaysia that had a department of Islam. He was also
appointed to teach in the first Islamic teacher’s college when it was opened in
1975. This was during an intense period in the establishment of Islamic higher
education in Malaysia. During this time, he began to be consulted by Mahathir,
then minister of education, on religious matters, and this was the beginning
of his life-long relationship with Mahathir, who served as prime minister from
1981 to 2003. Abdul Hamid was appointed to lead various government departments on religion, such as the Department of Islamic and Moral Education
in the Ministry of Education, and the Religious Matters Section of the Prime
Minister’s Office, which was later upgraded into a department due to his efforts.
Abdul Hamid’s career studying in religious schools and at al-Azhar in the 1960s
thus allowed him to become a pioneer in the expansion of Islamic education and
administration.
Razali Nawawi, three years younger than Abdul Hamid Othman, made a
different kind of contribution to the development of the Islamic movement
in Malaysia, although he had a similar trajectory from religious schools to
al-Azhar.58 Born in 1942, in a peasant family of Kelantan, Razali was sent to the
government Malay elementary school. Despite his good results and interest in
English and science, his father did not allow him to go to the English secondary
school because he believed it educated children to be unbelievers (kāfir). He was
sent to a religious school and then continued his studies at Kolej Islam Malaya.
After achieving a bachelor’s degree there, he was sent to al-Azhar for his master’s degree in 1964. He received a scholarship from the Kelantan government, which was sufficient to fund part of his subsequent travels. Since study at
al-Azhar was “only for the degree” and he could not learn anything for spiritual
improvement there, he wished to leave Egypt as soon as possible. He never made
contact with Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which was
banned and strictly monitored by the Egyptian government. Moreover, he was
reluctant even to interact with Egyptians in general. The majority of Malaysian
students were afraid of the secret police who regularly monitored students’
activities.
When he achieved a master’s degree from al-Azhar – with an additional
diploma of education from Ein Shams University – he decided to move to
England. It had long been his desire to study English in order “to be rich”,
because of the hardships of his impoverished childhood. With his saved money
and newly achieved scholarship granted again by the government of Kelantan,
he studied English for a year in London, and then took a course for the diploma
in law at the University of London. He then moved to Birmingham University
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for a Master of Comparative Law degree, and returned to Malaysia to be a lecturer in the Faculty of Islam at the National University of Malaysia.
It was in England that he discovered the international Islamic movements
such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaʿat-i-Islami through their books
and activities. In London, he began to organise small discussion groups, called
usrah (family), and formed an association of Malaysian Muslim students. This
experience involved him in the establishment of the Malaysian Muslim Youth
Association (ABIM), and he became its first president in 1972. Under the
leadership of Anwar Ibrahim during the 1970s, ABIM became the largest and
most influential organisation in Malaysia. Anwar Ibrahim joined Mahathir’s
government in 1981, and served in various ministerial positions, ultimately
as the deputy prime minister, until he was dismissed in 1999.59 Even though
he never served as a government officer, Razali Nawawi was one of Anwar’s
closest colleagues and was a member of many government committees related
to Islamisation policies. Razali Nawawi is one of the first generation of students
to have studied both at al-Azhar and at universities in the West. This would
become a typical career trajectory for Islamic academics in the 1980s and 1990s,
as Islamic higher education rapidly expanded in Malaysia.
These examples show that al-Azhar functioned as an alternative venue for
higher education, providing Malay students with the opportunity to achieve
higher social status. Prior to the early 1960s, it was only wealthy Malay children,
such as members of the royal family, who had the chance to study at foreign universities, but the existence of al-Azhar and the Malay support system provided
the opportunity for ordinary Malay students to study at a university as well.
Kolej Islam Malaya became a destination for excellent students from religious
schools who wished to secure their access to higher education. However, it was
not the only door to al-Azhar, and in the 1960s Malay students had other ways
to reach that university after their study in religious schools. One of the major
paths was via South Asia. Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, the supreme leader of the
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (1930–), was born in Kelantan and studied in local
pondoks before continuing his study in Darul Ulum Deoband in India from 1952
to 1957. He then moved to al-Azhar to major in Arabic as an undergraduate
and in Islamic law in his master’s course. He returned to his homeland in 1962
to teach in religious schools and soon emerged as a political leader.60 Nik Aziz’s
pattern of studying in South Asia before going to al-Azhar became a model for
students in the 1970s, partly due to their admiration of him.61
Indonesia was another destination for Malay students seeking Islamic higher
education. Ustaz R (pseudonym) served as a teacher of religion in government
secondary schools from 1977 until he retired in 1999.62 Born in Kedah in 1944,
he studied at a religious school in Kedah until he achieved the fourth-grade
certificate of secondary education (Shahadah Empat Thanawi). In 1969, he
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decided to continue his study at the al-Washliah University in Medan, Sumatra.
The religious school in Kedah had connections to other universities in Medina,
Egypt and Indonesia, but he chose Indonesia because it was cheaper, and offered
the additional advantage of allowing him to study in both Indonesian and
Arabic. After achieving the Bachelor of Shariʿa and Diploma of Education
in Medan in 1973, he was sent to al-Azhar by the university to be admitted
to the third year of undergraduate courses. Although there was a dormitory
for Malaysian students (riwāq), he did not stay there because he was married
to a Malaysian woman from the same university in Medan. His three years in
al-Azhar were filled mostly with intensive study. All the Malaysian students
were very close to each other, and he often attended tutorials conducted by
senior Malaysian students outside the formal lesson schedules. He also joined
the activities of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and took
part in some excursions during semester breaks that not many other Malaysians
joined.
He intended to continue his studies at al-Azhar in order to become a teacher,
believing this to be the ideal job to realise Islamic morals that stress the importance of sharing knowledge. As soon as he returned from al-Azhar, he was
employed as a teacher of religion in a government secondary school and served
in various locations around peninsular Malaysia until he retired to Kedah.
By the 1960s, the opportunities for Malaysian students to study at al-Azhar
had gradually expanded, thanks to such official supports as the preparatory
courses in Kolej Islam, scholarships and the student hostels in Cairo. In addition
to the official modes of support, foreign institutions for Islamic learning in countries such as Indonesia and India also provided other avenues through which to
prepare for study at al-Azhar. Students were returning with university degrees
that were still rare for Malaysian Muslims just at the moment when the structures for religious education and administration were expanding. The degrees
gave them higher social status and crucial roles in the Islamic resurgence and
Islamisation policies of the 1970s and 1980s.

Study in al-Azhar after its popularisation
The popularisation of study at al-Azhar began in the 1970s. One new phenomenon at this time was an increase in the number of female Malaysian students
studying there. Al-Azhar opened a women’s college in 1962, and in the 1970s
the number of female students rapidly increased.63 In the early 1970s, there were
some female graduates of al-Azhar who taught in famous religious schools such
as Maktab Mahmud in Kedah. The increasing number of female students is evidence of an improvement in the Malaysian students’ environment at al-Azhar,
including student hostels and associations.
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Rates of enrolment in religious schools in the early 1970s were generally
stagnant because of the rapid increase in educational opportunities for Muslim
students in the government school system; religious schools tended to become
an alternative for students who had failed in government schools. However, the
children of religious families, such as those of religious teachers, generally still
enrolled in religious schools even though some religious teachers themselves
preferred to send their children to government schools. One of the important
changes of this period was the increasing attainability of higher education.
By the late 1970s, going to college, whether religious or secular, had already
become an achievable dream for most Malay people. Study at al-Azhar was
now only one of a number of choices available for higher education, and was no
longer considered as special as it had been for the previous generation. Student
life was more relaxed, with an increasing number of students and an expansion
in the amount of support they were offered.
Badrulamin Baharum,64 one of the leaders of the People’s Justice Party
Malaysia (Keadilan), was among the al-Azhar students of this time. He was born
in 1961, the son of the imam of the masjid in Tawau, Sabah. He was an excellent
student in the religious school in Sabah and was thus sent to a famous religious
school in Selangor, and then to the Kolej Islam, where he received his certificate
in 1978. According to him, this certificate was more respected than the current
STAM, because it evidenced a level of skill in reading and speaking Arabic that
was sufficient for study at al-Azhar. He entered the Faculty of Shariʿa in 1979
along with eight friends. His student life had been supported by a scholarship
from the Sabah Foundation worth up to 10,000 RM a year. All the students from
Sabah received the same scholarship, while students from elsewhere received
scholarships from their respective states or the federal government.
Students in Cairo at that time could enjoy certain freedoms. The city of
Cairo tempted many of the Malaysian students to stay out and enjoy themselves
until the small hours; even for serious students, it was unusual to finish their
studies in four years. Badrulamin was one of the rare students who did finish
his course in four years and with good results. However, it was only in the first
year that he attended all his university classes, because attendance was not
obligatory. Once registered, students did not need to do anything other than
to sit the examinations – these examinations were difficult, but the students
could prepare themselves adequately by reading alone. In the third and fourth
year, Badrulamin taught other Malaysian students privately more often than he
attended his own classes. In fact, the first thing for new students to do was find
senior students who were good at teaching. Some of the more famous teachers,
including Badrulamin, retained their popularity upon their return to Malaysia.
Although his daily interactions were mostly with the Malaysian students, he
also joined in with some activities of the Indonesian Bugis students’ association,
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because his father was of Bugis origin. Generally, the Malaysian students were
more intimate with students from southern Thailand than with Indonesians;
they often held joint events such as soccer games and Thai boxing, but there
were no activities related to Islamic movements. Although the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia had begun in the early 1970s, its influence was still limited
to the Malaysian universities and urban high schools. Badrulamin had been
exposed to ABIM in Kolej Islam, where many of the students actively participated in the movement. Despite his interest in Islamic movements, he did not
have an opportunity to join any Malaysian or Egyptian movements in Egypt.
Only a few Malaysian students joined the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood,
although it was not rare for Malaysian students to attend the open lectures or
sermons by leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in mosques.
Badrulamin became actively involved in the Malaysian Islamic youth movement ABIM only after further study in Britain. Soon after his return to Malaysia,
he was employed as a lecturer at the newly established International Islamic
University Malaysia. He was sent by the university to continue his master’s and
doctorate courses in the United Kingdom, and worked as an associate professor
in the International Islamic University until 1999. Since he resigned from the
university as a result of a political dispute, he has worked as a “free preacher”
who teaches in places such as prayer houses and offices, and also as a politician of
the opposition party Keadilan. A “free preacher” is someone who teaches upon
invitation without official association with any institution; thus, the authority
of a free preacher is based only upon his speaking ability, character and religious
knowledge. To be a graduate of al-Azhar is important in achieving this level of
authority.
In the 1980s, the Malaysian students at al-Azhar numbered in the thousands.
A wide range of factors motivated these students to study at al-Azhar, including
becoming teachers of religion, following the model of Islamic leaders in the
Islamic movements or Islamic party, curiosity about life in a foreign country,
and, above all, an appetite for religious knowledge. By this point, it was not
only the preparatory courses such as Kolej Islam that were issuing certificates
for al-Azhar, but also the independent religious schools. In 1977, for example,
Madrasa an-Nahdhah, in Kedah, became one of the first independent religious
schools to establish an agreement with al-Azhar University for their certificate
to be recognised, with the first student entering al-Azhar with this certificate in
1979.
The graduates of al-Azhar in the 1980s and the early 1990s did not have
difficulty finding work. The religious schools were in need of teachers to meet
the rapid increase in students. This is clear from the fact that many Indonesian
graduates of al-Azhar and other higher Islamic institutions had been employed
in these schools in the 1980s. One of the Indonesian teachers, for instance,
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who is still teaching in a religious school in Kedah, graduated from al-Azhar in
1982. While at al-Azhar, he made friends with Malaysian students from Kedah
and after graduation was asked to teach in a religious school there. Although
there were eight Indonesian religious teachers when he started teaching in his
current school in 1989, currently only two remain because most such teachers in
Malaysia worked on a ten-year contract. As the increasing number of Malaysian
graduates filled the teaching positions in the 1990s, they went home.65
The introduction of the Maʾahad Buʾuth curriculum and new standardised
examinations at state level in 1994 made it easier for students to continue their
study at al-Azhar. The support system for student life in Egypt was improved by
each state government as well. In addition to the federal student association,
the Malay Association of the Arab Republic of Egypt (PMRAM), the student
association of each state was officially recognised and provided with a budget
from the state government. The students’ hostel was also expanded and rebuilt
by the state governments to accommodate the increasing number of students.66
Government officers were sent by both federal and state governments to take
care of their students, and, in addition to this official support and protection,
the news from seniors and friends who were already studying at al-Azhar motivated junior students who were still in religious schools to study there. Today,
most of the candidates for study at al-Azhar already have close friends, siblings
or cousins there who provide them with information and will help them when
they arrive.
However, this popularisation inevitably also provided opportunities for students with lower levels of ability to study at al-Azhar. Although the achievements of Malay students in al-Azhar had not been a problem for the earliest
generations, this rapid increase of students now caused new problems, including
a large number of failing students. Moreover, by the end of the 1990s, the positions for religious teachers or officers had already been filled by graduates of
al-Azhar and domestic higher education institutions; in the 2000s, therefore,
unemployment became visible among al-Azhar graduates, and especially so after
the withdrawal of financial assistance to religious schools. While the unemployment of university graduates in general emerged as a serious problem in the same
period, the unemployment of al-Azhar graduates was linked to unique factors
such as competition with graduates of local universities and the decrease in the
number of religious schools.
The story of one couple from Kedah, who studied together at al-Azhar beginning in 1998, is illustrative of the problem. The couple were married in Egypt,
and the wife finished her studies in five years; the husband, however, was unable
to pass one of his subjects and so extended his study until the eighth year.
While waiting, the wife opened small Malaysian restaurants to earn a livelihood.
Finally, the husband gave up and the family returned to Malaysia in 2005. They
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looked for employment in religious secondary schools, but could not find work:
most of the schools were hurt by the decreasing number of students and were
being forced to fire teachers. While looking for jobs as teachers, they opened a
home Qurʾanic school to meet the minimum needs of a humble life.
The introduction of a programme called J-Qaf in government primary schools
helped many such unemployed graduates of al-Azhar. It was initiated by the
new prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, who replaced Mahathir in 2003. The
J-Qaf programme was a new arrangement for Islamic education in government
schools, with a focus on jawi (Malay language written in Arabic script), Qurʾan
study, Arabic and fardu ain (basic knowledge of Islam that is obligatory for
everybody). When the Ministry of Education employed new teachers for this
programme, the graduates of al-Azhar and other universities in Arab countries
were given priority in order to improve the teaching of Arabic. Many of the
unemployed graduates took advantage of this opportunity.
Since popularisation, graduating from al-Azhar no longer entails privilege.
However, it remains important to have studied at al-Azhar if one wishes to be
recognised as a religious authority. For example, the teachers of senior classes at
religious schools that follow the al-Azhar curriculum should still be graduates of
al-Azhar or other famous Arab universities. Nevertheless, because of the popularisation of higher education in Malaysia, in many cases the bachelor’s degree
from al-Azhar is no longer enough. Since it is rare for Malaysian students at
al-Azhar to continue their studies in the graduate schools of al-Azhar, those who
seek higher education degrees normally enter master’s courses in other universities in Malaysia or abroad. Today, a majority of the graduates of al-Azhar who
are working as academics, senior officers, famous preachers or political leaders
hold qualifications higher than the master’s degree.
Students’ experiences of al-Azhar, and indeed the meaning of studying there,
have both changed in accord with the Azharisation of religious schools in
Malaysia and the popularisation of study at al-Azhar. Al-Azhar is no longer the
exclusive choice for higher Islamic learning, and the university’s graduates are
no longer celebrated as people with special knowledge. However, al-Azhar still
attracts a large number of Malaysian students, not only because of the accessibility and official support they are provided, but also because it represents the highest level of Islamic learning. Malaysian universities do provide various courses
in Islamic studies, but their students are rarely fluent in Arabic – though it must
also be noted that even the students at al-Azhar are not entirely fluent, since
they generally interact only with Malaysians. Some students who are serious
about studying Arabic choose Jordan, Syria or other Arab countries where there
are smaller numbers of Malaysian students. Nevertheless, al-Azhar remains a
destination for serious students because there they can look for opportunities to
study under famous shaykhs not only in the classroom, but also in the masjid and
— 211 —

S hap ing Globa l Islam ic Di s c o u r s es
elsewhere. The combination of its reputation as the highest centre for Islamic
learning and the accessibility and availability of support contributes to the flow
of Malaysian students to al-Azhar today.

Conclusion: The Result of “Azharisation”
By the late twentieth century, Malaysian students had become the largest group
of foreign students at al-Azhar. This increase was both the cause and the result
of the “Azharisation” of ʿulama training in Malaysia. The development of
al-Azhar into a modern religious institution, on the one hand, and the lack of
educational opportunities for Muslims in Malaya, on the other, had contributed
to the development of the al-Azhar-based religious education system in Malaya.
Al-Azhar began to attract students from Malaya in the early twentieth century,
and some returnees from al-Azhar established modern Islamic schools that took
al-Azhar as their model. These modern religious schools provided alternatives
for Muslim students in Malaya whose educational opportunities were restricted;
al-Azhar was the only chance for most of them to obtain a higher degree.
The development of the al-Azhar-based religious school system, together with
financial and material support, motivated students to study at al-Azhar. The
al-Azhar-based religious school curriculum was established as the standardised
examination system, first at state level and then at federal level. The religious
secondary schools, which had almost exclusive responsibility for the basic training of ʿulama in Malaysia, were completely “Azharised” with the official adoption of the curriculum and examination system.
The Azharisation of religious secondary schools transformed the careers of
the graduates of al-Azhar, and resulted in a marked change in the impact they
could have on their return from Egypt. The returnees from al-Azhar in the early
twentieth century played key roles as the founders and higher officers of religious
schools. When the Islamic institutions for higher education were established in
the 1970s, the graduates of al-Azhar were employed as the first generation of
professors. The graduates of the 1980s and early 1990s did not have to worry
about future jobs because of the many positions as teachers of religion or other
officers that became available as a result of the Islamisation policy. However,
the supply of al-Azhar graduates surpassed demand in the late 1990s, and in the
early years of the new millennium the returnees from al-Azhar began to face
difficulty in finding jobs.
As previous studies have emphasised, the returnees from al-Azhar did indeed
bring back new ideas and ideologies to their homeland in the early twentieth
century. However, the increased number of students did not result in religious
disputes or political instability. Rather, the students were sent out with the
support of state governments and state religious offices, and took advantage of
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the Islamisation policy on their return. Students at al-Azhar rarely had contact
with Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Although a small
portion of the student body was indeed close to the Muslim Brotherhood and
later played a role in the Islamic political movements active in Malaysia, few of
them imported any political ideas or Islamic movements directly from Egypt.
Rather, it was the Malaysian students who studied in Western universities and
joined international Islamic movements there who had a more direct impact on
the Islamic revival movements in Malaysia in the 1970s, as in the cases of Razali
Nawawi and Badrulamin Baharum above.
The Azharisation of ʿulama training had a great influence on the development of Islam in Malaysia. The immediate result was the establishment of a
standardised modern religious education system in Malaysia. In the beginning,
the importation of the al-Azhar curriculum was an independent initiative on
the part of the religious schools, but later this was promoted by state and federal
governments. This indirectly led to government control of the ʿulama. Indeed,
it is not unusual for the governments of Muslim-majority countries to integrate
the ʿulama training system into the national bureaucracy in order to place
ʿulama under government control. However, the unique characteristic of the
process of bureaucratisation in Malaysia was that it was facilitated by importing
the system of al-Azhar: in other words, Azharisation indirectly resulted in the
bureaucratisation and control of ʿulama in Malaysia.
The Azharisation of the religious school curriculum resulted in the popularisation of study at al-Azhar. Together with the increasing level of official support,
this made studying at al-Azhar easier and more accessible. This increase in the
number of students inevitably entailed an increase in the number of failed students. In addition to the general deterioration in student quality, the expansion
of domestic institutions for Islamic higher education resulted in the relative
depreciation of the value of the graduates of al-Azhar in Malaysia. As one of
the officers in the Malaysia Department of Islamic Development commented,
until the early 1980s the graduates of al-Azhar had been distinguished with the
title ustaz (male teacher of religion), while the graduates of local Islamic departments were called encik (general title for male); but now there is no distinction
between the two, and ustaz (fem. ustazah) is used for anyone who has been
educated at a religious school to at least secondary level.
Al-Azhar has significantly influenced ʿulama training in Malaysia. However,
the ideological and political influence was not as significant as previous studies
have assumed. This influence was limited to the early twentieth century and the
1980s. The more important, and long-term, influence was exerted through its
institutional aspects. It was al-Azhar itself, as the model of a modern religious
school system and an alternative destination for higher education, that resulted
in the Azharisation of ʿulama training in Malaysia. Although the value of
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al-Azhar as an alternative higher education institution has declined with the
expansion of higher education in Malaysia, the al-Azhar-based religious secondary school system still functions as an almost exclusive institution for preparing
students to major in Islamic studies at universities both locally and abroad. The
influence of al-Azhar as an institutional model, especially at the secondary level,
has remained undimmed, even when higher religious education in Malaysia was
taken over by local universities.
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